In the coming few decades, the world is facing three related problems.

First, agriculture contributes to climate change to a considerable extent. In its Fifth Assessment Report, the IPCC's Working Group III concludes that the AFOLU sector (agriculture, forestry and other land use) is responsible for just under a quarter (∼10 – 12 GtCO2eq/yr) of anthropogenic GHG emissions. Usually, a distinction is made between non-CO2 emissions, in particular methane (NH4) emitted by livestock and rice cultivation, and nitrous oxide (N2O) caused by the use of synthetic fertilizers and the application of manure on soils and pasture. Methane and Nitrous oxide have 25 times and 300 times stronger impact on the climate than CO2 respectively. CO2 emissions from agriculture are mainly caused by deforestation and peatland drainage. Emissions from agriculture have been rising on a yearly basis since 1990, although with important regional differences (they went down in Europe and up in Asia).

Risk management and oversight have long been recognized as core corporate governance issues and have gained renewed attention in the wake of the financial crisis. Recent corporate governance reforms in China follow these global trends. This article is the first to examine the intersections between corporate governance and risk regulation in China from a comparative perspective. It surveys corporate governance tools that have been adopted by Chinese regulators and firms to motivate effective risk oversight and risk management across the corporate enterprise, focusing on China's regulation of internal controls and risk management systems. These internal mechanisms are particularly important given the widely recognized limits of external monitoring and enforcement mechanisms in China.

This article observes that recent guidelines on enterprise risk management (ERM) and internal controls reflect international corporate governance standards and that China adopts a broad perspective on risk oversight that extends to both financial and non-financial risks. China's adoption of international models offers a new opportunity to reexamine longstanding debates on the potential for global corporate governance convergence. This article argues that China has adopted a regulatory approach to internal risk oversight and management that is consistent with its historical law reform trajectory, the reality of China's state-dominated equity markets, and the continued influence of the state on firm management. Its conclusions support the literature on the path dependency of corporate governance systems and prior comparative studies of corporate governance in China that find convergence of form but divergence of function.

This paper suggests how the regulation of Solar RadiationManagement (SRM) field research in Europe could be designed to maximise the possibility of securing legitimacy. It argues that legitimacy is maximised when regulatory frameworks are legal, and also responsive, flexible, deliberative and inclusive. By adopting an ‘incorporated’ approach to assessing the risk of Solar Radiation Management (SRM) field research, the EU can import elements of ‘directly deliberative polyarchy’ into its otherwise orthodox constitutional regulatory approach thereby maximising legitimacy. The argument is new in so far as it juxtaposes two conceptions of procedural legitimacy – one institutional and the other functional – in the context of significant scientific uncertainty in the technocratic regulatory paradigm of the EU. The significance of the work is that it draws on these conceptions of legitimacy to advance a pragmatic model of institutional design which comprises procedures that maximise legitimacy with minimal disruption to the EU's institutional balance of powers.

This article looks at the different regulatory approaches on food irradiation, starting with international standards on food irradiation, describing the approach in the US and other third countries, and finally in the EU, where there has been a regulatory standstill since 1999. The current EU approach on food irradiation, which authorises irradiation of certain predefined product categories and sets upper dose limits, does not appear to be in line with the approach used under the relevant internationally-recognised standards, such as the Codex Alimentarius and the International Plant Protection Convention. There are potential legal conflicts between the current regulatory framework on food irradiation in the EU and the international trade framework of the World Trade Organization. Ultimately, the EU must base its measures on scientific principles, on relevant international standards, and choose the least trade-distortive measures that are available (i.e., ensure that they are applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health). In 2011, the European Food Safety Authority published new risk assessments on food irradiation, which the European Commission has requested in view of drafting new EU legislation on food irradiation, and which appear to open the way for a fundamental altering of the regulatory parameters (such that food irradiation regulations must be scientifically-justified and in line with the relevant international standards), and seem to weaken the EU stance vis-à-vis the possible instances where the current rules on food irradiation prevent (de jure or de facto) access to the EU market by third countries’ operators and products, particularly those of developing countries.

For many years, the EU's legislation on animal testing and marketing bans regarding cosmetic products and their ingredients has been giving rise to controversy. First, the bans were introduced under the regime of the Cosmetics Directive, which was subsequently replaced by Regulation (EC) No. 1223/2009 on cosmetic products (hereinafter “EU Cosmetics Regulation”). In this process, the animal testing and marketing bans of Article 4a of the Cosmetics Directive were transferred – with identical content and largely with the same wording – to Article 18 of the EU Cosmetics Regulation, so that the legal issues connected with the bans have basically remained the same. Since the transitional periods for the application of the bans ended on 11 March 2009 and 11 March 2013 (for details, see Article 18(2) of EU Cosmetics Regulation), and the bans as provided by Article 18(1) of the EU Cosmetics Regulation are binding and directly applicable in the EU Member States, they must be observed by the affected businesses as of now. Violations are to be sanctioned in the Member States in an effective, proportionate and dissuasive manner (Article 37 of EU Cosmetics Regulation).

Counter-terrorist sanctions against private individuals adopted by the EU and by the UN are an exceptionally illustrative example of the executive’s power grasp, where the dangers of counter-terrorist policies and of externalized rulemaking have mutually reinforced each other. This article (re-)considers the role of the judiciary in the face of extreme exercise of externalized executive powers, demonstrates that multilayered governance has extended the powers of courts, shows that the justified exercise of judicial power has led the EU institutions and the Member States into a self-inflicted catch-22, and makes an argument that the extended powers of the executive and of the judiciary should be contained and guided by a principled choice of the constituent power. Constitutional law should require the judiciary to take a substantive approach to multilayered governance that reflects the principle of separation of powers.

This section updates readers on the latest developments in pharmaceutical law, giving information on legislation and case law on various matters (such as clinical and pre-clinical trials, drug approval and marketing authorisation, the role of regulatory agencies) and providing analysis on how and to what extent they might affect health and security of the individual as well as in industry.

In Clean Tech Intellectual Property: Eco-marks, Green Patents, and Green Innovation, Eric Lane takes the position that clean tech intellectual property (IP), or green IP, differs from IP in other industries because green IP is characterized by several unique features of clean tech. These, according to Lane, include a diversity of technologies, the fact that clean tech borrows from and builds on prior periods of green technology R&D and technologies from other industries such as computers and semiconductors, and clean tech's promise of solutions to mitigate climate change and benefit the environment.

The process risk allocation is essential for effective PPP contracts, depending on the scope of defined tasks and responsibilities between the parties in their quest to deliver public services. However, risk in critical infrastructure is sui generis risk which could not be treated contractually and transferred by the public sector to the private sector or retained by the party to an arrangement which is suited best to borne such risks.

Risk in critical infrastructure, being either internal or external, is endemic to the relevant services andwhen critical infrastructure is delivered by public-private partnerships or owned by private actors, the treatment of such risk merits a third-party approach. Such third-party could be an industry in itself, such as insurance, re-insurance or hedge fund insurance bond finance, or a sector / industry approach which related to the owners/operators of the relevant infrastructure, by means of collective apportioning and mitigation of risks associated with the failure of providing services fromsuch infrastructure. The most innovative way of treating risk of critical infrastructure remains in the discretion of EU Member States, in the form of integrating costs related to risk assessment and security measurers to protect critical infrastructure into tariff arrangements of relevant services. In such manner, the enduser / consumer of services ensures and collectively insures their delivery against any type of risk which is not quantified and determined as part of corporate arrangements between the state and the private sector provider of services.

For more than 10 years, I have had the privilege of being Vice President of STOA, the European Parliament's Science and Technology Options Assessment arm. During that time, I have been part of the team that has refocused STOA towards the crucial role of monitoring trends in science and technology, commissioning research to examine the implications for policy makers, and organising events to disseminate results.

During the same period, my work as a legislator has made me more and more aware of the need to examine science and technological trends, in order to ensure that the legislation that we amend and approve is truly “fit for purpose”. We are not afraid to recommend changes where we think that technological developments will make suggested provisions redundant or ineffective. To give a recent example, in our review of the Directive on Consumer Rights, we insisted on including new provisions to safeguard consumers buying faulty digital products or services. These were not included in the original text, but were subsequently agreed by the Member States and the European Commission.

The transfer of climate-friendly technologies from developed countries to developing countries has been identified in international forums as a key factor in efforts to mitigate climate change. Commentators and negotiators have argued, however, that efforts to transfer climate-friendly technologies from developed countries to developing countries have fallen far short of what is needed. Although a host of barriers play a role in the pace of transfer of clean technologies, such as lack of financial resources, inadequate infrastructure, trade barriers, and lack of skilled workers to name a few, intellectual property rights (IPRs) have been accused of being a particularly significant barrier. Developing countries have made strong proposals to severely curtail IPRs on clean technologies, particularly patent rights. These proposals present potential threats to patent rights on clean technologies in developing countries and include expanded compulsory licensing, excluding clean technologies from patenting, and revoking existing patent rights on clean technologies in developing countries. The motivation for such proposals stem largely from theoretical considerations, when, in fact, recent studies provide evidence that patent rights are not a barrier to the transfer of clean technologies to the developing world and, to the contrary, are more likely facilitating the diffusion of clean technologies in developing countries.

Technological advances in the quality, availability and linkage potential of health data for research make the need to develop robust and effective information governance mechanisms more pressing than ever before; they also lead us to question the utility of governance devices used hitherto such as consent and anonymisation. This article assesses and advocates a principles–based approach, contrasting this with traditional rule–based approaches, and proposes a model of principled proportionate governance. It is suggested that the approach not only serves as the basis for good governance in contemporary data linkage but also that it provides a platform to assess legal reforms such as the draft Data Protection Regulation.