As parliamentarians it is our job to represent the people of Europe and to make laws that are in the people's best interest. This sounds simple at a first glance, but it is not as simple when you think about it twice. A law might be in the interest of the people now, because it has known positive effects in the short term. But sometimes the very same law might bear a risk in the long-term, especially for future generations, and sometimes we can't even tell yet how big that risk is. If we would follow a short-sighted approach which only aims at the expected positive effects without taking into account actual and potential adverse effects that might occur in the future, we would act irresponsibly towards the generations of our children and grandchildren. That is why risk governance and the precautionary principle rightfully play a major role in the daily work of the legislator.

The aim of this paper is to recognize and discuss the inherent risks associated with Internet regulation and control over digital content. The key point of this analysis is that Internet regulation can present human rights risks. In particular, the paper examines how restrictions over Internet content are posing regulatory issues directly related to the growing importance of an equitable access to digital information. It also considers the relevance and impact of computer–mediated communication, its potential on democratization of freedom of expression and the problem of conflicting rights. Drawing upon comparative and case study material, the paper finally discusses and investigates the potential risks and vulnerabilities related to communication technologies focusing on legislative reforms in the area of digital communications and their implications for fundamental freedoms.

According to the principle of risk analysis established by Regulation 178/2002, food safety measures in the EU and Member States must be based on scientific risk assessment. Apart from science, however, decision makers should take into account other legitimate factors, such as societal, ethical or traditional concerns. The extent to which risk managers can deviate from scientific evaluations in considering these factors depends on how much discretion is conferred on public authorities. This article compares the discretion at both national and Union levels of food safety regulation in the context of the internal market mechanism by analysing the standard review applied to food safety measures by the European judiciary.

In a hot, flat, hyper–connected world, public perception of risk may determine if agriculture will save the planet by 2050 or destroy it. Science and technology options may hold the key to solving the situation, but, if media experience with “pink slime” and raw milk are any indication, society may be in for a bumpy ride. This article will examine global trends in food and agriculture, the interplay between food safety and public perceptions of risk, and the role of risk communication in addressing public perceptions.

Rarely has international law been investigated from a Business to Agency (B2A) or even Agency to Agency (A2A) perspective. In recent years, the “mushrooming” of agencies at European level has triggered the importance of looking more closely into the relationship of the agencies towards each other. Is there a struggle over competences and regulatory objects, and would such competition lead to desirable outcomes? In this paper I will first show that, due to the historical development of administrative law in Europe and the USA, the perception of the desirability of agency competition differs. I will then contrast these findings with EU pharmaceutical law and show that it tends to avoid competition. Also, in practice, competition among agencies is still exceptional for European pharmaceutical regulation. Finally, I conclude these findings and hint at the limits of the desired process for further coherence. Although a move towards even greater convergence in European risk regulation is desirable, it does have its limits set by the principle of conferral in Article 5 (1, 2) EU read in conjunction with the areas of shared competence and the competence to support, coordinate and supplement.

At a time of increasing recognition worldwide of the role of Chief Science Advisers as of critical importance in improving dialogue between science and policy, the European Union, notably the European Commission, is currently considering – under the pressure of civil society organisations – whether to maintain or scrap this recently–created position. After contextualizing this debate within the broader efforts undertaken by the Barroso Commission to strengthen science in EU policymaking, this article discusses what role, if any, a Chief Scientist may play within the EU systemof scientific advice. After denouncing the lack of a public debate about the merits of this post at the time of its creation, the article takes as a point of departure the criticisms made against this position and assesses them in the light of the mandate entrusted to the Chief Scientist Advisor. It argues that the major point of disagreement on this post revolves around the question of whether the Chief Scientist Advisor, as it currently stands, helps or hinders the EU incorporating the ‘best science’ into policy. After identifying the flaws of the actual mandate and the challenges faced by the first holder of the position, it argues that the burden of proof rests with the EU Commission to prove the merits, and more specifically, the rationale for having yet another source of scientific advice in the EU.

This report evaluates the current regulatory regime for health claims in the EU on the basis of a case study of the marketing of Optimel Control, a yoghurt drink which was marketed in several EU member states as a functional food aimed at suppressing appetite and maintaining weight control. Our case study of the marketing of Optimel Control in the Netherlands reveals that the use of non-textual marketing claims was much more important than the use of textual health claims. Because the current EU regulatory regime emphasizes the evaluation of the wording of health claims, but lacks an evaluation of non-textual claims we conclude that there is a regulatory void that producers can use to market their products in ways that suggest more health effects than scientifi cally warranted. As a result the protective effect of the current EU regulatory regime on health claims is less strong than what legislators may have intended. While it might seem most logical to simply expand EFSA's remit by also letting it look at non-textual claims, we argue that a better solution to close this gap is through a stricter monitoring of unfair commercial practices at national level.

On 22 April 2015 the European Commission published a review of the current GMO legislation (the GM Review) and tabled a proposal for its amendment (the GM Proposal). The GM Proposal aims to allow to the member states to ban on their territory the use of GMOs authorised under the EU legislation. This is very similar to the possibility for opting out from cultivation of authorised GMOs which was finally adopted earlier this year. While this may look like a new trend, all the more interesting in the context of possible Brexit, Grexit and Danish opt-out from the provisions on Justice and Home Affairs, the present article will focus only on the GM Review, which essentially admits that the existing GMO regime is a failure.

Private liability can potentially play a crucial role in protecting critical infrastructure. Traditional liability rules will especially play their deterrent and therefore preventive effect in the case of so-called man-made “technological” disasters. By using a strict liability role and by providing solvency guarantees potential tort-feasors can be provided with incentives to take optimal preventivemeasures.However, the case of nuclear accidents, addressed inmore detail, makes clear that in practice those efficient liability rules that would be needed to generate this preventive effect are often not implemented at the legislative level. The legislator rather imposes financial limits on liability and provides for public funding, thus effectively granting a subsidy to operators. Those type of inefficient rules laid down in international conventions are obviously often the result of interest group politics.

As far as natural disasters are concerned liability rules can play less of a role given the fact that those are considered an “act of God”. One could then only consider public authority liability.However, this is not often accepted in practice and there may also be theoretical reasons to be careful with the imposition of public authority liability. Public authorities are multitask agents which need a substantial amount of discretion. That explains that many legal systems award (partial) immunity from liability to public authorities. This leads generally to the conclusion that although liability rules can play a role in the protection of critical infrastructure those rules may have important limits as well. As a result the primary instrument to protect critical infrastructure will in practice often be safety regulation rather than liability rules.

Since first embarking on the road of risk management options for the regulation of recombinant DNA (rDNA) activities and use in 1978, the European Union (EU) has largely failed to create a regulatory and policy environment regarding genetically modified (GM) crops and their cultivation that is (a) efficient, (b) predicable, (c) accountable, (d) durable or (e) interjurisdictionally aligned.

This study focuses on the role of the discount rate in cost–benefit analysis (CBA) of regulation, providing a systematic investigation into regulatory practice vis–à–vis the existing economic theories. In the first part, a quick survey of the main economic literature on the social discount rate (SDR) is presented. In the second part, the current institutional practice is investigated, firstly comparing the recommendations on discounting issued by institutional actors in the US (Office of Management Budget, Environmental Protection Agency) and the EU (Commission), and secondly examining the SDRs adopted in two samples of CBAs selected among Regulatory Impact Analyses of US EPA and Impact Assessments of EU Directorate–General for the Environment. A gap exists between economic theory and institutional practice in the selection of the SDR. Regulatory decisions which are based on CBA reflect the most workable economic literature on discounting rather than the most theoretically consistent one, thus yielding less reliable and less robust results. Scholars who aim at improving the quality of rule–making and at fostering the application of CBA in regulatory decisions should improve the “operational validity” of their research, thus providing practitioners with methods that are both consistent and workable.