The expression “risk regulation” conveys the idea of normalisation of the way in which the State deals with the problems raised by risk, through rules, institutions and procedures set up to either prevent risk or manage it once it materialises. It must be conceded, however, that there is a tension between risk regulation (understood as a means of bringing risk under control) and the fact that the emergence of new risks has persistently caused turmoil. For this reason, risk is proving to be a serious test of the State's ability to pursue the public interest when dealing with issues which are characteristically complex, both technically and socially.

The European Union has responded to the BSE and GMO crises by developing a truly European risk regulation system which has been a major driver of legal and institutional reform. Implementation has been far from homogeneous across the Member States, however, my premise being that the objective of normalisation has met perhaps unexpected obstacles in Southern European countries like Portugal, raising the question of the kind of local conditions which may either favour or hinder Europeanisation processes. This paper discusses the topic based on the analysis of three case studies illustrating the way the Portuguese state has tackled environmental and public health risks, and the impact of EU law and policy on the whole question.

With respect to critical information and communication technologies (ICT), nations most often declare their national critical infrastructure to include telecommunication services and in some cases critical services offered by key Internet Service Providers (ISP). This paper debates whether nations, their policy-makers, legislation and regulation largely overlook and fail to properly govern the full set of ICT elements and services critical to the functioning of their nation. The related societal and economical risk, however, needs to be closely mitigated, managed and governed. Legal and regulatory obligations to increase the ICT resilience may sometimes encourage this process.

The environmental consequences of the increasing global seafood production and consumption are substantial and drive a search for providing more adequate governance responses. In recent years, market-based approaches to sustainable seafood governance have gained considerable traction. Born in part out of perceived failures of state-based regulations, a range of civil society-led governance approaches have emerged. Private seafood governance arrangements interact with public seafood regulations and this may lead to competition, collaboration or hybridity. This interaction should however not be assessed in general but more closely related to the different stages in the regulatory cycle: agenda setting/negotiation, implementation and monitoring/enforcement. Collaboration between public and private global seafood governance arrangements occurs primarily in the first phase of the regulatory cycle but gets much less prominent in later phases where competition or even separation prevails. Harmonization between public and private sustainable seafood governance arrangements in the near future is therefore unlikely.

Two inter–related themes provide the architecture of this better regulation package: the political tone of the initiative and the responsibility/blame game. The tone is in part the consequence of the political context surrounding regulatory policy in the EU. Whilst in the past regulatory quality standards interested only a few top civil servants and elected politicians, today there is much more political interest – and contestation, as shown by the new better regulation watchdog created by non-governmental organizations and their response to the package. The very fact that in May 2015 there was media interest in the leaked version of the chapeau communication is a novelty. Why so much attention? Among others, the rhetoric of the past few years on making the EU acquis fit for purpose and less burdensome, coupled with a growing recognition by stakeholders that impact assessment and policy evaluation are “here to stay” have turned better regulation into an additional window of opportunity for those wishing to influence EU policy–making.

Both the Lisbon Treaty and the new Inter-Institutional Agreement strengthen the role of the European Parliament (EP) as co-legislator. At the same time, European Union (EU) officials increasingly recognise the need for broader acceptance of the principles and agreements of the Better (Smart) Regulation strategy, as proposed in an October 2010 Commission Communication. There is a need to make high quality risk management decisions in a more risk averse environment and a changed policy framework. Indeed, principles supporting better regulation have become more widely adopted by all EU institutions, notably with the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) of the European Commission, which now screens all new proposals. Due to the broad diffusion of these principles, risk assessment techniques have become more widely understood. This trend is particularly salient in four areas of application: (1) the on-going debate between regulating by hazard and regulating by risk; (2) a better understanding of the nature of risk/risk trade-offs, (3) use of benefit/risk assessment, and (4) the Commission Communication regarding the precautionary principle.

Cross-border surrogacy transactions [CBST] entail several risks for the participants and the resulting child and, consequentially, for their states. In the absence of clear standards or coherent legal rules, the global industry depends on private contracts, the result of negotiations between parties from different countries with unequal bargaining power, which distributes risks and benefits unfairly. In this article I suggest a Fair Trade model as an instrument for the regulation of these transactions.

The Fair Trade model addresses market failures and the externalization of risks. The basic principles of Fair Trade include trading process according to proper standards of quality and ethics based on a certification mechanism, a minimum price to producers, direct purchasing, transparent rules and fair distribution. In addition to quality and ethics, Fair Trade is a developmental tool, ensuring more of the economic benefits to producers in the global south.

Applying these elements on the cross-border surrogacy market can be fruitful for the regulation of risks entailed in CBST. Certification of surrogacy services can ensure proper medical standards and fundamental rights, and decrease health risks; direct purchasing through democratically elected surrogates’ co-operatives could improve the surrogates’ power of negotiation and decrease contractual risks; a minimum price could guarantee a greater income to surrogates, and social premium could be used to fund communal projects and help surrogates to improve their social position. Finally, transparency can address administrative risks and ensure that children’s rights are not violated.

This article examines the issue of risk in research and development (R&D) pertaining to new pharmaceuticals, especially those aimed at neglected diseases and/ or relevant primarily to the developing world. In particular, the article considers the role of patent pools and other forms of non-proprietary models as alternatives to patents (and other types of intellectual property rights) in R&D for new pharmaceuticals. The article concludes that that these mechanisms still achieve very little output and can therefore not currently be considered as viable alternatives to the use of patents in pharmaceutical R&D. Another relevant finding is that many of the existing collaborative initiatives and partnerships for R&D in neglected diseases actually rely on different forms of intellectual property rights.

At the beginning of a pleasant summer week towards the end of July, Food Law professionals from all over the world travelled to the village of Cadenabbia on Lake Como in Italy in order to participate in the fourth edition of the Summer Academy on Global Food Law and Policy. The Academy, which has established its reputation as a high-level training and networking opportunity within the world of food law and policy, was presided by Associate Professor of Law at HEC Paris, Alberto Alemanno, and organised in cooperation with Lexxion, publisher of the European Journal of Risk Regulation (EJRR) and the European Food and Feed Law Review (EFFL).

On April 20, 2010, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) announced its judgment in a high-stakes environmental dispute between Argentina and Uruguay, concerning Uruguay's authorization for pulp mills on the banks of the Uruguay River, which forms the international boundary between the two countries.

This article critically reflects upon the introduction of behavioural, ‘nudging’ approaches into UK policy making, the latest in a series of regulatory innovations. Initiatives have focused particularly upon correcting lifestyle risk behaviours, marking a significant continuity with previous ‘nannying’ policy. On the other hand, nudging represents a departure, even inversion of previous approaches that involved the overstating of risk, being based partly upon establishing a norm that bad behaviours are less, rather than more common than supposed. Despite substantive similarities, its attraction lies in the reaction against the former approach but must also be understood in the context of the economic crisis and a diminished sense of liberty and autonomy that makes intimate managerial intervention seem unproblematic. Problems are, in fact, substantial, as nudging is caught between the utility of unconscious disguised direction and the need to allow some transparency, thereby choice. Further, it assumes clear, fixed ‘better outcomes’ but encourages no development of capacity to manage problems, contradicting a wider policy intent to build a more responsible and active citizenry. More practically, nudging faces considerable barriers to becoming a successfully implemented programme, in the context of severe, Conservativeled austerity with which it is now associated.