The scandal involving the Volkswagen group broke out last Fall, at the dawn of the very delicate UN Conference on Climate Change (COP21) held in Paris, and the posting of an unofficial version of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). This so, just when a leaked version Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) ran through the veins of the Internet and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was just about to be signed in New Zealand, fostering market integration by pushing further national treatment and mutual recognition, against the backdrop -albeit one small step at a time- of an increasing demand for environmental protection through the setting, among other regulation tools, of emission thresholds.

The environmental and health effects of nanomaterials represent significant emergingrisks. However, there is at present rather limited knowledge regarding the ways in which nanomaterials might be released from products and enter the environment or how they are transported and accumulate in ecosystems. Additional data is therefore needed to estimate the possible release of nanomaterials at various stages of the life- cycle to allow identification of potential pathways into the environment. Available tools for risk assessment of nanomaterials are reviewed with the aim of identifying unknowns and uncertainties and data requirements. To carry out risk assessment it is first necessary to determine where nanomaterials are likely to present hazards that are different from those of conventional chemicals and therefore where the challenges will be greatest. Some of the limitations of current risk assessment methodologies for nanomaterials are examined.

As its name suggests, the EJRR focuses on risk regulation by privileging a European perspective. This issue does not intend to depart from this characterizing feature of the journal. What would make it “special” then? The “specialty” has to be found in the type of risk which our authors deal with in their articles contributing to the symposium: the one posed by, and intrinsic to, financial markets, with a particular view to the recent (better said, current?) financial crisis.

Opponents of the transatlantic trade and investment partnership treaty (TTIP) fear that the EUmight lose the capacity to protect public health as it deems appropriate. The freedomto regulate would be jeopardized because TTIP would bind the EU to the United States’ regulatory interests, which are expressly or implicitly assumed to live up to a ‘lower’ standard than those in the EU. The ‘TTIP–leaks’ provide a good opportunity to examine the potential impact of the agreement on EU public health regulation. This brief contribution uses as its starting point the document “Tactical State of Play of the TTIP negotiations” (hereafter “Tactical Document”) of March 2016, and focuses on pharmaceuticals and medical devices. In light of the statements in this document, we query what would change for the EU consumer, and what would be the impact on the EU regulators’ role in protecting public health.

Standing is a particularly controversial aspect of EU law. In the Lisbon Treaty, a third head was added to Art 263(4) with the aim of liberalising standing for private litigants. This article examines the practical effects of those reforms, by reference to three cases – Bricmate, FESI and SolarWorld – where litigants sought to challenge anti–dumping measures directly before the EU courts. It concludes that the interpretation of the third head is highly unsatisfactory, both on its own terms and in light of the purpose of the third head. The EU Courts have deliberately restricted the third head of standing, to the extent of making it sometimes more difficult to satisfy than the second head. The article fleshes out a model in keeping with the purpose and text of the Lisbon reforms, and critically assesses the argument that the relaxation of standing rules would result in an unmanageable increase in the workload of the EU courts.

On 5 February 2016, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (hereinafter, NOAA),within the United States (hereinafter, US) Department of Commerce, published a Proposed Rule to create a seafood traceability programme. The programme intends to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (hereinafter, IUU) fishing, prevent fraudulent trade and to serve as the contribution of the US to the global action to combat IUU fishing, along the lines of other similar regulatory frameworks, such as the EU's extensive regulationon IUU fishing. However, despite the legitimate objectives of the measure, it is imperative that regulators take into account the potential consequences for international trade when designing such programmes.

Case C-354/13, Fag og Arbejde (FOA) v Kommunernes Landsforening (KL) [2014] (not yet reported)

There is no general principle under European Union law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of obesity in regard to employment and occupation. Obesity alone is not a disability but can constitute a disability where it is accompanied by a limitation resulting from long term physical, mental or psychological impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder the full and effective participation of the individual in professional life on an equal basis with other workers (official headnote).

In December 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued a preliminary ruling addressing, firstly, whether obesity is a protected ground of non–discrimination, and, secondly, whether obesity can amount to a disability. This piece begins with an introduction to the topic of obesity, followed by the facts of the case, the CJEU's judgment and a comment on the decision.

While there is now a large amount of social science research on scientific expertise, testimonies made by sociologists who themselves participated in scientific expertise on a controversial topic remain rare. It is this type of feedback and testimony that this paper will articulate and discuss. The aim is to propose a series of reflections on scientific expertise from a personal experience: the participation of the author as a sociologist in an expert committee set up by the former French Agency for the Safety of Health, the Environment and Work (AFSSET) on the topic of radio-frequencies. Several problematic aspects of scientific expertise will thus be discussed from this concrete experience: the problem of the composition of the expert group and the issue of conflict of interest, the way in which the work of expertise is organized within the group, the effects of the presence of an observer from an association, and the differences between scientific work and scientific expertise.

With the Communication on Smart Regulation issued in October 2010, the European Commissiontried to foster a better management of the whole policy cycle. According to thatCommunication, amending policy proposals must be preceded by an ex-post assessmentof the current situation, allowing “closing the policy cycle”. This paper tries to answer thequestion whether the EU Impact Assessments System is fit to steer and close the policy cycle,and what is the relation between ex-ante IA and ex-post evaluation “on the ground” so far. This is done via a macro and micro analysis, based on scorecard approach and three casestudies, comparing the EU IA system performance with a theoretical benchmark derived from the EU policy document and process. The paper concludes that the EU Impact Assessmentsystem, as it is currently designed and implemented, is not yet fi t to steer and closethe policy cycle. To achieve this goal, all the analytical and empirical layers of the policycycle should be fully dealt with since the ex-ante phase.

On 2 March 2010 the European Commission authorised the cultivation of a BASF's genetically modified potato “Amflora” throughout the European Union. This came after a tortuous process commenced in 1996 and so far it is the only authorisation of a GMO for cultivation in EU since the current regulation was established. On 3 March 2010, President Barroso announced that the Commission intends to propose amendments to the current regulation to allow the Member States to prohibit the cultivation of GMO authorised for cultivation in the EU and it did so on June 13, 2010. This is one of the very few cases where decision-making power is effectively devolved back from Union to state level; it is even more impressive that this is happening on the initiative of the Commission and despite the obvious negative consequences for the internal market. In the meantime BASF botched the 2011 growing season for Amflora in Sweden and in 2012 announced that it withdraws its GM crops from the EU. This article follows the saga purports to find the reasons why it entailed an immediate change.

This section updates readers on the latest developments in pharmaceutical law, giving information on legislation and case law on various matters (such as clinical and pre-clinical trials, drug approval and marketing authorisation, the role of regulatory agencies) and providing analysis on how and to what extent they might affect health and security of the individual as well as in industry.

The Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (the socalled ‘RASFF’) is at the heart of food risk management within the European Union. It aims at providing authorities with an effective tool for exchanging information on measures taken to ensure food safety. It was created in 2002 by the General Food Law Regulation to help Member States to coordinate their food safety actions. Nearly ten years later, the adoption of Regulation 16/2011 of 10 January 2011, laying down implementing measures for the RASFF, intends to clarify the specific conditions and procedures applicable to the transmission of notifications through this tool, thus providing more legal certainty in the system.

Case C350/12 P Council of the European Union v. Sophie in't Veld Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 3 July 2014

This article is a critical reflection on the manifoldness of the notion of “partnership” in Critical Infrastructure Protection. It is argued that the partnership arrangement can be a promising political approach to CIP if the details of public-private cooperation – that is: the participants, the duration, the responsibilities and duties, as well as possible financial compensation – are formalized. Illusionary ideas of a “partner-like” relationship between the public and the private, such as those laid down in the German “National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection”, are, however, doomed to fail. State authorities have to actively offer binding regulatory arrangements to private CI firms in order to establish which companies genuinely agree to cooperate – and which do not. Due to the state's constitutional obligation to guarantee national security and protect the life and health of its citizens, introducing legal requirements is the only possible reaction to a company's refusal to cooperate. In order to avoid overly intrusive market intervention, the state's offer to private firms or their industry associations to conclude binding regulatory contracts on CIP matters may serve as a promising compromise between a laissez-faire approach and regulation.