The target article forcefully reminds researchers of the context that research on prejudice faces. Dixon et al. expose a tendency in the field of intergroup research toward an appeasement approach to social conflict. Although we applaud their exposition, we find the comparison of the prejudice reduction and the collective action models lopsided. Considered in isolation, the latter also suffers from a lack of attention to the context in which social psychological research is conducted. Moreover, a framework for the relational view recommended by the authors is still missing. Let us focus on each point in turn.
Dixon et al.'s contribution targets the relation between social psychological research and the sociopolitical reality in which such research is embedded. They cogently diagnose a lack of awareness of such embeddedness for the prejudice reduction model. But the collective action model also relies on implicit assumptions, including the assumption that demands for social changes raised by disadvantaged groups are always legitimate. Dixon et al. adopt these decontextualized assumptions without considering the typically diverging perspectives of involved groups and third parties. But adopting these premises unintentionally legitimizes all kinds of mobilization for collective action and conflict escalation, including, for example, hate-preachers' support of religious fundamentalism.
However, the question of how to attain a more just society by resisting or supporting social change is not a psychological question to begin with. Hence, it cannot be answered by suggesting decontextualized psychological principles – neither general prejudice reduction nor general increase of mobilizing emotions.
Social change toward equality always acts within a context of shared, often controversial cultural understanding about what inequalities are legitimate in a certain domain. Decisions on the direction of social change should be the choice of the members of the studied groups as political agents, which possibly includes the researchers themselves. The task for researchers as researchers is what comes after that decision: the investigation of underlying processes. This is the second aspect we want to comment on: We believe that Dixon et al. do not go far enough in their proposal of paradigmatic change in intergroup research. Dixon et al. propose “recovering the relational character of intergroup attitudes” as one future direction (sect. 4.1.1), but translate this only into studying effects on both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. They do not attend to the psychological processes underlying the relational nature of intergroup attitudes and behavior as such.
So far, the focus of psychological research on intergroup relations has been attitudes toward, and representations of, the perceivers' own or other groups, and Dixon et al. adhere to that focus. To gain a common perspective for both social change models, it is necessary to analyze the psychological processes involved in the construction of social relations. In particular, we should study representations of, and attitudes toward, relations between own and other groups, including probable or desired alternatives to existing relations. To do so, we propose to use Relational Models Theory (RMT; Fiske Reference Fiske1992; Reference Fiske and Haslam2004).
RMT is a general theory of social relations positing that all social relations are coordinated by utilizing four basic relational structures supported by specific motives and emotions: (1) communal sharing, coordination of social interaction according to shared identity; (2) authority ranking, coordination according to linearly differentiated ranking of status and prerogatives; (3) equality matching, where the organizing principle is balanced one-to-one correspondence among participants; and (4) market pricing, governed by ratios (for example, of contributions and benefits).
The principles behind communal sharing and authority ranking elucidate problems of the prejudice reduction model identified by Dixon et al. The goals of prejudice reduction are increased liking, together with identification as a common ingroup; this constitutes coordination in terms of communal sharing. Advantaged groups might, however, coordinate according to authority ranking, which predicts paternal benevolence toward low-status relational partners and hostility toward those striving to overturn the rank order. A focus solely on prejudice reduction is problematic because it does not differentiate between liking based on communal sharing – on being the same – and paternalistic fondness for loyal subordinates. Furthermore, when disadvantaged groups comply with “superior” groups' benevolent offers to coordinate according to authority ranking, further efforts to advocate more fundamental change are compromised.
Applying RMT to intergroup relations provides a framework for the understanding of the cognition, emotion, motivation, and moral judgment underlying intergroup behavior. In order for RMT to model dynamic change appropriately, it can profit from integration with Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979; Waldzus & Fiske, in preparation), which can be considered an early integration of prejudice reduction and social change perspectives.
Conceptualizing desired or probable alternatives of intergroup relations through RMT does not require fixing in advance whether or how social relations should be changed. The parties involved in the intergroup relation must make the decisions, possibly including the researcher with her/his own political and ideological convictions and aspirations. For example, a disadvantaged group can have the goal to retain authority ranking in the relation to the advantaged group, but to gain more paternal treatment. It could also aim to retain the legitimacy of status differentiation while moving to a higher position, or, more radically, to reverse the status relations between the groups (i.e., revolution). Finally, it could have the goal to switch from authority ranking to an equality matching relation, in which resources and burdens are allocated according to principles of even balance and one-to-one correspondence among distinct groups with equal entitlements. Collective action movements could also include aspects of communal sharing (i.e., constituting a common essence) that are conducive to reconciliation. Similar considerations apply to intentions of advantaged groups and even third parties.
Dixon et al.'s comparison of prejudice reduction and collective action should be followed by integration at a new level. Investigating relational cognition will enable us to describe and predict psychological processes at work in the interaction between disadvantaged and advantaged groups. Such research can provide involved individuals and groups with conceptual tools to understand their own and others' actions and motivations – and to change their relationships by prejudice reduction, collective action, or otherwise.
The target article forcefully reminds researchers of the context that research on prejudice faces. Dixon et al. expose a tendency in the field of intergroup research toward an appeasement approach to social conflict. Although we applaud their exposition, we find the comparison of the prejudice reduction and the collective action models lopsided. Considered in isolation, the latter also suffers from a lack of attention to the context in which social psychological research is conducted. Moreover, a framework for the relational view recommended by the authors is still missing. Let us focus on each point in turn.
Dixon et al.'s contribution targets the relation between social psychological research and the sociopolitical reality in which such research is embedded. They cogently diagnose a lack of awareness of such embeddedness for the prejudice reduction model. But the collective action model also relies on implicit assumptions, including the assumption that demands for social changes raised by disadvantaged groups are always legitimate. Dixon et al. adopt these decontextualized assumptions without considering the typically diverging perspectives of involved groups and third parties. But adopting these premises unintentionally legitimizes all kinds of mobilization for collective action and conflict escalation, including, for example, hate-preachers' support of religious fundamentalism.
However, the question of how to attain a more just society by resisting or supporting social change is not a psychological question to begin with. Hence, it cannot be answered by suggesting decontextualized psychological principles – neither general prejudice reduction nor general increase of mobilizing emotions.
Social change toward equality always acts within a context of shared, often controversial cultural understanding about what inequalities are legitimate in a certain domain. Decisions on the direction of social change should be the choice of the members of the studied groups as political agents, which possibly includes the researchers themselves. The task for researchers as researchers is what comes after that decision: the investigation of underlying processes. This is the second aspect we want to comment on: We believe that Dixon et al. do not go far enough in their proposal of paradigmatic change in intergroup research. Dixon et al. propose “recovering the relational character of intergroup attitudes” as one future direction (sect. 4.1.1), but translate this only into studying effects on both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. They do not attend to the psychological processes underlying the relational nature of intergroup attitudes and behavior as such.
So far, the focus of psychological research on intergroup relations has been attitudes toward, and representations of, the perceivers' own or other groups, and Dixon et al. adhere to that focus. To gain a common perspective for both social change models, it is necessary to analyze the psychological processes involved in the construction of social relations. In particular, we should study representations of, and attitudes toward, relations between own and other groups, including probable or desired alternatives to existing relations. To do so, we propose to use Relational Models Theory (RMT; Fiske Reference Fiske1992; Reference Fiske and Haslam2004).
RMT is a general theory of social relations positing that all social relations are coordinated by utilizing four basic relational structures supported by specific motives and emotions: (1) communal sharing, coordination of social interaction according to shared identity; (2) authority ranking, coordination according to linearly differentiated ranking of status and prerogatives; (3) equality matching, where the organizing principle is balanced one-to-one correspondence among participants; and (4) market pricing, governed by ratios (for example, of contributions and benefits).
The principles behind communal sharing and authority ranking elucidate problems of the prejudice reduction model identified by Dixon et al. The goals of prejudice reduction are increased liking, together with identification as a common ingroup; this constitutes coordination in terms of communal sharing. Advantaged groups might, however, coordinate according to authority ranking, which predicts paternal benevolence toward low-status relational partners and hostility toward those striving to overturn the rank order. A focus solely on prejudice reduction is problematic because it does not differentiate between liking based on communal sharing – on being the same – and paternalistic fondness for loyal subordinates. Furthermore, when disadvantaged groups comply with “superior” groups' benevolent offers to coordinate according to authority ranking, further efforts to advocate more fundamental change are compromised.
Applying RMT to intergroup relations provides a framework for the understanding of the cognition, emotion, motivation, and moral judgment underlying intergroup behavior. In order for RMT to model dynamic change appropriately, it can profit from integration with Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979; Waldzus & Fiske, in preparation), which can be considered an early integration of prejudice reduction and social change perspectives.
Conceptualizing desired or probable alternatives of intergroup relations through RMT does not require fixing in advance whether or how social relations should be changed. The parties involved in the intergroup relation must make the decisions, possibly including the researcher with her/his own political and ideological convictions and aspirations. For example, a disadvantaged group can have the goal to retain authority ranking in the relation to the advantaged group, but to gain more paternal treatment. It could also aim to retain the legitimacy of status differentiation while moving to a higher position, or, more radically, to reverse the status relations between the groups (i.e., revolution). Finally, it could have the goal to switch from authority ranking to an equality matching relation, in which resources and burdens are allocated according to principles of even balance and one-to-one correspondence among distinct groups with equal entitlements. Collective action movements could also include aspects of communal sharing (i.e., constituting a common essence) that are conducive to reconciliation. Similar considerations apply to intentions of advantaged groups and even third parties.
Dixon et al.'s comparison of prejudice reduction and collective action should be followed by integration at a new level. Investigating relational cognition will enable us to describe and predict psychological processes at work in the interaction between disadvantaged and advantaged groups. Such research can provide involved individuals and groups with conceptual tools to understand their own and others' actions and motivations – and to change their relationships by prejudice reduction, collective action, or otherwise.