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From extreme emotions to extreme actions: Explaining non-normative collective action and reconciliation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2012

Allard R. Feddes
Affiliation:
University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Social Psychology Department, 1018 XA Amsterdam, The Netherlands. a.r.feddes@uva.nlhttp://home.medewerker.uva.nl/a.r.feddes/l.mann@uva.nlhttp://home.medewerker.uva.nl/l.mann/doosje@uva.nlhttp://home.medewerker.uva.nl/e.j.doosje/
Liesbeth Mann
Affiliation:
University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Social Psychology Department, 1018 XA Amsterdam, The Netherlands. a.r.feddes@uva.nlhttp://home.medewerker.uva.nl/a.r.feddes/l.mann@uva.nlhttp://home.medewerker.uva.nl/l.mann/doosje@uva.nlhttp://home.medewerker.uva.nl/e.j.doosje/
Bertjan Doosje
Affiliation:
University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Social Psychology Department, 1018 XA Amsterdam, The Netherlands. a.r.feddes@uva.nlhttp://home.medewerker.uva.nl/a.r.feddes/l.mann@uva.nlhttp://home.medewerker.uva.nl/l.mann/doosje@uva.nlhttp://home.medewerker.uva.nl/e.j.doosje/

Abstract

A key argument of Dixon et al. in the target article is that prejudice reduction through intergroup contact and collective action work in opposite ways. We argue for a complementary approach focusing on extreme emotions to understand why people turn to non-normative collective action and to understand when and under what conditions extreme emotions may influence positive effects of contact on reconciliation.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012 

In reaction to a number of terrorist acts over the last decade, an impressive amount of studies have been conducted by social and behavioural scientists addressing the question: How do people become radicalised and prepared to use violence to achieve their goals? Following the classification as proposed by Martin (Reference Martin, Olson, Herman and Zanna1986, in Wright et al. Reference Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam1990), this ideology-based violence can be termed “non-normative collective action” as it does not conform to the norms of the existing social system. A key argument of Dixon et al. is that prejudice reduction – in the form of stimulating positive contact and a common identity between an advantaged group and a minority group – and collective action work in opposite ways, showing a “‘darker side’ of both common identification and positive contact” (sect. 3.2, para. 7). We agree this may be the case for members of groups who are still on speaking terms with each other. However, we argue that for individuals who have been radicalised to such an extent that they are motivated to use violence as a means to reach social change, reducing prejudice and intergroup contact are hardly an option anymore. Mere antipathy is in this context the exception rather than the rule. We examine the role of intergroup emotions in explaining non-normative collective action.

Extreme emotions and non-normative collective action

Research has shown that specific emotions that are felt at a group level can lead to action tendencies and behaviour favouring the own group (Doosje et al. Reference Doosje, Branscombe, Spears and Manstead1998; Mackie et al. Reference Mackie, Smith and Ray2008). Several authors have now pointed out the importance of extreme emotions like humiliation, hate, disgust, and contempt in (support for) violent behaviour (e.g., De Wolf & Doosje Reference De Wolf and Doosje2010; Fischer & Roseman Reference Fischer and Roseman2007; Lindner Reference Lindner2001; Sternberg Reference Sternberg2003; Tausch et al. Reference Tausch, Becker, Spears, Christ, Saab, Singh and Siddiqui2011). Interestingly, anger has been proposed to be a key emotion in intractable conflict (e.g., Bar-Tal Reference Bar-Tal2004), but recent findings by Tausch and colleagues (2011) indicate that anger may be more related to normative collective action (e.g., demonstrations) rather than non-normative collective actions (e.g., support for use of violence). Fischer and Roseman (Reference Fischer and Roseman2007) argue that anger can actually serve a useful social function. These authors claim that anger can have beneficial effects by, for example, enhancing self-esteem or restoring unfair situations. When anger turns into hate, however, reconciliation is less likely. Hate, unlike anger, is characterized by the “negation of intimacy,” or distance seeking (Sternberg Reference Sternberg2003). It is important to note that this tendency to avoid one another makes positive intergroup contact effects less likely to occur.

Other emotions that lead to avoidance but can lead to out-group targeted violence are contempt and disgust. Contempt is considered an extremely negative emotion as it results in short-term derogation, long-term social exclusion, a lack of reconciliation, and an absence of relational improvement (Fischer Reference Fischer, Trnka, Balcar and Kuška2011; Fischer & Roseman Reference Fischer and Roseman2007). Interestingly, Tausch and colleagues (2011) report that not anger, but contempt predicted support for non-normative action.

Contempt but also disgust has been associated with extreme forms of violence (O'Gorman Reference O'Gorman and Silke2010). In line with this, research by Staub (Reference Staub1989) has shown that people are more prepared to engage in collective violence when they perceive the in-group as superior and the out-group as inferior or even as less human. An example is the Rwanda genocide in 1994. In this context, the Rwandese radio station RTLM called upon Hutus to exterminate the “Tutsi cockroaches.” With members of the out-group dehumanised, it became easier to use violence against former neighbours and friends. Dehumanisation (Leyens et al. Reference Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez-Perez and Gaunt2000) occurs when members of an outgroup are perceived to be less human compared with in-group members. In turn, this can result in excluding out-group members from moral principles. Extreme emotions play a key role in this process, as dehumanisation often goes along with feelings of disgust and contempt (De Wolf & Doosje Reference De Wolf and Doosje2010).

Besides hate, contempt, and disgust, humiliation also seems to be an important emotion that can lead to violent behaviour towards others. War-crimes, genocide, and terrorism have all been mentioned to be a result of humiliation (Lindner Reference Lindner2001). Humiliation is defined as “the deep dysphoric feeling associated with being, or perceiving oneself as being unjustly degraded, ridiculed, or put down – in particular, one's identity has been demeaned or devalued” (Hartling & Luchetta Reference Hartling and Luchetta1999, p. 264).

As argued by Smith (Reference Smith2008) and Lindner (Reference Lindner2001), group members may take different actions when their group has been humiliated. Besides conforming and escaping further humiliation, one response is to take revenge. As Bin Laden put it after the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda: “What the United States tastes today is a very small thing compared to what we have tasted for tens of years. Our nation has been tasting this humiliation and contempt for more than 80 years.” (BBC 2001).

Extreme emotions and reconciliation

Importantly, extreme emotions may not only lead to violent non-normative collective action. We argue that these emotions can, under the right circumstances, also lead to reconciliation. This is nicely illustrated by research findings by Rimé et al. (Reference Rimé, Kanyangara, Yzerbyt and Paezt2011) on effects of “Truth and Reconciliation Gacaca trials.” In these trials, the perpetrators of genocide were trialed but also given the opportunity to show remorse. The emotional reactivation among the witnessing audience (often relatives of victims) as well as the perpetrator had a positive effect on the relation between victim and perpetrator groups of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Social cohesion between the groups was enhanced, in-group self-categorization decreased, and there were more positive attitudes regarding the out-group.

To conclude with this example, we argue that research on extreme emotions does not only inform our understanding of why people turn to non-normative collective action on behalf of a group, but also helps us understand when and under what conditions extreme emotions may influence positive effects of contact on reconciliation.

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