Dixon et al. provide an excellent integration of research relevant to widening concerns about psychology's unquestioned conviction about the value of prejudice reduction. In the first half of the article, the authors summarize evidence that advantaged group hostility and negative evaluations of the disadvantaged group (i.e., prejudice) may not be the genesis or the only agent of protracted intergroup inequality. We strongly agree (see, Wright & Baray Reference Wright, Baray, Dixon and Levine2012) but wondered about the authors' proposed solution. Repeatedly, they call for a broad redefinition of prejudice to include other processes, claiming that research has converged “to challenge the traditional concept of prejudice as negative evaluation” (sect. 2.6., para. 1) and instead favour a definition like the one provided by Rose (Reference Rose1956), which would include a full “set of attitudes which causes, supports or justifies discrimination” (sect. 4, para. 1). We are not convinced that broadening the concept of prejudice is wise at all. For example, even their extremely inclusive new definition would not include intergroup helping (one of their culprits in maintaining inequality), which is not “an attitude,” but rather a behaviour. Further, prejudice would now apparently include attitudes about anything as long as the downstream outcome of that attitude is that some group is unfairly disadvantaged. So, my love of coffee (an attitude) could be prejudice if it leads me to buy coffee grown by a company that actively subjugates the rights of workers. Moreover, defining a psychological process by its inevitable outcome is problematic. We cannot know if something is prejudice until we see all of its subsequent consequences to determine if one outcome involves discrimination. Finally, how we conceptualize and define psychological constructs is not a trivial issue. If we cannot agree on the meanings and parameters of important concepts, we cannot engage in scholarly arguments about causes and consequences. So, a better solution to the literature's myopic focus on prejudice is to leave the definition of prejudice alone – prejudice is an evaluation of a group and its members – and encourage others to follow the suggestion in the article's title to go “beyond prejudice” and consider other processes that also cause and maintain inequality.
Dixon et al. review several perspectives (including ours; e.g., Wright & Lubensky Reference Wright, Lubensky, Demoulin, Leyens and Dovidio2009) on how and why cross-group contact, while improving intergroup attitudes (reducing prejudice), can also undermine the psychological underpinnings of collective action. They also argue that among advantaged groups there may be a weak relationship between positive intergroup attitudes and support for meaningful structural change. Our recent theorizing concludes that in fact the harmonious interpersonal interactions described by contact researchers as critical to reducing prejudice can also be responsible not only for undermining collective action intention, but also for reaffirming, reinforcing, and legitimizing inequality (Wright & Baray Reference Wright, Baray, Dixon and Levine2012). Our position is based on Ridgeway's (Reference Ridgeway, Jost and Major2001) Status Construction Theory, which holds that members of both high- and low-status groups learn and strengthen their shared group status beliefs by participating in or observing numerous specific interpersonal cross-group interactions. When inequality is a basic element of an intergroup relationship, cross-group interactions will be influenced by the shared stereotypes that exist to explain these inequalities. Hence, high- and low-status group members will simultaneously engage in subtle behaviours that demonstrate and legitimize these status differences. These subtle cues, enacted over and over again in cross-group interactions, reinforce and legitimize the status differences that produce them. In fact, it may be precisely when harmonious interpersonal behavior is encouraged that members of both groups are most likely to tune their behaviour (e.g., Sinclair et al. Reference Sinclair, Hardin, Lowery and Colangelo2005) to match group stereotypes in an effort to smooth the interpersonal interaction. Furthermore, explicitly structuring situations so groups are thought to have “equal status” during the interaction (a key condition of optimal contact) may only exacerbate this problem, because when the inevitable subtle cues demonstrating the superiority of one group emerge, the obvious attribution is to the character of the groups (not the situation). Hence, efforts to “get along” lead both advantaged and disadvantaged group members to rely on shared expectations of how to act. The resulting positive cross-group interactions, while leading to liking, can be precisely the place where group status differences are enacted and reified (Wright & Baray Reference Wright, Baray, Dixon and Levine2012).
The final section focuses on solutions and reconciling the prejudice reduction and collective action approaches. In our own discussions, we focus on two levels of solution. First, individual and interpersonal level solutions (Wright & Lubensky Reference Wright, Lubensky, Demoulin, Leyens and Dovidio2009) involve ways that cross-group interaction partners may manage the competing psychological requirements of contact and collective action. One example of a solution at this level (among others) involves the process of subtyping, whereby the disadvantaged group member distances his or her friend from the rest of the advantaged outgroup, describing that friend as “an exception to the rule.” Hence, positive feelings about the friend need not undermine perceptions of the rest of the outgroup as agents of discrimination. In addition, this offers an alternative identity to the advantaged group member; one of ally or coconspirator in the fight for justice. Especially if the advantaged group partner accepts this subtype, the friendship is unlikely to be misconstrued as evidence of intergroup harmony. Second, like Dixon et al., we believe that “for group-based equality to be cultivated and maintained we need to move beyond a model dominated by a focus on prejudice reduction, and recognize that efforts to change unjust and unequal social structures will require both harmony and managed conflict, a recognition of group differences as well as similarities, open discussion of existing inequalities that exposes both discrimination and privilege and enough animus and acrimony to stimulate assertive action” (Wright & Baray Reference Wright, Baray, Dixon and Levine2012, p. 245). One possibility is a temporal approach with periods of segregation, identity building, conflict, and social change followed by periods of integration, community building, harmony, and cooperation. The timing and duration of each phase would depend on the history and on the social and political realities of that particular intergroup context.
In short, we share many of the views expressed in this article and join the authors in encouraging a broader dialogue exploring the limits and benefits of both harmony and conflict in intergroup relations.
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Dixon et al. provide an excellent integration of research relevant to widening concerns about psychology's unquestioned conviction about the value of prejudice reduction. In the first half of the article, the authors summarize evidence that advantaged group hostility and negative evaluations of the disadvantaged group (i.e., prejudice) may not be the genesis or the only agent of protracted intergroup inequality. We strongly agree (see, Wright & Baray Reference Wright, Baray, Dixon and Levine2012) but wondered about the authors' proposed solution. Repeatedly, they call for a broad redefinition of prejudice to include other processes, claiming that research has converged “to challenge the traditional concept of prejudice as negative evaluation” (sect. 2.6., para. 1) and instead favour a definition like the one provided by Rose (Reference Rose1956), which would include a full “set of attitudes which causes, supports or justifies discrimination” (sect. 4, para. 1). We are not convinced that broadening the concept of prejudice is wise at all. For example, even their extremely inclusive new definition would not include intergroup helping (one of their culprits in maintaining inequality), which is not “an attitude,” but rather a behaviour. Further, prejudice would now apparently include attitudes about anything as long as the downstream outcome of that attitude is that some group is unfairly disadvantaged. So, my love of coffee (an attitude) could be prejudice if it leads me to buy coffee grown by a company that actively subjugates the rights of workers. Moreover, defining a psychological process by its inevitable outcome is problematic. We cannot know if something is prejudice until we see all of its subsequent consequences to determine if one outcome involves discrimination. Finally, how we conceptualize and define psychological constructs is not a trivial issue. If we cannot agree on the meanings and parameters of important concepts, we cannot engage in scholarly arguments about causes and consequences. So, a better solution to the literature's myopic focus on prejudice is to leave the definition of prejudice alone – prejudice is an evaluation of a group and its members – and encourage others to follow the suggestion in the article's title to go “beyond prejudice” and consider other processes that also cause and maintain inequality.
Dixon et al. review several perspectives (including ours; e.g., Wright & Lubensky Reference Wright, Lubensky, Demoulin, Leyens and Dovidio2009) on how and why cross-group contact, while improving intergroup attitudes (reducing prejudice), can also undermine the psychological underpinnings of collective action. They also argue that among advantaged groups there may be a weak relationship between positive intergroup attitudes and support for meaningful structural change. Our recent theorizing concludes that in fact the harmonious interpersonal interactions described by contact researchers as critical to reducing prejudice can also be responsible not only for undermining collective action intention, but also for reaffirming, reinforcing, and legitimizing inequality (Wright & Baray Reference Wright, Baray, Dixon and Levine2012). Our position is based on Ridgeway's (Reference Ridgeway, Jost and Major2001) Status Construction Theory, which holds that members of both high- and low-status groups learn and strengthen their shared group status beliefs by participating in or observing numerous specific interpersonal cross-group interactions. When inequality is a basic element of an intergroup relationship, cross-group interactions will be influenced by the shared stereotypes that exist to explain these inequalities. Hence, high- and low-status group members will simultaneously engage in subtle behaviours that demonstrate and legitimize these status differences. These subtle cues, enacted over and over again in cross-group interactions, reinforce and legitimize the status differences that produce them. In fact, it may be precisely when harmonious interpersonal behavior is encouraged that members of both groups are most likely to tune their behaviour (e.g., Sinclair et al. Reference Sinclair, Hardin, Lowery and Colangelo2005) to match group stereotypes in an effort to smooth the interpersonal interaction. Furthermore, explicitly structuring situations so groups are thought to have “equal status” during the interaction (a key condition of optimal contact) may only exacerbate this problem, because when the inevitable subtle cues demonstrating the superiority of one group emerge, the obvious attribution is to the character of the groups (not the situation). Hence, efforts to “get along” lead both advantaged and disadvantaged group members to rely on shared expectations of how to act. The resulting positive cross-group interactions, while leading to liking, can be precisely the place where group status differences are enacted and reified (Wright & Baray Reference Wright, Baray, Dixon and Levine2012).
The final section focuses on solutions and reconciling the prejudice reduction and collective action approaches. In our own discussions, we focus on two levels of solution. First, individual and interpersonal level solutions (Wright & Lubensky Reference Wright, Lubensky, Demoulin, Leyens and Dovidio2009) involve ways that cross-group interaction partners may manage the competing psychological requirements of contact and collective action. One example of a solution at this level (among others) involves the process of subtyping, whereby the disadvantaged group member distances his or her friend from the rest of the advantaged outgroup, describing that friend as “an exception to the rule.” Hence, positive feelings about the friend need not undermine perceptions of the rest of the outgroup as agents of discrimination. In addition, this offers an alternative identity to the advantaged group member; one of ally or coconspirator in the fight for justice. Especially if the advantaged group partner accepts this subtype, the friendship is unlikely to be misconstrued as evidence of intergroup harmony. Second, like Dixon et al., we believe that “for group-based equality to be cultivated and maintained we need to move beyond a model dominated by a focus on prejudice reduction, and recognize that efforts to change unjust and unequal social structures will require both harmony and managed conflict, a recognition of group differences as well as similarities, open discussion of existing inequalities that exposes both discrimination and privilege and enough animus and acrimony to stimulate assertive action” (Wright & Baray Reference Wright, Baray, Dixon and Levine2012, p. 245). One possibility is a temporal approach with periods of segregation, identity building, conflict, and social change followed by periods of integration, community building, harmony, and cooperation. The timing and duration of each phase would depend on the history and on the social and political realities of that particular intergroup context.
In short, we share many of the views expressed in this article and join the authors in encouraging a broader dialogue exploring the limits and benefits of both harmony and conflict in intergroup relations.