As Tomasello highlights in the target article, a key distinguishing feature of human collaboration is the ability to form a second-personal agent “we,” which regulates “I” and “you” in our commitments towards achieving a joint goal. Collaboration characterized by second-personal agency is the foundation for the development of a broad-based second-personal morality of fairness and mutual respect. Further, through engaging in joint intentional collaborative interactions, children come to understand the self-other equivalence of “I” and “you,” thereby providing the foundation for individuals to relate to each other as equals. Collaboration structured by second-personal agency appears to be unique to humans, and the apprehension of perspectival equivalence involved in this form of social understanding may well explain why humans also uniquely show a commitment to treating collaborators fairly (Tomasello et al. Reference Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne and Moll2005).
We have two goals in this commentary on the target article. First, we intend to apply a developmental account of second-personal agency focused on the role of triadic interactions (Moore & Barresi Reference Moore and Barresi2017) to complement Tomasello's developmental account of second-personal morality. Second, we highlight recent findings that uncover the social contextual factors within joint intentional collaboration that activate second-personal moral concerns.
Whereas Tomasello argues for a fundamental role of joint intentional collaboration, his account is relatively silent on how a joint intentional schema comes about developmentally. Following Moore and Barresi (Reference Moore and Barresi2017; see also Barresi & Moore Reference Barresi and Moore1996), we propose that it is through the triadic interactions arising in the second half of the first year that children gain the social experience necessary to form the joint intentional schemas that Tomasello argues are essential for second-personal morality. Triadic interactions contain second-person information of various forms (see Moore & Barresi Reference Moore and Barresi2017), but we suggest that it is through experiencing triadic interactions whereby infants and interactive partners share intentional orientations to objects and states of affairs that infants are able to coordinate their own first-person intentional orientation with their third-person perspective on the intentional orientation of their partner (Moore & Barresi Reference Moore and Barresi2017). It is this experience of shared intentionality within triadic interactions that allows children to form a joint intentional schema. The ability to form a joint intentional schema allows children to engage in the type of dual-level collaboration wherein, as Tomasello argues, children come to recognize the self-other equivalence from which a second-person morality develops (Tomasello Reference Tomasello2019).
A central argument in Tomasello's target article account is that a sense of fairness develops through joint intentional collaboration. This preference for fairness emerges through the formation of a joint-agentive “we,” which is embodied by mutual action towards a common goal. Within this form of dual-level collaboration, children come to recognize self-other equivalence with their collaborative partners. To date, much of the evidence that collaboration increases children's concern for fairness has come in the context of collaborating to earn resources (Corbit et al. Reference Corbit, McAuliffe, Callaghan, Blake and Warneken2017; Hamann et al. Reference Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg and Tomasello2011; Warneken et al. Reference Warneken, Lohse, Melis and Tomasello2011). However, when children collaborate to earn resources, there are several social contextual factors that may activate fairness concerns; working to earn resources, working to achieve a common goal, and enjoying a positive social exchange. Thus, although Tomasello convincingly argues for the importance of joint intentional collaboration in the target article, parsing the influence of these factors will provide a better understanding of the psychological processes through which joint intentional collaboration fosters fairness concerns.
In order to systematically investigate the influence of each of these factors, Corbit (Reference Corbit2019) assessed children's (3–5 years old) sharing before and after engaging in three collaborative contexts: achieving a shared goal of earning resources, achieving a shared goal independent of resources, and playing a social game. Children increased sharing to collaborators with whom they had accomplished a shared concrete goal, independently of whether the resources they shared were earned together or obtained outside of the collaborative context. Importantly, sharing increased only when children collaborated towards a concrete goal, and not when the goal of their collaborative interaction was to play a social game. An important question that emerges from these findings is why might a concrete goal increase sharing, whereas a primarily social goal does not?
Joint intentional collaboration towards a concrete goal may serve a unique role in fostering a second-personal moral obligation. When a shared goal is to play a social game there is less need for mutual (second-personal) regulation of the role for “I” and “you.” This is because the goal of playing a social game can be accomplished in a myriad of ways; so as long as partners remain engaged, their social goal will be achieved. When there is a concrete goal, and “we” are dependent on one another to achieve that goal, then “I” must regulate “you” (and vice versa), guided by the shared intention “we” have. Indeed, when children collaborate towards a concrete goal, over repeated iterations they are able to form role ideals that structure the way each collaborator must fulfill their role towards achieving the joint goal. If the goal that “we” have is to engage socially, then the role that “you” and “I” play is secondary to that of the second-personal agentive “we.”
An obligation to treat collaborators fairly necessitates that “you” and “I” are recognized as equivalent, yet distinct, agents currently engaged in shared intentionality. Fairness is intrinsically a relative process where I compare my stake to yours, and “we” as equivalent agents can agree on a mutually satisfactory outcome. We propose that in collaboration where the role “I” and “you” must be mutually regulated by “we” in order to achieve a shared concrete goal, the resulting commitment to mutually satisfactory (“fair”) outcomes will be greater than when “we” is the focal point of an interaction and the individual roles “you” and “I” play are secondary. Thus, a shared concrete goal may provide the focal point within joint intentional collaboration to facilitate the integration of first-, second-, and third-personal information providing a foundation for a broad-based second-personal morality.
As Tomasello highlights in the target article, a key distinguishing feature of human collaboration is the ability to form a second-personal agent “we,” which regulates “I” and “you” in our commitments towards achieving a joint goal. Collaboration characterized by second-personal agency is the foundation for the development of a broad-based second-personal morality of fairness and mutual respect. Further, through engaging in joint intentional collaborative interactions, children come to understand the self-other equivalence of “I” and “you,” thereby providing the foundation for individuals to relate to each other as equals. Collaboration structured by second-personal agency appears to be unique to humans, and the apprehension of perspectival equivalence involved in this form of social understanding may well explain why humans also uniquely show a commitment to treating collaborators fairly (Tomasello et al. Reference Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne and Moll2005).
We have two goals in this commentary on the target article. First, we intend to apply a developmental account of second-personal agency focused on the role of triadic interactions (Moore & Barresi Reference Moore and Barresi2017) to complement Tomasello's developmental account of second-personal morality. Second, we highlight recent findings that uncover the social contextual factors within joint intentional collaboration that activate second-personal moral concerns.
Whereas Tomasello argues for a fundamental role of joint intentional collaboration, his account is relatively silent on how a joint intentional schema comes about developmentally. Following Moore and Barresi (Reference Moore and Barresi2017; see also Barresi & Moore Reference Barresi and Moore1996), we propose that it is through the triadic interactions arising in the second half of the first year that children gain the social experience necessary to form the joint intentional schemas that Tomasello argues are essential for second-personal morality. Triadic interactions contain second-person information of various forms (see Moore & Barresi Reference Moore and Barresi2017), but we suggest that it is through experiencing triadic interactions whereby infants and interactive partners share intentional orientations to objects and states of affairs that infants are able to coordinate their own first-person intentional orientation with their third-person perspective on the intentional orientation of their partner (Moore & Barresi Reference Moore and Barresi2017). It is this experience of shared intentionality within triadic interactions that allows children to form a joint intentional schema. The ability to form a joint intentional schema allows children to engage in the type of dual-level collaboration wherein, as Tomasello argues, children come to recognize the self-other equivalence from which a second-person morality develops (Tomasello Reference Tomasello2019).
A central argument in Tomasello's target article account is that a sense of fairness develops through joint intentional collaboration. This preference for fairness emerges through the formation of a joint-agentive “we,” which is embodied by mutual action towards a common goal. Within this form of dual-level collaboration, children come to recognize self-other equivalence with their collaborative partners. To date, much of the evidence that collaboration increases children's concern for fairness has come in the context of collaborating to earn resources (Corbit et al. Reference Corbit, McAuliffe, Callaghan, Blake and Warneken2017; Hamann et al. Reference Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg and Tomasello2011; Warneken et al. Reference Warneken, Lohse, Melis and Tomasello2011). However, when children collaborate to earn resources, there are several social contextual factors that may activate fairness concerns; working to earn resources, working to achieve a common goal, and enjoying a positive social exchange. Thus, although Tomasello convincingly argues for the importance of joint intentional collaboration in the target article, parsing the influence of these factors will provide a better understanding of the psychological processes through which joint intentional collaboration fosters fairness concerns.
In order to systematically investigate the influence of each of these factors, Corbit (Reference Corbit2019) assessed children's (3–5 years old) sharing before and after engaging in three collaborative contexts: achieving a shared goal of earning resources, achieving a shared goal independent of resources, and playing a social game. Children increased sharing to collaborators with whom they had accomplished a shared concrete goal, independently of whether the resources they shared were earned together or obtained outside of the collaborative context. Importantly, sharing increased only when children collaborated towards a concrete goal, and not when the goal of their collaborative interaction was to play a social game. An important question that emerges from these findings is why might a concrete goal increase sharing, whereas a primarily social goal does not?
Joint intentional collaboration towards a concrete goal may serve a unique role in fostering a second-personal moral obligation. When a shared goal is to play a social game there is less need for mutual (second-personal) regulation of the role for “I” and “you.” This is because the goal of playing a social game can be accomplished in a myriad of ways; so as long as partners remain engaged, their social goal will be achieved. When there is a concrete goal, and “we” are dependent on one another to achieve that goal, then “I” must regulate “you” (and vice versa), guided by the shared intention “we” have. Indeed, when children collaborate towards a concrete goal, over repeated iterations they are able to form role ideals that structure the way each collaborator must fulfill their role towards achieving the joint goal. If the goal that “we” have is to engage socially, then the role that “you” and “I” play is secondary to that of the second-personal agentive “we.”
An obligation to treat collaborators fairly necessitates that “you” and “I” are recognized as equivalent, yet distinct, agents currently engaged in shared intentionality. Fairness is intrinsically a relative process where I compare my stake to yours, and “we” as equivalent agents can agree on a mutually satisfactory outcome. We propose that in collaboration where the role “I” and “you” must be mutually regulated by “we” in order to achieve a shared concrete goal, the resulting commitment to mutually satisfactory (“fair”) outcomes will be greater than when “we” is the focal point of an interaction and the individual roles “you” and “I” play are secondary. Thus, a shared concrete goal may provide the focal point within joint intentional collaboration to facilitate the integration of first-, second-, and third-personal information providing a foundation for a broad-based second-personal morality.