Tomasello draws from research on nonhuman primates and human children to position moral obligation as a uniquely human motivation, arguing that the psychological construction of a shared agent “we” works to direct and self-regulate collaborative activities in humans, giving rise to a sense of moral obligation. However, we argue that this account, while illuminating, overlooks key distinctions between different kinds of moral obligations – and, importantly, the distinct psychological processes that they entail. Among the most central of these distinctions is that found between prescriptive obligations (i.e., obligations to engage in certain positive, beneficial behaviors; e.g., one should help others in need) and proscriptive obligations (i.e., obligations not to engage in certain negative, harmful behaviors; e.g., one should not hurt others). When we fulfill and adhere to prescriptive obligations, we generally earn praise and gratitude; when we violate proscriptive obligations, we generally earn blame and punishment. Additionally, failures to meet prescriptive obligations and non-violations of proscriptive obligations are relatively less relevant to observers (e.g., Haidt & Baron Reference Haidt and Baron1996).
Importantly, social psychological research has revealed differences between how prescriptive fulfillments and proscriptive violations are evaluated. Adults tend to judge proscriptive morality as concrete, mandatory, and duty-based, while viewing prescriptive morality as abstract, discretionary, and based in either duty or desire; even framing the same basic moral act as either prescriptive or prescriptive can change people's judgments (Janoff-Bulman et al. Reference Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh and Hepp2009). Additionally, adults treat beliefs about immoral acts (i.e., violations of obligation) as more objective, agreed upon by others, and true than beliefs about moral acts (i.e., fulfillments of obligation; Goodwin & Darley Reference Goodwin and Darley2012). On the whole, then, proscriptive obligations appear to have more psychological weight than prescriptive obligations.
It may be possible to reconcile these asymmetries within Tomasello's theoretical framework – for example, it may be that proscriptive obligations entail a greater sense of “we” in their formation and enforcement – but more work will be necessary to assess these possibilities.
Additionally, the process by which observers judge violations of obligation and fulfillments of obligation also appears to differ. For example, immoral, obligation-violating acts tend to elicit more causal attribution and counterfactual thinking than moral, obligation-fulfilling acts (Bohner et al. Reference Bohner, Bless, Schwarz and Strack1998; Bostyn & Roets Reference Bostyn and Roets2016; Roese & Olson Reference Roese and Olson1997). In addition, although agent intentionality influences the perceived morality and immorality of both obligation-fulfilling acts and obligation-violating acts, intentionality appears to matter more for evaluating blameworthy acts than praiseworthy acts (Guglielmo & Malle Reference Guglielmo and Malle2019; Ohtsubo Reference Ohtsubo2007; Pizarro et al. Reference Pizarro, Uhlmann and Salovey2003). For example, both adults and children judge unintended, obligation-violating “side effects” (of a person's actions) to be blameworthy. However, they fail to judge unintended, obligation-upholding side effects to be equally praiseworthy (Knobe Reference Knobe2003a; Reference Knobe2003b; Leslie et al. Reference Leslie, Knobe and Cohen2006). People also more readily incorporate the magnitude of the consequences of proscriptive obligations than prescriptive obligations into their judgments of the agent (Gneezy & Epley Reference Gneezy and Epley2014; Klein & Epley Reference Klein and Epley2014). Together, this research suggests that judgments of proscriptive obligations incorporate factors related to causality, intentionality, and consequences more than do judgments of prescriptive obligations.
Importantly, research suggests that even young children have an awareness of this distinction between prescriptive and proscriptive violations. For example, children have been shown to exhibit better memory for negative, obligation-violating individuals than positive, obligation-fulfilling individuals (Barclay & Lalumiere Reference Barclay and Lalumiere2006; Kinzler & Shutts Reference Kinzler and Shutts2008). Additionally, children as young as 14 months have greater difficulty following do's than don'ts (Kochanska et al. Reference Kochanska, Coy and Murray2001). These findings suggest that these asymmetries do not simply reflect “second step” (sect. 2, para. 2) differences attributable to culture-specific learning, but rather emerge at an earlier ontogenetic stage.
These differences in judgments of prescriptive and proscriptive obligations suggest that there are important nuances to how developing humans learn about the moral obligations of their group and culture – and that the processes by which we learn about, represent, and evaluate prescriptive obligations (e.g., to obey our elders) may be different from those of proscriptive obligations (e.g., to not harm others).
Additionally, there is also evidence that the relevant weight accorded to each of these forms of obligation can differ as a function of the specific context in which they are embedded. For example, these two broad classes of moral obligation also seem to operate somewhat distinctly across intergroup boundaries. This appears to be an important caveat to Tomasello's claim that obligation “applies to, and only to, one's cultural compatriots” (sect. 2.2, para. 2). Whereas we agree that this claim generally holds true regarding prescriptive obligations (e.g., there is little expectation that one will help members of cultural outgroups), proscriptive obligations seem to be more common across intergroup boundaries (e.g., the obligation not to willingly harm members of cultural outgroups).
One apparent example of these asymmetries is the (rapidly growing) number of public apologies made by leaders of majority (racial/ethnic, religious, and/or cultural) groups for past injustices to minority groups – apologies which, almost without exception, center on violations of proscriptive obligations not to harm, rather than violations of prescriptive obligations (Blatz et al. Reference Blatz, Schumann and Ross2009; Lazare Reference Lazare2004).
As Tomasello suggests, these cross-group apologies may indicate “an expanded sense of all of humanity as in one's in-group moral community” (sect. 2.2, para. 2). However, his account does not explain these apparent asymmetries in how prescriptive and proscriptive obligations operate across group boundaries.
We suggest that these prescriptive/proscriptive asymmetries may offer Tomasello a promising opportunity to refine his theory of moral obligation. These differences in how observers evaluate proscriptive and prescriptive obligations suggest that there may be different forms of obligation, each utilizing distinct psychological processes. At the very least, different moral obligations appear to engender different responses when they are upheld or violated. What psychologically distinguishes prescriptive obligations from proscriptive obligations? How could such differences emerge? For a complete account of the psychology of moral obligations, these questions ought to be addressed.
Tomasello draws from research on nonhuman primates and human children to position moral obligation as a uniquely human motivation, arguing that the psychological construction of a shared agent “we” works to direct and self-regulate collaborative activities in humans, giving rise to a sense of moral obligation. However, we argue that this account, while illuminating, overlooks key distinctions between different kinds of moral obligations – and, importantly, the distinct psychological processes that they entail. Among the most central of these distinctions is that found between prescriptive obligations (i.e., obligations to engage in certain positive, beneficial behaviors; e.g., one should help others in need) and proscriptive obligations (i.e., obligations not to engage in certain negative, harmful behaviors; e.g., one should not hurt others). When we fulfill and adhere to prescriptive obligations, we generally earn praise and gratitude; when we violate proscriptive obligations, we generally earn blame and punishment. Additionally, failures to meet prescriptive obligations and non-violations of proscriptive obligations are relatively less relevant to observers (e.g., Haidt & Baron Reference Haidt and Baron1996).
Importantly, social psychological research has revealed differences between how prescriptive fulfillments and proscriptive violations are evaluated. Adults tend to judge proscriptive morality as concrete, mandatory, and duty-based, while viewing prescriptive morality as abstract, discretionary, and based in either duty or desire; even framing the same basic moral act as either prescriptive or prescriptive can change people's judgments (Janoff-Bulman et al. Reference Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh and Hepp2009). Additionally, adults treat beliefs about immoral acts (i.e., violations of obligation) as more objective, agreed upon by others, and true than beliefs about moral acts (i.e., fulfillments of obligation; Goodwin & Darley Reference Goodwin and Darley2012). On the whole, then, proscriptive obligations appear to have more psychological weight than prescriptive obligations.
It may be possible to reconcile these asymmetries within Tomasello's theoretical framework – for example, it may be that proscriptive obligations entail a greater sense of “we” in their formation and enforcement – but more work will be necessary to assess these possibilities.
Additionally, the process by which observers judge violations of obligation and fulfillments of obligation also appears to differ. For example, immoral, obligation-violating acts tend to elicit more causal attribution and counterfactual thinking than moral, obligation-fulfilling acts (Bohner et al. Reference Bohner, Bless, Schwarz and Strack1998; Bostyn & Roets Reference Bostyn and Roets2016; Roese & Olson Reference Roese and Olson1997). In addition, although agent intentionality influences the perceived morality and immorality of both obligation-fulfilling acts and obligation-violating acts, intentionality appears to matter more for evaluating blameworthy acts than praiseworthy acts (Guglielmo & Malle Reference Guglielmo and Malle2019; Ohtsubo Reference Ohtsubo2007; Pizarro et al. Reference Pizarro, Uhlmann and Salovey2003). For example, both adults and children judge unintended, obligation-violating “side effects” (of a person's actions) to be blameworthy. However, they fail to judge unintended, obligation-upholding side effects to be equally praiseworthy (Knobe Reference Knobe2003a; Reference Knobe2003b; Leslie et al. Reference Leslie, Knobe and Cohen2006). People also more readily incorporate the magnitude of the consequences of proscriptive obligations than prescriptive obligations into their judgments of the agent (Gneezy & Epley Reference Gneezy and Epley2014; Klein & Epley Reference Klein and Epley2014). Together, this research suggests that judgments of proscriptive obligations incorporate factors related to causality, intentionality, and consequences more than do judgments of prescriptive obligations.
Importantly, research suggests that even young children have an awareness of this distinction between prescriptive and proscriptive violations. For example, children have been shown to exhibit better memory for negative, obligation-violating individuals than positive, obligation-fulfilling individuals (Barclay & Lalumiere Reference Barclay and Lalumiere2006; Kinzler & Shutts Reference Kinzler and Shutts2008). Additionally, children as young as 14 months have greater difficulty following do's than don'ts (Kochanska et al. Reference Kochanska, Coy and Murray2001). These findings suggest that these asymmetries do not simply reflect “second step” (sect. 2, para. 2) differences attributable to culture-specific learning, but rather emerge at an earlier ontogenetic stage.
These differences in judgments of prescriptive and proscriptive obligations suggest that there are important nuances to how developing humans learn about the moral obligations of their group and culture – and that the processes by which we learn about, represent, and evaluate prescriptive obligations (e.g., to obey our elders) may be different from those of proscriptive obligations (e.g., to not harm others).
Additionally, there is also evidence that the relevant weight accorded to each of these forms of obligation can differ as a function of the specific context in which they are embedded. For example, these two broad classes of moral obligation also seem to operate somewhat distinctly across intergroup boundaries. This appears to be an important caveat to Tomasello's claim that obligation “applies to, and only to, one's cultural compatriots” (sect. 2.2, para. 2). Whereas we agree that this claim generally holds true regarding prescriptive obligations (e.g., there is little expectation that one will help members of cultural outgroups), proscriptive obligations seem to be more common across intergroup boundaries (e.g., the obligation not to willingly harm members of cultural outgroups).
One apparent example of these asymmetries is the (rapidly growing) number of public apologies made by leaders of majority (racial/ethnic, religious, and/or cultural) groups for past injustices to minority groups – apologies which, almost without exception, center on violations of proscriptive obligations not to harm, rather than violations of prescriptive obligations (Blatz et al. Reference Blatz, Schumann and Ross2009; Lazare Reference Lazare2004).
As Tomasello suggests, these cross-group apologies may indicate “an expanded sense of all of humanity as in one's in-group moral community” (sect. 2.2, para. 2). However, his account does not explain these apparent asymmetries in how prescriptive and proscriptive obligations operate across group boundaries.
We suggest that these prescriptive/proscriptive asymmetries may offer Tomasello a promising opportunity to refine his theory of moral obligation. These differences in how observers evaluate proscriptive and prescriptive obligations suggest that there may be different forms of obligation, each utilizing distinct psychological processes. At the very least, different moral obligations appear to engender different responses when they are upheld or violated. What psychologically distinguishes prescriptive obligations from proscriptive obligations? How could such differences emerge? For a complete account of the psychology of moral obligations, these questions ought to be addressed.