Tomasello presents a compelling analysis of the motivating force behind humans’ sense of obligation, focusing on the intersubjective structure of an obligation. However, obligations are not always immersed in agreements only between individuals. Occasionally, they are promises we make to ourselves, our commitments to a particular ideal of living or a moral value – entities that Tomasello does not discuss. These two different types of obligations can together explain individuals’ behavior. If Bob is impudent to Charlie and Alice condemns Bob's behavior, Alice's criticism may derive from her heartfelt commitment to a certain principle of proper behavior to which she holds everyone accountable; she does not necessarily think that Bob has a sense of obligation to Charlie or anyone else. She holds Bob accountable to the standard itself, not to other people. Alice cares about the ideal of proper behavior; therefore, it is important to her that people follow a certain behavioral standard when engaging with others.
The philosopher Harry Frankfurt argued that human behavior is shaped by the things we care about (Frankfurt Reference Frankfurt1982). Although ethical considerations regulate our relations with other people (using moral obligations), we often do not find the requirements of ethics to be the only things we care about. Even people with a strong sense of moral obligations to others can care equally about ideals such as being loyal to a family tradition or can devote themselves to ecological principles of fighting climate change (Frankfurt Reference Frankfurt, Satz, Korsgaard, Bratman and Dan-Cohen2006).
Some people find moral obligations to be their most important obligations, above all other commitments. Others may choose to intentionally violate a moral obligation to another person not because there is a stronger moral obligation to which they are committed, but rather because they consider a certain value, ideal, or course of action to be more important to them than meeting the demands of moral obligations to others. Frankfurt's work draws our attention to the possibility that a unanimous hierarchical scale of obligations (where morality is superior to all other commitments) may not exist. An individual's sense of obligation to other people as well as to specific values or standards varies not only between people but also between situations: A person can choose to fulfill his obligation to another individual in one situation, but in a different circumstance he might choose to obey his commitment to a certain value or ideal over a moral obligation to a person.
Frankfurt has addressed this type of commitment as an integral part of one's inner identity, which serves as the reason and motivation for one's actions. He writes:
A person who cares about something is, as it were, invested in it. He identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced. Thus he concerns himself with what concerns it, giving particular attention to such things and directing his behavior accordingly. (Frankfurt Reference Frankfurt1988, p. 83)
People whose behavior is governed by their commitments to the ideals they care about rather than by their moral obligations to others may be considered self-centered or judged as a person who lacks empathy. However, as Frankfurt has pointed out, the structure of people's personality is more complex than a one-dimensional scale of morality on one end and self-interest on the other. He argued that persons may feel committed to certain cultural or religious ideals that derive neither from moral nor egoistic considerations and may pursue those nonmoral ideals without considering their own personal goals (Frankfurt Reference Frankfurt2004).
Even though Frankfurt challenged the widely accepted authoritative nature of moral obligations, he did not claim that our relationships with other people or the moral requirements for maintaining those relationships are not important to us. He offered the possibility that other types of commitments may count as heavily or even more heavily with us, and he held that one should not assume that moral obligations always override them. For Frankfurt, what guides our behavior is not our moral or nonmoral obligations per se, but rather our attitude toward them: how much we care about these obligations and how important it is for us to carry them out.
According to Frankfurt, the fact that one cares about a certain thing is constituted by a complex set of cognitive dispositions, but he did not account for the interpersonal factors that affect those dispositions. The role of an individual's social environment and group expectations in shaping human behavior is, to some extent, left out of Frankfurt's discussion. To fill the lacuna, let us return to Alice's disapproval of Bob's behavior: Even if Alice profoundly cares about a certain ideal of proper behavior, why should she hold Bob accountable to the same ideal? What urges her to condemn Bob's acts? Whereas Frankfurt did not engage in this type of question, Tomasello considers the societal aspects that are missing from Frankfurt's account. In Tomasello's view, the origins of Alice's expectations may derive from her view of herself, Bob, and Charlie, as members of the same cultural group. As such, all group members are obligated to conform to the group's ways or, if not, they must provide an explanation for their deviation. The object of Alice's sense of obligation may be a standard rather than a person, but in any case, her cultural identity and group affiliation will always play a significant role in the process of cultivating the things she cares about and her attitude toward transgression.
To conclude, human or non-human entities can be the objects of our feelings of obligation, and those, in turn, influence and shape our behavior. My intention in this commentary was to point toward an enhanced psychological account of humans’ sense of obligation, including the approaches of both Frankfurt and Tomasello. Each theory portrays only part of the picture; together, they offer a more comprehensive account of individuals’ feelings of obligation and the objects of those feelings.
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Tomasello presents a compelling analysis of the motivating force behind humans’ sense of obligation, focusing on the intersubjective structure of an obligation. However, obligations are not always immersed in agreements only between individuals. Occasionally, they are promises we make to ourselves, our commitments to a particular ideal of living or a moral value – entities that Tomasello does not discuss. These two different types of obligations can together explain individuals’ behavior. If Bob is impudent to Charlie and Alice condemns Bob's behavior, Alice's criticism may derive from her heartfelt commitment to a certain principle of proper behavior to which she holds everyone accountable; she does not necessarily think that Bob has a sense of obligation to Charlie or anyone else. She holds Bob accountable to the standard itself, not to other people. Alice cares about the ideal of proper behavior; therefore, it is important to her that people follow a certain behavioral standard when engaging with others.
The philosopher Harry Frankfurt argued that human behavior is shaped by the things we care about (Frankfurt Reference Frankfurt1982). Although ethical considerations regulate our relations with other people (using moral obligations), we often do not find the requirements of ethics to be the only things we care about. Even people with a strong sense of moral obligations to others can care equally about ideals such as being loyal to a family tradition or can devote themselves to ecological principles of fighting climate change (Frankfurt Reference Frankfurt, Satz, Korsgaard, Bratman and Dan-Cohen2006).
Some people find moral obligations to be their most important obligations, above all other commitments. Others may choose to intentionally violate a moral obligation to another person not because there is a stronger moral obligation to which they are committed, but rather because they consider a certain value, ideal, or course of action to be more important to them than meeting the demands of moral obligations to others. Frankfurt's work draws our attention to the possibility that a unanimous hierarchical scale of obligations (where morality is superior to all other commitments) may not exist. An individual's sense of obligation to other people as well as to specific values or standards varies not only between people but also between situations: A person can choose to fulfill his obligation to another individual in one situation, but in a different circumstance he might choose to obey his commitment to a certain value or ideal over a moral obligation to a person.
Frankfurt has addressed this type of commitment as an integral part of one's inner identity, which serves as the reason and motivation for one's actions. He writes:
A person who cares about something is, as it were, invested in it. He identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced. Thus he concerns himself with what concerns it, giving particular attention to such things and directing his behavior accordingly. (Frankfurt Reference Frankfurt1988, p. 83)
People whose behavior is governed by their commitments to the ideals they care about rather than by their moral obligations to others may be considered self-centered or judged as a person who lacks empathy. However, as Frankfurt has pointed out, the structure of people's personality is more complex than a one-dimensional scale of morality on one end and self-interest on the other. He argued that persons may feel committed to certain cultural or religious ideals that derive neither from moral nor egoistic considerations and may pursue those nonmoral ideals without considering their own personal goals (Frankfurt Reference Frankfurt2004).
Even though Frankfurt challenged the widely accepted authoritative nature of moral obligations, he did not claim that our relationships with other people or the moral requirements for maintaining those relationships are not important to us. He offered the possibility that other types of commitments may count as heavily or even more heavily with us, and he held that one should not assume that moral obligations always override them. For Frankfurt, what guides our behavior is not our moral or nonmoral obligations per se, but rather our attitude toward them: how much we care about these obligations and how important it is for us to carry them out.
According to Frankfurt, the fact that one cares about a certain thing is constituted by a complex set of cognitive dispositions, but he did not account for the interpersonal factors that affect those dispositions. The role of an individual's social environment and group expectations in shaping human behavior is, to some extent, left out of Frankfurt's discussion. To fill the lacuna, let us return to Alice's disapproval of Bob's behavior: Even if Alice profoundly cares about a certain ideal of proper behavior, why should she hold Bob accountable to the same ideal? What urges her to condemn Bob's acts? Whereas Frankfurt did not engage in this type of question, Tomasello considers the societal aspects that are missing from Frankfurt's account. In Tomasello's view, the origins of Alice's expectations may derive from her view of herself, Bob, and Charlie, as members of the same cultural group. As such, all group members are obligated to conform to the group's ways or, if not, they must provide an explanation for their deviation. The object of Alice's sense of obligation may be a standard rather than a person, but in any case, her cultural identity and group affiliation will always play a significant role in the process of cultivating the things she cares about and her attitude toward transgression.
To conclude, human or non-human entities can be the objects of our feelings of obligation, and those, in turn, influence and shape our behavior. My intention in this commentary was to point toward an enhanced psychological account of humans’ sense of obligation, including the approaches of both Frankfurt and Tomasello. Each theory portrays only part of the picture; together, they offer a more comprehensive account of individuals’ feelings of obligation and the objects of those feelings.