Tomasello provides a compelling account in the target article that moral obligations play a foundational role in the evolution of human ultra-sociality, unique among primates (Tomasello & Vaish Reference Tomasello and Vaish2013; Tomasello Reference Tomasello2014b). In particular, Tomasello acknowledges the importance of “we-intentions” (Searle Reference Searle1995b; Reference Searle2010), through which social actors performatively constitute human institutions and the facts they make possible, such as promises, debts, and other obligations. Tomasello clearly highlights the ability of children as young as three to engage in “we-intentions”, and to think of themselves as members of sociocultural groups, with important consequences for moral obligation. But by focusing on young children, Tomasello offers little to clarify how the capacity for attunement to shared intentionality might develop in its earliest stages, and how it might continue to play a pivotal role in social interactions later in life. Older children, adolescents, and adults continue to participate in dynamic exchanges of stances (Du Bois Reference Du Bois and Englebretson2007) that invoke, evoke, or simply presuppose moral obligations. We believe that the sociality of moral obligation represents a lifelong preoccupation of humans. Its foundations are evident early in infancy, and the dynamics of its constitution and the scope of its effects become both more nuanced and more comprehensive with development.
How early in development do humans see the world as structured by social groups, and see themselves as morally obligated to follow their group's norms? Tomasello argues that a shift happens around 3 years of age. Specifically, he writes, “Ontogenetically, it is only children after three years of age who identify with their culture in this manner” (sect. 2.2, para. 1). But as Tomasello's own recent work shows, even toddlers (18-month-olds) protest when people do not conform to a partner's action, particularly when the action is situated within a normative game (Schmidt et al. Reference Schmidt, Rakoczy and Tomasello2019). That is, when toddlers see someone do a novel action, they are more likely to protest a second person who performs a different action, in cases in which the first person clearly marked that the action corresponded to a norm (“How we do it”). Although these actions are taking place within a partnership, they seem to indicate a broader understanding of obligations incurred via a group's social norms.
In fact, a rapidly growing body of research suggests that the origins of reasoning about people as members of social groups is already in place in infancy, even before children would be able to verbally protest (Liberman et al. Reference Liberman, Woodward and Kinzler2017a). For example, in addition to preferring to approach and learn from people from their own group (e.g., Begus et al. Reference Begus, Gliga and Southgate2016; Buttelmann et al. Reference Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum and Carpenter2013; Kinzler et al. Reference Kinzler, Dupoux and Spelke2007), infants in the first year of life expect people from a group to act alike (Powell & Spelke Reference Powell and Spelke2013), to affiliate (Liberman et al. Reference Liberman, Woodward and Kinzler2017b), and to be similar to one another (Liberman et al. Reference Liberman, Woodward, Sullivan and Kinzler2016). Thus, even preverbal infants appear to structure the social world into social groups, and to make inferences about people's likely traits and behaviors based on group membership. Can these abilities be reconciled with an understanding of the “we-intentions” that would provide evidence of cultural group membership? If so, are they indicative of potential developmental precursors which can grow with the experience of participating in the norms of a cultural group? If not, is there any type of non-verbal evidence that could suggest attention to “we-intentions” in infancy? In general, some clarification is needed about where children's clear understanding of moral obligation to members of their own cultural group comes from.
This points to further questions of mechanism for the learning of we-intentions. Moral norms must be experienced, and learned, through the scaffolding of interactional practices of stancetaking. Moral evaluation is a stance act that is enacted by an individual, but through social interaction it becomes contextualized as a we act. According to the stance triangle model (Du Bois Reference Du Bois and Englebretson2007), conversational partners calibrate the relationship between their respective stances, undertaking a simultaneous commitment to moral evaluation of an object; ethical positioning of themselves; and affiliative alignment (convergent or divergent) with their interlocutors (Du Bois Reference Du Bois and Englebretson2007; Reference Du Bois2014; Du Bois et al. Reference Du Bois, Hobson and Hobson2014). When a shared stance object commands our joint attention (Tomasello Reference Tomasello1988), it invites not only my expressed evaluation but yours, plus a third aspect which may be explicit or implicit: an assessment of the alignment between my stance and yours. Children are attuned to stance alignment early, as suggested by toddlers’ stances framed in dialogic resonance (Köymen & Kyratzis Reference Köymen and Kyratzis2014). Stance alignment continues to play a pivotal role in the interactional construction of moral and social identity through childhood, adolescence, and adulthood (de León Reference de León2019; Goodwin Reference Goodwin2006; Stivers et al. Reference Stivers, Mondada and Steensig2011), in both typically developing children and children with autism (Du Bois et al. Reference Du Bois, Hobson and Hobson2014; Sterponi Reference Sterponi2004).
Although humans surely feel themselves subject to the compelling force of moral obligations, they are also exquisitely attuned to conflicting norms, which may compete for their allegiance within and across groups. The possibility of negotiating which obligation currently carries the greater moral imperative, given the complexities and ambiguities of everyday social life, may lead people to invoke, compare, reject, or adopt one moral principle over another, ultimately resolving (or not) the vexed question of what is the right thing to do. In the target article, Tomasello provides striking evidence that moral obligations emerge by early childhood and develop across the school years. But we suggest it is important to consider a broader developmental time course and to come to terms with the cognitive and affective affordances, as well as interactional practices, that scaffold the emergence of an increasingly nuanced attunement to moral obligation within a social framing. Humans are an incredibly social species: Our drive to cooperate and take stances that convey alignment with our own social group may be evidenced across the lifespan. Future research will benefit by bringing together converging evidence from across the lifespan, drawing from naturally occurring interactions and experiments, to clarify why, how, and with what consequences humans manage the sociality of moral obligation.
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Tomasello provides a compelling account in the target article that moral obligations play a foundational role in the evolution of human ultra-sociality, unique among primates (Tomasello & Vaish Reference Tomasello and Vaish2013; Tomasello Reference Tomasello2014b). In particular, Tomasello acknowledges the importance of “we-intentions” (Searle Reference Searle1995b; Reference Searle2010), through which social actors performatively constitute human institutions and the facts they make possible, such as promises, debts, and other obligations. Tomasello clearly highlights the ability of children as young as three to engage in “we-intentions”, and to think of themselves as members of sociocultural groups, with important consequences for moral obligation. But by focusing on young children, Tomasello offers little to clarify how the capacity for attunement to shared intentionality might develop in its earliest stages, and how it might continue to play a pivotal role in social interactions later in life. Older children, adolescents, and adults continue to participate in dynamic exchanges of stances (Du Bois Reference Du Bois and Englebretson2007) that invoke, evoke, or simply presuppose moral obligations. We believe that the sociality of moral obligation represents a lifelong preoccupation of humans. Its foundations are evident early in infancy, and the dynamics of its constitution and the scope of its effects become both more nuanced and more comprehensive with development.
How early in development do humans see the world as structured by social groups, and see themselves as morally obligated to follow their group's norms? Tomasello argues that a shift happens around 3 years of age. Specifically, he writes, “Ontogenetically, it is only children after three years of age who identify with their culture in this manner” (sect. 2.2, para. 1). But as Tomasello's own recent work shows, even toddlers (18-month-olds) protest when people do not conform to a partner's action, particularly when the action is situated within a normative game (Schmidt et al. Reference Schmidt, Rakoczy and Tomasello2019). That is, when toddlers see someone do a novel action, they are more likely to protest a second person who performs a different action, in cases in which the first person clearly marked that the action corresponded to a norm (“How we do it”). Although these actions are taking place within a partnership, they seem to indicate a broader understanding of obligations incurred via a group's social norms.
In fact, a rapidly growing body of research suggests that the origins of reasoning about people as members of social groups is already in place in infancy, even before children would be able to verbally protest (Liberman et al. Reference Liberman, Woodward and Kinzler2017a). For example, in addition to preferring to approach and learn from people from their own group (e.g., Begus et al. Reference Begus, Gliga and Southgate2016; Buttelmann et al. Reference Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum and Carpenter2013; Kinzler et al. Reference Kinzler, Dupoux and Spelke2007), infants in the first year of life expect people from a group to act alike (Powell & Spelke Reference Powell and Spelke2013), to affiliate (Liberman et al. Reference Liberman, Woodward and Kinzler2017b), and to be similar to one another (Liberman et al. Reference Liberman, Woodward, Sullivan and Kinzler2016). Thus, even preverbal infants appear to structure the social world into social groups, and to make inferences about people's likely traits and behaviors based on group membership. Can these abilities be reconciled with an understanding of the “we-intentions” that would provide evidence of cultural group membership? If so, are they indicative of potential developmental precursors which can grow with the experience of participating in the norms of a cultural group? If not, is there any type of non-verbal evidence that could suggest attention to “we-intentions” in infancy? In general, some clarification is needed about where children's clear understanding of moral obligation to members of their own cultural group comes from.
This points to further questions of mechanism for the learning of we-intentions. Moral norms must be experienced, and learned, through the scaffolding of interactional practices of stancetaking. Moral evaluation is a stance act that is enacted by an individual, but through social interaction it becomes contextualized as a we act. According to the stance triangle model (Du Bois Reference Du Bois and Englebretson2007), conversational partners calibrate the relationship between their respective stances, undertaking a simultaneous commitment to moral evaluation of an object; ethical positioning of themselves; and affiliative alignment (convergent or divergent) with their interlocutors (Du Bois Reference Du Bois and Englebretson2007; Reference Du Bois2014; Du Bois et al. Reference Du Bois, Hobson and Hobson2014). When a shared stance object commands our joint attention (Tomasello Reference Tomasello1988), it invites not only my expressed evaluation but yours, plus a third aspect which may be explicit or implicit: an assessment of the alignment between my stance and yours. Children are attuned to stance alignment early, as suggested by toddlers’ stances framed in dialogic resonance (Köymen & Kyratzis Reference Köymen and Kyratzis2014). Stance alignment continues to play a pivotal role in the interactional construction of moral and social identity through childhood, adolescence, and adulthood (de León Reference de León2019; Goodwin Reference Goodwin2006; Stivers et al. Reference Stivers, Mondada and Steensig2011), in both typically developing children and children with autism (Du Bois et al. Reference Du Bois, Hobson and Hobson2014; Sterponi Reference Sterponi2004).
Although humans surely feel themselves subject to the compelling force of moral obligations, they are also exquisitely attuned to conflicting norms, which may compete for their allegiance within and across groups. The possibility of negotiating which obligation currently carries the greater moral imperative, given the complexities and ambiguities of everyday social life, may lead people to invoke, compare, reject, or adopt one moral principle over another, ultimately resolving (or not) the vexed question of what is the right thing to do. In the target article, Tomasello provides striking evidence that moral obligations emerge by early childhood and develop across the school years. But we suggest it is important to consider a broader developmental time course and to come to terms with the cognitive and affective affordances, as well as interactional practices, that scaffold the emergence of an increasingly nuanced attunement to moral obligation within a social framing. Humans are an incredibly social species: Our drive to cooperate and take stances that convey alignment with our own social group may be evidenced across the lifespan. Future research will benefit by bringing together converging evidence from across the lifespan, drawing from naturally occurring interactions and experiments, to clarify why, how, and with what consequences humans manage the sociality of moral obligation.