Mahr & Csibra (M&C) propose that the main function of episodic memory is to create reliable information packages through episodic reconstruction in order to convince others about the authenticity of a certain statement. Although the account offered does not make any predictions about the mechanisms involved, M&C argue that “the main achievements in episodic memory development occur as a consequence of the development of retrieval mechanisms” (sect. 4, para. 5). Consequently, they leave open the relationship between the characteristics of encoding and retrieval processes.
We propose that an extension of the present theory may be fruitful with regard to the encoding of memory traces that later may become constituents of episodic memories. As retrieval is a search among memory traces, it is necessary that the selection process of elements that are encoded is determined by the same factors that later trigger and guide the construction of episodic memories (Tulving & Thomson Reference Tulving and Thomson1973; Wagner et al. Reference Wagner, Desmond, Glover and Gabrieli1998). If the role of episodic memories is to provide proof for reliable information through asserting epistemic authority, and as M&C argue, “contextual elements that … make verification possible … allow one to be perceived as more convincing” (sect. 3.1.1, para. 7), then parts of a situation that may make reporting it later as authentic should be more likely encoded in the first place.
According to M&C's proposal, episodic memory is useful for keeping social commitments, an essential part of human social life. Recalling an episodic memory aims to serve as justification for the authentic nature of our belief, and it may be scrutinized by our interlocutor. Therefore, we can apply self-directed epistemic vigilance beforehand to assess the likelihood that the interlocutor would accept the content as legitimate. In their conceptualization, following the argument of Cosmides and Tooby (Reference Cosmides, Tooby and Sperber2000), in human communicative interactions it is useful to maintain the causal history of first-person beliefs.
We suggest that in order to retain the causal history of beliefs, encoding processes need to be sensitive to potential aspects of a situation that can be retrieved when an episodic memory is formed – which also enables avoiding assertions that would lead the social partner to decline our claims of epistemic authority. This applies to the causal history of first-person beliefs that M&C discuss, but it is also necessary with regard to third-person beliefs. The latter is especially important because, although it may happen that we have no prior communicative episode with the social partner, assertions of epistemic authority are in fact often preceded by a history of interactions with the addressee.
This notion appears in M&C's examples as well (e.g., sect. 3.1.1, para. 1): John and Jenny are on a walk, and Jenny expresses her belief that they might have left the oven on at home. John replies, “Don't worry, I remember that we turned it off.” In this communicative episode, the reference to remembering makes Jenny both (1) accept John's belief as true and (2) change her own belief as well. However, this assertion may not be as effective if Jenny had also expressed that her worries emerged from remembering that she saw the oven working right before they left the apartment; if Jenny did not remember that John has indeed been in the kitchen that morning; or especially if she had reasons to think that John in fact did not go into the kitchen. Consequently, for such arguments to be successful, it is necessary that the communicator not only retrieve and use information about the source of her or his first-person beliefs, but also select information potentially relevant and adequate for persuading the partner, which could be done only in relation to the communicative partner's access to the events in question.
For successful construction of episodic memories that are used in communication, one therefore often has to encode not just any contextual detail, but track information in relation to a specific social partner. To later recall information that is relevant for that social partner, one must – at the time a specific episode takes place – select, encode, and store (and, often, index) – those elements to a specific person. Additionally, one must take into account any aspects of the event that may potentially contribute to the later construction of the episodic memory related to that communication encounter.
A further challenge is to describe what enables the identification of relevant memory traces at reconstruction. M&C argue that episodic memory requires not only the understanding that seeing leads to knowing, but further that seeing validates claims about knowledge. We propose that in order to bridge encoding and retrieval, online theory of mind (by which we mean real-time, continuous belief monitoring) has to support the encoding of information potentially relevant to the basis of belief formation. Episodic memory “hooks” onto these elements (of the causal history of belief formation for the social partner's belief), and if a later cue refers to these bases of previously formed (attributed) beliefs, this enables the collection of adequate components of episodic memory. Importantly, this process requires the reidentification of the social partner, and the attribution of the social knowledge base and monitoring of potential differences between the self and the partner. Altogether, this mechanism increases the (perceived) veridicality of episodic beliefs reported in a communicative interaction.
The suggested interdependence between episodic memory and theory of mind opens novel perspectives with regard to the developmental trajectory of both domains. Namely, the emergence of episodic memory retrieval would be bootstrapped by communicative situations (e.g., Southgate et al. Reference Southgate, Chevallier and Csibra2010) especially when mindreading is involved; and relatedly, the mindreading system could learn to update previously attributed beliefs according to relevant new information (Király et al., in preparation) through the emergence of episodic memory.
Mahr & Csibra (M&C) propose that the main function of episodic memory is to create reliable information packages through episodic reconstruction in order to convince others about the authenticity of a certain statement. Although the account offered does not make any predictions about the mechanisms involved, M&C argue that “the main achievements in episodic memory development occur as a consequence of the development of retrieval mechanisms” (sect. 4, para. 5). Consequently, they leave open the relationship between the characteristics of encoding and retrieval processes.
We propose that an extension of the present theory may be fruitful with regard to the encoding of memory traces that later may become constituents of episodic memories. As retrieval is a search among memory traces, it is necessary that the selection process of elements that are encoded is determined by the same factors that later trigger and guide the construction of episodic memories (Tulving & Thomson Reference Tulving and Thomson1973; Wagner et al. Reference Wagner, Desmond, Glover and Gabrieli1998). If the role of episodic memories is to provide proof for reliable information through asserting epistemic authority, and as M&C argue, “contextual elements that … make verification possible … allow one to be perceived as more convincing” (sect. 3.1.1, para. 7), then parts of a situation that may make reporting it later as authentic should be more likely encoded in the first place.
According to M&C's proposal, episodic memory is useful for keeping social commitments, an essential part of human social life. Recalling an episodic memory aims to serve as justification for the authentic nature of our belief, and it may be scrutinized by our interlocutor. Therefore, we can apply self-directed epistemic vigilance beforehand to assess the likelihood that the interlocutor would accept the content as legitimate. In their conceptualization, following the argument of Cosmides and Tooby (Reference Cosmides, Tooby and Sperber2000), in human communicative interactions it is useful to maintain the causal history of first-person beliefs.
We suggest that in order to retain the causal history of beliefs, encoding processes need to be sensitive to potential aspects of a situation that can be retrieved when an episodic memory is formed – which also enables avoiding assertions that would lead the social partner to decline our claims of epistemic authority. This applies to the causal history of first-person beliefs that M&C discuss, but it is also necessary with regard to third-person beliefs. The latter is especially important because, although it may happen that we have no prior communicative episode with the social partner, assertions of epistemic authority are in fact often preceded by a history of interactions with the addressee.
This notion appears in M&C's examples as well (e.g., sect. 3.1.1, para. 1): John and Jenny are on a walk, and Jenny expresses her belief that they might have left the oven on at home. John replies, “Don't worry, I remember that we turned it off.” In this communicative episode, the reference to remembering makes Jenny both (1) accept John's belief as true and (2) change her own belief as well. However, this assertion may not be as effective if Jenny had also expressed that her worries emerged from remembering that she saw the oven working right before they left the apartment; if Jenny did not remember that John has indeed been in the kitchen that morning; or especially if she had reasons to think that John in fact did not go into the kitchen. Consequently, for such arguments to be successful, it is necessary that the communicator not only retrieve and use information about the source of her or his first-person beliefs, but also select information potentially relevant and adequate for persuading the partner, which could be done only in relation to the communicative partner's access to the events in question.
For successful construction of episodic memories that are used in communication, one therefore often has to encode not just any contextual detail, but track information in relation to a specific social partner. To later recall information that is relevant for that social partner, one must – at the time a specific episode takes place – select, encode, and store (and, often, index) – those elements to a specific person. Additionally, one must take into account any aspects of the event that may potentially contribute to the later construction of the episodic memory related to that communication encounter.
A further challenge is to describe what enables the identification of relevant memory traces at reconstruction. M&C argue that episodic memory requires not only the understanding that seeing leads to knowing, but further that seeing validates claims about knowledge. We propose that in order to bridge encoding and retrieval, online theory of mind (by which we mean real-time, continuous belief monitoring) has to support the encoding of information potentially relevant to the basis of belief formation. Episodic memory “hooks” onto these elements (of the causal history of belief formation for the social partner's belief), and if a later cue refers to these bases of previously formed (attributed) beliefs, this enables the collection of adequate components of episodic memory. Importantly, this process requires the reidentification of the social partner, and the attribution of the social knowledge base and monitoring of potential differences between the self and the partner. Altogether, this mechanism increases the (perceived) veridicality of episodic beliefs reported in a communicative interaction.
The suggested interdependence between episodic memory and theory of mind opens novel perspectives with regard to the developmental trajectory of both domains. Namely, the emergence of episodic memory retrieval would be bootstrapped by communicative situations (e.g., Southgate et al. Reference Southgate, Chevallier and Csibra2010) especially when mindreading is involved; and relatedly, the mindreading system could learn to update previously attributed beliefs according to relevant new information (Király et al., in preparation) through the emergence of episodic memory.