Since Tulving's (Reference Tulving1985) seminal work, psychologists have treated episodic memories not just as involving the recall of autobiographical events, but critically, as entailing autonoetic consciousness – that is, a “reliving” through acts of remembering. In order to explain why humans possess a memory with this curious property, Mahr & Csibra (M&C) ask what function episodic memory serves over, for instance, event memory. For them, the answer rests in the communicative nature of remembering. When speakers convey episodic memories to listeners – when they state “I remember that I turned off the oven” – they establish epistemic authority and do so in part because of the autonoetic character of the episodic memory. This epistemic authority assures listeners that they can accept, with a reasonable degree of certainty, that the oven was turned off. M&C claim that listeners would be less certain if they were merely told, “I turned off the oven.”
We have reservations about this claim. Is there, as M&C aver, more epistemic authority to the statement “I remember turning off the oven” than not only the statement “I turned off the oven,” but also the statement “I know that I turned off the oven”? Or to put it another way, why is autonoesis necessary for assertions of epistemic authority, whereas noesis is not, or is so to a lesser degree? To insist “I know that I turned off the oven,” one need not remember turning off the oven. One may simply know that checking if the oven is off is part of a complex routine one always goes through when leaving the house. Many people may believe the assurance of a well-established routine over reports of specific recollections told from a first-person perspective. After all, by virtue of personal experience and metacognitive insight, people have a sense of the potential fallibility of memory (Ryan & See Reference Ryan and See1993). Moreover, with recurrent coverage in mass media and public education, the unreliability of memory has increasingly become common knowledge. Additionally, conversational rules captured by the maxim of quantity and relevance (Sperber & Wilson Reference Sperber and Wilson1986) may lead listeners to wonder why the speaker uses an additional, essentially unnecessary qualifier like “I remember” to assert the truth of a proposition.
We have, however, a stronger reservation about the epistemic authority putatively granted by episodic memory. For us, M&C's focus on the epistemic functions of remembering is too myopic. As scholars have noted, the functions of episodic memory reach beyond the epistemic (e.g., Bluck et al. Reference Bluck, Alea, Habermas and Rubin2005; Hirst & Echterhoff Reference Hirst and Echterhoff2012). Critically, remembering can have a social function, in that it can serve to bind together speaker and listener. A couple reminiscing about their first date might not be terribly concerned about conveying new information to each other or even verifying their recollections. The conversation is not about epistemic authority. Rather, the conversation is undertaken to enhance intimacy.
M&C touch on the social functions of remembering when they discuss “social commitments.” For instance, people often promise that they will do something. Saying that “I remember that you fulfilled your promise” becomes a means of asserting epistemic authority as to the fulfillment of (or failure to fulfill) a social commitment. But, as our example of a couple reminiscing indicates, the social function of communicative remembering goes far beyond its role in ensuring social commitments. Social relations are much more than contractual arrangements. Indeed, many of the social relationships people value – between themselves and lovers, friends, or even business colleagues – are better characterized in terms of emotional connections than contractual agreements. Communicative acts of remembering not only allow one to keep account of social commitments, but also they can enhance the sense of interpersonal connectedness.
In contrast to the questionable need for autonoesis to grant epistemic authority, there is little question that autonoesis is needed if remembering is to foster social bonding. Joint reminiscing simply could not accomplish this function if the relevant parties were not jointly re-experiencing the remembered event. The intimacy created between John and Jane as they jointly recount their first date depends on their jointly reliving that date. They must both be autonoetically conscious that their memory concerns an event that happened to them. Indeed, assertion of epistemic authority might even ruin the moment.
Moreover, whereas mnemonic reliability is critical in epistemic claims of remembering, remembering does not have to be viewed as, or actually be, reliable to enhance social bonds. After all, it is through the unreliability and malleability of memory that relationally motivated joint recollections reshape the memories of relevant parties and thereby lead to a convergence on a shared representation of the past (Hirst & Echterhoff Reference Hirst and Echterhoff2012). As a result of their conversation, John and Jane come to remember their first date in the same way, not because they jointly assess the validity of the claim, but because Jane implants a memory into John, or John induces Jane to forget particular details as he fails to mention them.
In this way, acts of remembering allow the creation of a collective memory and a shared reality and, in turn, enhance human sociality (Echterhoff et al. Reference Echterhoff, Higgins and Levine2009a; Hirst Reference Hirst, Stone and Bietti2014). M&C failed to appreciate this outcome. For instance, the passages on communication effects on memory (sect. 3.1.2 in the target article) misrepresent underlying motivational processes (see Echterhoff et al. Reference Echterhoff, Higgins and Levine2009a). There is no evidence that these effects are driven by reputational concerns. Rather, tailoring one's communication to the audience for reasons other than shared-reality creation, such as reputation management, is likely to eliminate the effects (Echterhoff et al. Reference Echterhoff, Higgins, Kopietz and Groll2008).
The curious property of autonoesis, then, may have as much to do with the social, as opposed to the epistemic, functions of remembering. Indeed, for us, it is not surprising that, inasmuch as human being are “ultrasocial” (Campbell Reference Campbell and Bridgeman1983), something as distinctively human as the autonoetic character of episodic memory may rest in part on the social functions of remembering.
Since Tulving's (Reference Tulving1985) seminal work, psychologists have treated episodic memories not just as involving the recall of autobiographical events, but critically, as entailing autonoetic consciousness – that is, a “reliving” through acts of remembering. In order to explain why humans possess a memory with this curious property, Mahr & Csibra (M&C) ask what function episodic memory serves over, for instance, event memory. For them, the answer rests in the communicative nature of remembering. When speakers convey episodic memories to listeners – when they state “I remember that I turned off the oven” – they establish epistemic authority and do so in part because of the autonoetic character of the episodic memory. This epistemic authority assures listeners that they can accept, with a reasonable degree of certainty, that the oven was turned off. M&C claim that listeners would be less certain if they were merely told, “I turned off the oven.”
We have reservations about this claim. Is there, as M&C aver, more epistemic authority to the statement “I remember turning off the oven” than not only the statement “I turned off the oven,” but also the statement “I know that I turned off the oven”? Or to put it another way, why is autonoesis necessary for assertions of epistemic authority, whereas noesis is not, or is so to a lesser degree? To insist “I know that I turned off the oven,” one need not remember turning off the oven. One may simply know that checking if the oven is off is part of a complex routine one always goes through when leaving the house. Many people may believe the assurance of a well-established routine over reports of specific recollections told from a first-person perspective. After all, by virtue of personal experience and metacognitive insight, people have a sense of the potential fallibility of memory (Ryan & See Reference Ryan and See1993). Moreover, with recurrent coverage in mass media and public education, the unreliability of memory has increasingly become common knowledge. Additionally, conversational rules captured by the maxim of quantity and relevance (Sperber & Wilson Reference Sperber and Wilson1986) may lead listeners to wonder why the speaker uses an additional, essentially unnecessary qualifier like “I remember” to assert the truth of a proposition.
We have, however, a stronger reservation about the epistemic authority putatively granted by episodic memory. For us, M&C's focus on the epistemic functions of remembering is too myopic. As scholars have noted, the functions of episodic memory reach beyond the epistemic (e.g., Bluck et al. Reference Bluck, Alea, Habermas and Rubin2005; Hirst & Echterhoff Reference Hirst and Echterhoff2012). Critically, remembering can have a social function, in that it can serve to bind together speaker and listener. A couple reminiscing about their first date might not be terribly concerned about conveying new information to each other or even verifying their recollections. The conversation is not about epistemic authority. Rather, the conversation is undertaken to enhance intimacy.
M&C touch on the social functions of remembering when they discuss “social commitments.” For instance, people often promise that they will do something. Saying that “I remember that you fulfilled your promise” becomes a means of asserting epistemic authority as to the fulfillment of (or failure to fulfill) a social commitment. But, as our example of a couple reminiscing indicates, the social function of communicative remembering goes far beyond its role in ensuring social commitments. Social relations are much more than contractual arrangements. Indeed, many of the social relationships people value – between themselves and lovers, friends, or even business colleagues – are better characterized in terms of emotional connections than contractual agreements. Communicative acts of remembering not only allow one to keep account of social commitments, but also they can enhance the sense of interpersonal connectedness.
In contrast to the questionable need for autonoesis to grant epistemic authority, there is little question that autonoesis is needed if remembering is to foster social bonding. Joint reminiscing simply could not accomplish this function if the relevant parties were not jointly re-experiencing the remembered event. The intimacy created between John and Jane as they jointly recount their first date depends on their jointly reliving that date. They must both be autonoetically conscious that their memory concerns an event that happened to them. Indeed, assertion of epistemic authority might even ruin the moment.
Moreover, whereas mnemonic reliability is critical in epistemic claims of remembering, remembering does not have to be viewed as, or actually be, reliable to enhance social bonds. After all, it is through the unreliability and malleability of memory that relationally motivated joint recollections reshape the memories of relevant parties and thereby lead to a convergence on a shared representation of the past (Hirst & Echterhoff Reference Hirst and Echterhoff2012). As a result of their conversation, John and Jane come to remember their first date in the same way, not because they jointly assess the validity of the claim, but because Jane implants a memory into John, or John induces Jane to forget particular details as he fails to mention them.
In this way, acts of remembering allow the creation of a collective memory and a shared reality and, in turn, enhance human sociality (Echterhoff et al. Reference Echterhoff, Higgins and Levine2009a; Hirst Reference Hirst, Stone and Bietti2014). M&C failed to appreciate this outcome. For instance, the passages on communication effects on memory (sect. 3.1.2 in the target article) misrepresent underlying motivational processes (see Echterhoff et al. Reference Echterhoff, Higgins and Levine2009a). There is no evidence that these effects are driven by reputational concerns. Rather, tailoring one's communication to the audience for reasons other than shared-reality creation, such as reputation management, is likely to eliminate the effects (Echterhoff et al. Reference Echterhoff, Higgins, Kopietz and Groll2008).
The curious property of autonoesis, then, may have as much to do with the social, as opposed to the epistemic, functions of remembering. Indeed, for us, it is not surprising that, inasmuch as human being are “ultrasocial” (Campbell Reference Campbell and Bridgeman1983), something as distinctively human as the autonoetic character of episodic memory may rest in part on the social functions of remembering.