The first person to be sentenced by the United Nations ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Tribunal) was Dražen Erdemović, a member of the Bosnian Serb Army who had pleaded guilty to one count of a crime against humanity – murder – and another of violations of the laws and customs of war – murder. Erdemović was a soldier in the 10th Sabotage Detachment of the Bosnian Serb army and the charges against him arose in connection with the slaughter of Bosnian Muslim civilians in the United Nations ‘safe areas’ of Srebrenica and Potocari.

The admissibility challenge of the defence in Katanga has raised complex issues of litigation in the light of the practice of self-referrals and existing ICC jurisprudence. This article examines the Katanga Trial Chamber decision and its consequences from this perspective. It focuses on three themes that are of particular relevance, since they have a direct impact on the functioning of the Court and its different organs: (i) the timing for a challenge of the admissibility of the case; (2) access to information related to admissibility; and (iii) the role of the defence.

As the clash of aspirations increased among European countries, a European ‘civil war’ started in 1914, which engulfed the whole world. With all the terrible destruction and loss of life, it was felt that an international organization must be established to avert war in future. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the British government succeeded in gaining separate representation for its dominions, including India. This created a rather anomalous situation, since a dependency of a foreign power, a colony which could not control its internal affairs, was accepted as a sovereign state by an international treaty. Europe had hardly recovered from the First World War in the late 1920s when it drifted towards a second holocaust in 1939. India became a founding member of the United Nations in 1945, even though it was still under British rule, participating in the historic founding conference. But Indian national public opinion was neither very hopeful nor enthusiastic about the conference on the new international organization. Not only India, which was not even independent at that time, but Asian countries as such played a very small and insignificant role in the formulation of the UN Charter.

The notion of ‘armed attack’ is at the heart of the law on the use of force in self-defence. The ICJ first addressed the issue in its judgment in Nicaragua; however, its formulation of the legal parameters of ‘armed attack’ has not been without controversy. In particular, the high threshold of force required for an ‘armed attack’ and the consequent distinction between ‘armed attack’ proper and acts of lower intensity (termed ‘frontier incidents’) is said to have reduced the barrier to armed aggression. More recently, the formulation has also been criticized for not being fully applicable to large-scale terrorist attacks such as the events of 11 September 2001. This article examines the Court's first pronouncement on the concept of armed attack, with a specific focus on the rationae materiae aspect of ‘armed attack’, which situates it in the context from which it arose and analyses its development through subsequent case law, particularly the Court's judgments in Oil Platforms and Armed Activities (Congo v. Uganda) and the decision of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission.

The ICTY has interpreted its Statute as a ‘treaty’. This was not the intention of the UN Secretariat and the Security Council, and is not consistent with other treatments of the Statute. While the Statute literally satisfies the definition of ‘treaty’ in the 1969 Vienna Convention, this shows only the generality of that definition. The adoption of more precise labels for the Statute and other multi-state instruments adopted by international organizations through representational mechanisms would avoid confusion and promote better understanding of the rules that govern them.

Ceasefire agreements are legally governed by international humanitarian law because they have generally been considered in relation to how they affect levels of violence. However, new research in the fields of anthropology, security, and development studies suggests that ceasefires can have many more ramifications. These range from their ability to influence governance institutions, property and citizenship rights, economic networks, and security mechanisms. Consequently, this article suggests that a broader legal framework is needed through which to consider ceasefires and their consequences. While canvassing the option of ceasefires being types of contractual documents or as special agreements under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the article concludes that the best way to regulate ceasefire agreements is through an expanded version of lex pacificatoria. Rather than being governed by hard international law, such a move would allow for the implementation of more flexible programmatic standards to influence the myriad ways ceasefires are negotiated, the conduct of belligerents, and their diverse effects on the ground during wartime.

Lomé Conventions I (1975) and II (1979) were the first regional trade agreements (RTAs) between the European Community (EC) and the group of postcolonial countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP). Specialized scholarship offers rich analyses of those Conventions; however, little is known about the role of law and lawyers in their making, and their relevance for present-day debates about RTAs.

This article advances existing knowledge in two ways. First, it historicizes the more visible role of law in constituting Lomé as a legal regime for governing EC-ACP regionalism. It then argues that the Conventions were distinct from existing RTAs due to their unique centrality on social and economic development; and from present-day RTAs, because they were conceived not simply as instrumental to but also as constitutive of development.

Second, by historicizing the less visible role of law and lawyers in the Lomé regime, the article identifies that a specialist conception of South-North RTAs was refined to govern which ideas, projects, norms, and institutions were applicable to Lomé. This distinct conception – called the development framework – was critical in creating the conditions of possibility for decision-makers negotiate, interpret, and manage the Conventions.

Those findings challenge conventional wisdom on two grounds. They suggest that Lomé was unique not for embodying a new model but for consolidating the development framework’s dominance. They contest present-day understanding of RTAs as textual manifestations of a universal concept by demonstrating the existence of competing conceptions, which express distinct notions of RTAs’ purpose, content, and form.

Despite the clear prohibition of rape by international law, no conventional or other international instrument defines this international crime or explains its relation to the international crime of genocide. This article reviews the recent precedent-setting judgments of the international criminal tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda which have sought to define rape in international law using different approaches. It also analyses the recent Akayesu Judgment of the Rwanda Tribunal. This is the first decision of an international tribunal to consider the question of whether rape can constitute genocide.

Commentators now regularly declare that the International Criminal court (ICC) – and international criminal law as a whole – is in crisis. It is certainly the case that the ICC faces a number of operational challenges, and that these challenges worry its defenders. However, one unexamined rationalist assumption is that the Court’s inability to deliver consistent outputs will mean waning influence. This article explores an alternative constructivist theory that the ICC produces diffuse social impacts that are not necessarily tied to its operating effectively. This theory is tested statistically using Google Trends data. Specifically, the article examines whether ICC intervention in a country is associated with more internet search for ‘human rights’. Taking this to be a measure of changing discourse in countries, the article finds that some types of ICC involvement are associated with a far higher interest in human rights, and that this interest only increases as ICC involvement extends in time. In short, despite its disappointments, evidence suggests that the ICC still serves a socio-pedagogical function. Though it does not fit well within a rational evaluation framework, this kind of information should be considered in ICC performance reviews.

The nature of international criminal trial practice is integral to the perception of the legitimacy of international criminal justice. However, our understanding of what transpires within the trial chambers of international courts and tribunals (ICTs) comes primarily from the reports of judges, lawyers, and stakeholders within the system. This article argues that, while the vast body of international criminal justice scholarship barely draws on socio-legal research, empirical work can contribute to a more objective understanding of international criminal trial practice. It examines prevailing academic approaches to the study of international trial practice as a backdrop to the assessment of data from one of the most expansive empirical studies of international trial practice, undertaken during the second mandate (1999–2003) of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The findings illustrate significant variations in how judges in different Trial Chambers chose to exercise discretion, revealing the co-existence of two distinct modalities of practice in ‘proactive’ and ‘reactive’ Trial Chambers. Quantitative and qualitative data allow for an assessment of the efficiency of these modalities, revealing the critical role of the performance of the judge in the trial process. It is argued that these findings highlight the potential for further socio-legal research to motivate ‘light-touch reform’ within the international criminal justice system.

Additional opinions (AOs) – dissenting opinions, separate opinions and declarations, whether authored individually or jointly – are a distinctive characteristic of the ICJ’s jurisprudence. Few decisions of the International Court of Justice (the Court, ICJ) are delivered without any additional opinion attached to it. Yet, despite their ubiquity, there is still significant disagreement as to their relationship to the authority of the Court and its decisions. Although this disagreement is commonly attributed to the different approaches and attitudes traditionally associated with the ‘civil law’ and ‘common law’ traditions, few ask specifically why those traditions take the approach they do, and even fewer consider the appropriateness of the extension of those attitudes to the ICJ, which of course is neither ‘civil law’ nor ‘common law’. In this article, using the work of Mirjan Damaška, I offer a contextually coherent and contextually contingent understand of the theory and practice of additional opinions at the ICJ upon which engagement with this practice – by judges, scholars and practitioners – can be premised. This effort to understand the relationship between additional opinions and institutional authority will, by its very nature, lead to a broader enquiry into the very nature of institutional authority at the ICJ. Having explained the importance of AOs to the structural integrity of the Court’s authority, I will close this article by highlighting the role of various stakeholders when engaging with that practice to ensure that their institutional function is discharged.

This presentation is twofold. The first part shows that the Nicaragua case played a significant role in reconciling the Third World with the International Court of Justice and, more generally, in revitalizing the Court. In the second part, the author, who was counsel for Nicaragua in that case, casts an eye as external analyst on the judgments of 1984, about which he has some reluctance, and 1986, which he largely approves of, even though Nicaragua did not win 100 per cent and some points may be debatable.

Rights and obligations connected with intellectual property and liability will influence the commercial exploitation of outer space by private entities. Whilst international space law facilitates private enterprise participation in space endeavour, additional action has been taken, on national as well as multi-national level, to provide the business community with the necessary incentives to play their role in the commercialization of space activities. The situation and legal developments described in this article mark the very beginning of a movement towards the consolidation and diversification of commercial space exploitation.

“[…]for in the international community the rule of law generally ranks second after politics.”

“Basis van goede verstandhouding kan slechts het recht zijn. Recht alleen kan goede houdingen bestendigen, geschillen voorkomen of bevredigend oplossen. Onrecht, geweld en anarchie voeren tot ondergang, omdat er kiem van destructie zit in al wat niet rechtens is.”

Does the International Court of Justice have the power to indicate legally binding provisional measures? On the basis of the provisions of the UN Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, it seems unlikely that the Court is bestowed with such a power. An alternative argument, which regards interim protection as a general principle of law, thus giving it binding force, is also not without difficulties. The situation seems to be clearer, however, when states declare in a treaty their intention to be bound by the provisional measures indicated by the Court. The argument considering provisional measures as a ‘moral obligation’ will be examined as well.

This article scrutinizes the investment chapters in the new EU Free Trade Agreements from a transparency perspective. The article examines the claims that the dispute settlement mechanisms in the new treaties are sufficiently participatory and more transparent than their predecessors. Procedural standards related to confidentiality of proceedings shall be analysed in the context of existing transparency safeguards in investment arbitration. In addition to procedural guarantees of transparency, the article examines relevant substantive rules affecting participatory aspects of dispute settlement. Furthermore, the article discusses forum-shopping strategies of the parties in the field of investment-related disputes, including internal forum-shopping and parallel proceedings using different procedural mechanisms. In this context, lessons from other fields such as international commercial arbitration related to transparency (in cases in which public interest is present) are highlighted. The proposal for the establishment of an integrated, multilateral court for investment cases is also invoked.

More than a decade after the end of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the issue of missing persons remains a major obstacle to reconciliation. With a focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina, this article looks at the phenomenon of missing persons and reviews the scope of the legal protection available to the victims and their family members, as well as some of the institutional efforts to shed light on their fate. The article describes the progressive development of the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a court modelled on the procedures of the European Court of Human Rights, which held that Bosnian authorities who are withholding from family members information about missing persons are violating their right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment and their right to respect for private and family life. It further illustrates the positive effects on politicians and lawmakers which can emanate from transitional justice.

In this monograph Professor Tai-Heng Cheng purports to set up a global perspective on the role of international law in international relations, and in particular on the conditions and ways through which it can be effective. The perspective is the one of the ‘rational’ decision-maker, in the best vein of the New Haven school, whose theoretical framework the author espouses completely and thoroughly. The book is a valuable contribution to international legal theory; it is not written in abstract and hollow words, but on the basis of a practical enquiry based on many examples. By adopting this perspective, it provides the reader with many interesting insights. In particular, it is enriching for the European reader, who is not used to this genuinely ‘US–American’ perspective. The various chapters of the book are as follows: ‘Confronting Anxieties about International Law’; ‘The Politics of Theorizing’; ‘Legalism and Morality’; ‘Judges’; ‘Arbitrators’; ‘Regulators’; ‘Legal Advisors’; ‘Officials’; and ‘Law beyond Cases’. The purpose of these lines is not to give a full account of that book. Nor is it to portray the numerous thought-provoking and fruitful aspects of the developments contained therein; nor, by the way, is it to criticize some points on which the ‘Europeans’ will easily disagree with the author, as on what is permitted to the US officials in Guantánamo (p. 227 ff.). The point is rather to spell out some cardinal aspects, which seem to the present author to be weaknesses of the general approach or inadequacies of particular points. The critical approach, which will here be put forward, should not lead the reader to believe that the book presently criticized is devoid of merit. On the contrary, the author of these lines would not have ventured into the exercise of writing an essay on it if he had believed that such was the case.

In July 2001 the Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights issued a General Comment on the possibility of member states derogating from human rights in case of emergency. Basing its analysis on the issue of limitation of fair trial rights during a state of emergency, this article suggests a critical analysis of the reasoning, rather than the conclusions, of the Committee. Expanding arguments developed by monitoring bodies of the American and European Conventions on Human Rights, the author suggests alternative reasoning according to which the right to a fair trial is inalienable. She argues in particular that this right constitutes a guarantee necessary to the effective enjoyment of all human rights, the preservation of legality in a democratic society, and the effectiveness of the principle of separation of powers.