This article presents a timely and relevant critical examination of the customary international law principles of distinction and proportionality, and the doctrine of military necessity and the extent to which they can be better interpreted to protect the environment during the conduct of hostilities in non-international armed conflict. In so doing, this article contributes new perspectives to the ongoing debate on how environmental protection ought to be enhanced during non-international armed conflict. The article also suggests ways in which the International Law Commission (ILC) might approach the development of draft principles based on these customary principles as part of their current programme of work.

The article focuses on one of the most intriguing and, at the same time, controversial issues of international criminal law: whether the state policy requirement should be considered as a constitutive element in core international crimes. Adopting a criminal policy perspective, my intention is to contribute to the ongoing discussion by offering a doctrinal and criminological corroboration of the position that answers in the affirmative. Nevertheless, I am not necessarily promoting a normative choice entailing the amendment of the definition of core international crimes, but I rather call for a policy choice of focusing on cases that presume a state policy component.

This article provides a reappraisal of the International Court of Justice's approach to jurisdiction and applicable law in Nicaragua, 25 years later. In the first phase of the proceedings arising from the US support of the activities of the Contras against the Sandinista government, the Court robustly asserted its jurisdiction despite the US reliance on its multilateral treaty reservation and the subsequent attempted modification of its Optional Clause declaration. At the same time, the Court approached the related question of applicable law with a wide, if not effusive, reliance on multilateral customary international law operating conjunctively with treaty law. The Court's dismissal of negotiations as a procedural precondition for invoking its jurisdiction in Nicaragua is contrasted with its recent findings in Georgia v. Russia.

As a standard of review, ‘objective reasonableness’ has been in the academic spotlight after the Whaling in the Antarctic judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court). The Court's approach was conceptually innovative and seemed to have operated a partial reversal of the burden of proof in favour of the applicant. In response to certain criticisms addressed to that decision, this article makes two claims. First, ‘reasonableness’, while being inherently vague, gives a justifiable degree of discretion to judges, thereby enabling them to make difficult adjudicatory choices without departing from the applicable legal framework. Second, the term finds sufficient support in the Court's case law dealing with state discretion in the implementation of treaties. Both claims relate to the very same core idea: that even if one remains sceptical as to the capacity of the term to enhance certainty, ‘reasonableness’ is a basic conceptual tool that facilitates judicial review in complex cases, including those of a scientific nature.

The article examines the theoretical concept of interregionalism in the context of the evolving framework between the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As the EU’s first free trade agreement (FTA) with an ASEAN country, the EU-Singapore FTA is a pathfinder agreement that signifies a new phase of interregionalism and the EU’s new Asia strategy after the Treaty of Lisbon. The article argues that the innovative designs of the EU-Singapore FTA will shape the normative development of EU-ASEAN relations in the post-pandemic era. It also cautions that a comparative analysis of EU and US agreements reveals deficiencies in the FTA that require remedies. To buttress the contention, key provisions on ASEAN cumulative rules of origin, banking and legal services and non-tariff barriers are analysed in light of contemporary Asian agreements. The research further provides insight into the effectiveness of new-generation rules on geographical indications, competition, and investor-state arbitration and mediation. Hence, the findings contribute to the understanding of interregionalism and the EU’s Asia-Pacific trade and investment agreements from global and interdisciplinary perspectives.

This article is part of the ongoing efforts to write a critical history of international arbitration in commercial and investment matters. It examines the ways in which the Spanish crown and its concessionaries set up a mechanism to settle legal disputes pertaining to the transatlantic slave trade. The transformation of asientos de negros from limited royal contracts to large-scale monopolies awarded to foreign chartered companies during the sixteenth, seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was accompanied by the creation of an international commercial arbitration system. Why was this system set up, how did it work, and what was its faith? The overall aim of the article is to invite international lawyers to rethink the history of international arbitration and pay closer attention to the ‘private’ dimensions of formal and informal imperialism. It also attempts to bridge the historical investigation and contemporary commentary. In the conclusion, I argue that this study allows us, in a mirroring effect, to question the idea that today's dispute settlement mechanism was conceived as a means to ‘depoliticize’ international investment law. What the introduction of arbitration achieves is to place some fundamental questions out of sight. Today, as in the past, arbitrators work from within the system; their work rests on a series of unspoken – and yet highly political – premises about the organization of economic life and the distribution of values.

This article examines COVAX, a public private partnership, from a public law perspective. It asks whether COVAX is a legitimate and appropriate instrument with regard to the goal of distributing COVID-19 vaccines in a globally equitable manner and enabling equal access to vaccination worldwide. By developing public-legal legitimacy standards for this purpose, the article critically distances itself from the outset from considering the use of private actors and forms of action in public functions (‘privatization’) essentially as a release of market economy rationality, which enables efficiency and effectiveness gains and relieves the public sector. With the public law perspective, the article questions precisely whether private-law, market-based action is appropriate with respect to the global distribution of vaccines in the pandemic.

This article questions the legality of the extent of the Iraqi sanctions regime, due to its severe impact on human rights such as the right to life and the right to health. After examining whether the Security Council is bound by human rights, the article examines if and to what extent the Security Council may limit human rights norms when imposing economic sanctions. In the process it distinguishes between non-derogable and derogable human rights. With respect to the latter, it supports limitation in accordance with a proportionality principle that protects the core of the rights involved, while at the same time allows the Security Council the flexibility required by its unique role in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Biodiversity loss raises some of the most difficult issues of equity in international environmental law. Differential obligations have been developed as a means of enabling developed and developing countries to participate in the Biodiversity Convention. This article contends that the actual practices of these obligations have been cast narrowly, reinforce the existing politics and economics of biodiversity conservation, and are difficult to see and practise. They have been predominantly understood as obliging the transfer of funds and technology between states and as implicitly encouraging technology-based development pathways. The article calls for differential obligations to be reworked in environmental justice terms to encompass plural, alternative development pathways, such as creating local economies. It proposes that emerging market-based, community initiatives and the ecological footprint concept could help to provide ways to make differential obligations more workable.

The devastating events of 9/11 triggered the adoption of Resolution 1373 (2001) by the UN Security Council, a contentious development which was much debated and was widely seen as presaging a new type of activity by the Security Council – legislating for all UN member states. And yet, in the counter-terrorism sphere at least, the Council’s legislative activity in the years following 9/11 was relatively modest. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, that activity has been far exceeded by the Council’s response to the emergence of ISIL in 2014. This more recent activity is of interest beyond the confines of counter-terrorism, but has received far less scrutiny to date. This article will remedy this gap, revisiting, in light of the recent activity, the relative merits and disadvantages of making counter-terrorism law through Security Council resolutions. It makes two main contentions. The first is that – due to some factors which were anticipated in the early 2000s and many which were not – Security Council resolutions on terrorism constitute a distinctive category of international law-making and pose serious challenges for the application of organizing principles and processes of general international law. The second is that, for these reasons as well as doubts as to the necessity and efficacy of recent action, making counter-terrorism law through Security Council resolutions should be the exception rather than the norm.

Last year the International Court of Justice (ICJ) marked its seventieth anniversary, and in the most recent issue of the Leiden Journal of International Law, Hugh Thirlway recognized this milestone with a look back through some key developments at the Court, focusing on the last few years. Here, we would like to undertake a retrospective of another sort, paying tribute to the ongoing connection between the Court and the Journal by taking a brief tour through the Journal's coverage of the Court over the years. It is hoped that this retrospective will not only bring back some fond memories but also – by viewing this material as a whole, and pointing out certain gaps in the Journal’s coverage of the Court's work – stimulate future analyses.

In the Preliminary Objections phase of this case the Court followed its previous jurisprudence based on the Right of Passage Over Indian Territory case (1957) concerning the operation of Article 36(2) of its Statute. It is argued here that there were compelling reasons why the Court should have reassessed this jurisprudence. The implications of the Right of Passage doctrine for the operation of Article 36(2) and the role of the Court in international affairs are also discussed.

The Dayton Accords of 1995 for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina provided for arbitration over the boundary line in the Brčko area of Bosnia. Arbitration took place between the Muslim and Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. The Award of 14 February 1997 did not draw a boundary line but established an international interim supervisory regime. On 15 March 1998 the Arbitral Tribunal handed down a Supplemental Award which extended the interim regime pending further action by the Tribunal. The Final Award of 5 March 1999 establishes a permanent self-governing Brčko District government that is independent of the two entities. The Tribunal reserves the authority to revise its decision in case of a failure of either party to cooperate in the implementation of the new regime.

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is one of the “compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions” provided for in Article 287 of the Convention. The Tribunal is established by Annex VI to the Convention which is its Statute. Within the Tribunal is established the Seabed Disputes Chamber which has jurisdiction to deal with respect to deep-sea mining activities covered by Part XI of the Convention.

The Tribunal performs three different but closely related functions. The first is to offer a forum of choice for states parties to the Convention to settle disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Convention. The second function is to provide a special, and largely mandatory, procedure for dealing with disputes in connection with the interpretation and application of the provisions of Part XI of the Convention. This is the function of the Seabed Disputes Chamber. The Chamber also has competence to give advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of the activities of the Assembly and Council of the International Seabed Authority. Thirdly, the Tribunal serves as a residual and compulsory mechanism for the settlement of certain disputes identified by the Convention as requiring expeditious decision, such as applications for the prompt release of arrested vessels and crew or requests for the prescription of provisional measures pending final decisions in cases. The Tribunal may also deal with disputes arising under other maritime agreements, if the agreements so provide.

The Tribunal commenced operations in October 1996. It has completed organizational work for its administrative judicial functions. It has adopted its Rules, the Resolution on the Internal Judicial Procedure and Guidelines to assist parties appearing before it. It has also established special Chambers. The Tribunal has already dealt with one application for the prompt release of a vessel and crew arrested in a foreign port and one request for provisional measures. Proceedings are in progress on the merits of the first case submitted to it.

For several years, there has been a tension between differing philosophies of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dispute settlement. Commentators have taken different views on whether the system was fundamentally based on an arbitration or a judicial model. The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Annex II to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), represents the first extensive, negotiated agreement revitalizing the dispute settlement system in the history of the General Agreement. It represents nothing less than a complete reform of the GATT dispute settlement system. What is remarkable is that it is the product of extensive multilateral negotiations. In the past, modifications were made to the system on an incremental, case-by-case basis. Since the GATT came into existence in 1948, Articles XXII and XXIII have formed the basis of the dispute settlement mecha-nism. They are very sparse provisions, and most of the procedures that have come to characterize the pre-WTO GATT system have evolved over time as a result of experience in specific cases. Some of these procedural improvements were codified in Decisions and Understandings negotiated at various points in GATT history, but none were as comprehensive as the DSU.

In Martić, the ICTY held that the term ‘civilian’ in the chapeau of crimes against humanity excludes persons hors de combat, but that such persons may still be victims of crimes against humanity. This paper analyses that holding and its applicability before the ICC. It observes that the holding may result in additional protection to prisoners of war, leave the group of victims of crimes against humanity undefined, and render the term ‘civilian’ in the chapeau nugatory. Some recommendations are offered in these regards.

This article considers the relationship of international law and the media through the prism of human rights. In the first section the international regulation of the media is examined and visions of good, bad, and new media emerge. In the second section, the enquiry is reversed and the article explores the ways in which the media is shaping international legal forms and processes in the field of human rights. This is termed the ‘mediatization of international law’. Yet despite hopes for new media and the Internet to transform international law, the theoretical work of Jodi Dean warns of the danger to democracy of commodification through the spread of ‘communicative capitalism’.

On May 14, 1954 the Inter-governmental Conference on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict which convened in The Hague, managed to adopt the text of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954 Hague Convention). Apart from the Convention as such, the Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, a Protocol directed towards the prevention of the exportation of cultural property from occupied territories during armed conflicts, and three Resolutions were adopted.