In cases that come before the International Court of Justice (‘the ICJ’, or ‘the Court’), its own jurisprudence looms large. This is despite the fact that no rule of stare decisis operates before the ICJ. The juxtaposition of the facts expressed in these two statements has generated significant doctrinal and theoretical debate. In this article I propose a novel theoretical framework for understanding the role that precedent has traditionally played in proceedings before the Court, and that which it should play in the future.

This theoretical framework rests upon a constructive interpretation of the doctrine of stare decisis. I examine the historical institutional practice of the Court in order to determine the range of possible versions of the doctrine which, in Dworkin’s words, ‘fit’ this practice. Noting that there is more than one potential version of stare decisis which fits the Court’s practice, I next consider which is justified as the version which best reflects the value of this doctrine. Having shown that the value that stare decisis strives to achieve is contextual justice, I argue that only a weak version of horizontal stare decisis can justify this doctrine. My ultimate claim is that the Court’s principal concern when considering whether to follow or depart from its own jurisprudence should be that of achieving justice in the context of that particular case, and not merely ensuring consistency, predictability or efficiency.

Interdisciplinary scholarship at the intersection of international law (IL) and International Relations (IR) has illuminated the roles of politics in law, of law in politics, and of the shifting boundary between the two in various areas of international affairs. The boundary itself, however, has proven resilient. While critical approaches investigating the politics of international law have come to insist on the lasting significance of legality proper, IR approaches to legalization have returned to politics. Although the apparent limits to challenging the boundary between legality and politics are not new, we suggest that they are intimately related to another great divide, i.e., that between the state and the international. Together, these two cross-cutting lines have shaped the possibilities and constraints of articulating substantive positions ‘in’ (international) law and politics at least since the Interwar period. Reading these distinctions as intertwined ‘nested oppositions’, this article reconstructs the stylized but paradigmatic debates between Max Weber and Hans Kelsen over the nature of the state and between Hans Morgenthau and Hersch Lauterpacht over the nature of the international. We further illustrate how the same conceptual oppositions still enable and constrain current debates in IL and IR, discussing as examples the creation of states and the justiciability of international crimes. Crossing and contesting the boundaries ultimately reaffirms them as the matrix in which conflicts over states and the international are articulated as legal and political.

Against the context of pending judicial proceedings between the State of Palestine and the United States of America (US) at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), this article critically examines the United Nations (UN) commitment to the international rule of law through an examination of its consideration of Palestine’s 2011 application for membership in the organization. The universality of membership of the UN is a foundation upon which the organization rests. The international law governing UN admission has accordingly been marked by a liberal, flexible and permissive interpretation of the test for membership contained in the UN Charter. In contrast, an assessment of the UN’s consideration of Palestine’s application for membership demonstrates that it was subjected to an unduly narrow, strict and resultantly flawed application of the membership criteria. An examination of the contemporaneous debates of the Council demonstrates that the main driver of this was the US, which used its legal authority as a permanent member of the Council to block Palestine’s membership. The principle argument used against membership was the US’s view that Palestine does not qualify as a state under international law. Notwithstanding, the State of Palestine has been recognized by 139 member states of the UN and has acceded to a number of treaties that furnish it with access to the ICJ. While a number of articles have been written about Palestine’s statehood, little has been written on the UN’s consideration of Palestine’s 2011 application for membership. Palestine v. USA provides a renewed opportunity to do so.

This commentary argues that the Trial Chamber in Katanga adopted an erroneous interpretation of the Statute of the International Criminal Court by limiting the grounds to ne bis in idem on which a challenge to admissibility can be brought after the confirmation of charges. The Trial Chamber held that the ‘commencement of trial’ under Article 19(4) is the moment of the constitution of the Trial Chamber, rather than the making of opening statements. This commentary re-examines the legal reasoning of the Court and advocates a different reading. It also suggests that the Chamber has failed to strike a proper balance between the possibility of making challenges to admissibility and the smooth and efficient working of the proceedings, which compromises the long-term legitimacy of the institution and the interests of justice.

While the Statute of the International Criminal Court guarantees to suspects and accused the right to be defended in person or through legal assistance, it contains little guidance as to the extent to which this most fundamental right will be provided. In order to ascertain how broadly it should be applied, the authors examine the application of the right by the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The authors note that the defence-orientated approach taken by the ad hoc Tribunals to the right to be defended in person or through legal assistance not only conforms with international obligations, but also in many respects goes beyond that required by international human rights law. It is, therefore, crucial that the ICC listens to the experience of the ad hoc Tribunals and adopts similar, if not identical, rules and regulations relating to the qualifications, conduct and assignment of counsel.

The watershed of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 calls for new approaches to the theory of international law. Hardt and Negri's Empire is a focal point for the broadly postmodernist New Approaches to International Law, which celebrates an infinite variety of resistances to oppressive structures. This book is itself in need of deconstruction. Post-structuralism must give way to a framework of analysis that accepts a place for agency, and with it, responsibility, alongside social structures. Contemporary Marxist critique of international relations, coming mainly from the field of geopolitical international history, can combine with social democratic critique of the international economic system to attach firm responsibility for the material economic woes of international society to the United States. The militarism of US foreign policy is, in a Marxist critique, primarily a function of US economic contradictions. Law plays a role here as a coercive instrument of the state. This state is capitalist in operating globally a system of accumulation by dispossession. Where necessary it reinforces its operations with violence. However, international law, as an expression of the equality of nations, especially in their social needs, is honoured in the breach by such dispossession and violence.

Inter-state disputes on human rights issues have been a far from exceptional phenomenon. During the Cold War the human rights question deeply divided the countries belonging to the Western and the communist blocs. Relations between developed and developing countries quite often have been heavily strained by controversies on human rights. But even within a group of countries belonging to an alliance or a homogeneous regional organization, human rights issues from time to time have been the cause of serious difficulties; e.g., the human rights record of Greece and Portugal within NATO and that of Greece and Turkey within the Council of Europe. Hardly ever have such disputes been subjected to third party dispute settlement machinery, even if such machinery was available. Most human rights treaties have a so-called procedure for state complaints, although in most cases acceptance of such a procedure is optional for the state parties. Only under two treaties, the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, it is mandatory for any state party against which a complaint by another state party is made, to submit itself to such a procedure. In most cases the procedures are of a fact-finding and mediatory character.Again, only under two (regional) treaties, the European and the American Convention on Human Rights, the initiating of such a procedure may lead to a binding decision.

The United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is expected to play an essential role in delineating the rights of the Arctic states to seabed resources in the Arctic Ocean. In this article, the authors look to the effect of scientific discourse on Commission authority. The authors argue that in addition to the conferral of its authority by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Commission draws its authority in the Arctic from the way its regulatory frameworks, aimed at containing or closing off disputes about jurisdiction and sovereign rights, correlate with discursive practices used by transnational networks to reach scientific agreement.

The ICTY has interpreted its Statute as a ‘treaty’. This was not the intention of the UN Secretariat and the Security Council, and is not consistent with other treatments of the Statute. While the Statute literally satisfies the definition of ‘treaty’ in the 1969 Vienna Convention, this shows only the generality of that definition. The adoption of more precise labels for the Statute and other multi-state instruments adopted by international organizations through representational mechanisms would avoid confusion and promote better understanding of the rules that govern them.

Following the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Avena case, US courts have had a mixed record in applying the decision domestically. In this article, I examine the treatment by US courts of claims by criminal defendants alleging Vienna Convention violations, subsequent to the Avena judgment. First, I discuss the two limited decisions so far taken by the US Supreme Court regarding the Vienna Convention, and briefly explain several of the judicially-created rules that have prevented most US courts from reaching the merits of Vienna Convention claims. Next, I analyse the ICJ judgment in the LaGrand case, and provide an overview of the reception of that case by the US courts. After a summary of the Avena decision, I turn to the latest cases in which Vienna Convention claims based on Avena have been raised in US courts, focusing on the two most important decisions, and examining their contradictory rulings. As the US Supreme Court has now decided to hear an appeal in one of these cases, I conclude by arguing that the Supreme Court should take the opportunity to elucidate the role of the International Court of Justice in US law when the United States has consented to binding treaty interpretation by that court.

The first person to be sentenced by the United Nations ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Tribunal) was Dražen Erdemović, a member of the Bosnian Serb Army who had pleaded guilty to one count of a crime against humanity – murder – and another of violations of the laws and customs of war – murder. Erdemović was a soldier in the 10th Sabotage Detachment of the Bosnian Serb army and the charges against him arose in connection with the slaughter of Bosnian Muslim civilians in the United Nations ‘safe areas’ of Srebrenica and Potocari.

It is submitted in this article that transfrontier agreements (of a publiclaw character) between decentralized authorities can be considered as a kind of international administrative agreements. After investigation of the power to conclude international (administrative) agreements and their (assumed) binding legal force in public international law, the article concludes that transfrontier agreements between decentralized authorities are in principle of a national and not of an international public law character. This article is also focussed on (overall) legal bases for transfrontier cooperation between decentralized authorities. In this respect the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation Between Territorial Communities or Authorities is important and will be discussed. The purpose of this convention, in force in several European states, is to provide a legal basis for transfrontier cooperation (of a public law character) between decentralized authorities. However in this matter states still consider additional norms necessary. In this respect two additional treaties have been concluded and will be discussed. The article concludes that these treaties not really are overall legal bases for the conclusion of transfrontier agreements between decentralized authorities.

The theories of joint criminal enterprise and joint control over the crime have often been cited as the paramount example of fragmentation in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court and the UN Tribunals. While the analyses on these two forms of co-perpetration have generally focused on contrasting the different definitional criteria that they rely on to distinguish between principals and accessories to a group crime, this article shifts the focus to one legal element that, although common for both theories, has actually caused a deeper dissonance in the topical case law of the international courts and tribunals: the ‘common plan’ requirement. It is argued that the varying interpretations of this element have given rise to three materially distinct constructions of co-perpetration responsibility in international criminal law. Several normative and practical concerns stemming from the adoption of broad definitions for the common plan element, and the related idea of ascribing responsibility for ‘excess’ crimes of the executed plan, are analyzed to emphasize the need for having a critical discussion on this element of co-perpetration.

The financial collapse of the International Tin Council (ITC) in 1985 raised three fundamental legal questions. Firstly, whether the granting of legal personality to an organization under international law by means of an international agreement always carries with it the limited liability of the organization. Secondly, it must be asked whether agreements to establish an international entity based on the statutes of international law are never subject to national jurisdiction. And thirdly, consideration is needed of the precautions to be taken in the future in order to avoid this kind of financial collapse. The answers to these questions have to consider that the international organizations have changed the emphasis of their activities from the perception of sovereign duties over the economic field where they rely on trust and cooperation with private enterprises. Due to this situation a distinction must be made between acts of state and activities under civil law. There is no principle at all in international or private law according to which the granting of international personality or legal capacity involves sole liability. Also the Act of State doctrine is not suited to protect the FTC or its member states from recourse to the court by private creditors in the case of civil acts. To realise the aim of creating a new and more equitable economic order and to improve the necessary credit standing, the statutes of the internationalorganizations must also contain improved control mechanisms.

Scholars of the history of international law have recently begun to wonder whether their work is predominantly about law or history. The questions we ask – about materials, contexts and movements – all raise intractable problems of historiography. Yet, few scholars have turned to historical theory to think through how we might go about addressing them.

This article works towards remedying that gap by exploring why and how we might engage with historiography more deeply.

Section 2 shows how the last three decades of the ‘turn to history’ can be usefully read as a move from ambivalence to anxiety. The major works of the 2000s thoroughly removed the pre-1990s ambivalence to history, offering brief considerations about method. Recent efforts building on those works have led to the present era of anxiety about both history and method, raising questions around materials, contexts and movements. But far from a negative state, this moment of anxiety is both appropriate and potentially creative: it prompts us to rethink our mode of engaging with historiography.

Section 3 explores how this engagement might proceed. It reconstructs the principles and debates within conceptual history around the anxieties of materials, contexts and movements. It then explores how these might be adapted to histories of international law, both generally and within one concrete project: a conceptual history of recognition in the writings of British jurists.

Section 4 concludes by considering the advances achieved by this kind of engagement, and reflects on new directions for international law and its histories.

As the clash of aspirations increased among European countries, a European ‘civil war’ started in 1914, which engulfed the whole world. With all the terrible destruction and loss of life, it was felt that an international organization must be established to avert war in future. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the British government succeeded in gaining separate representation for its dominions, including India. This created a rather anomalous situation, since a dependency of a foreign power, a colony which could not control its internal affairs, was accepted as a sovereign state by an international treaty. Europe had hardly recovered from the First World War in the late 1920s when it drifted towards a second holocaust in 1939. India became a founding member of the United Nations in 1945, even though it was still under British rule, participating in the historic founding conference. But Indian national public opinion was neither very hopeful nor enthusiastic about the conference on the new international organization. Not only India, which was not even independent at that time, but Asian countries as such played a very small and insignificant role in the formulation of the UN Charter.

The notion of ‘armed attack’ is at the heart of the law on the use of force in self-defence. The ICJ first addressed the issue in its judgment in Nicaragua; however, its formulation of the legal parameters of ‘armed attack’ has not been without controversy. In particular, the high threshold of force required for an ‘armed attack’ and the consequent distinction between ‘armed attack’ proper and acts of lower intensity (termed ‘frontier incidents’) is said to have reduced the barrier to armed aggression. More recently, the formulation has also been criticized for not being fully applicable to large-scale terrorist attacks such as the events of 11 September 2001. This article examines the Court's first pronouncement on the concept of armed attack, with a specific focus on the rationae materiae aspect of ‘armed attack’, which situates it in the context from which it arose and analyses its development through subsequent case law, particularly the Court's judgments in Oil Platforms and Armed Activities (Congo v. Uganda) and the decision of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission.

Ceasefire agreements are legally governed by international humanitarian law because they have generally been considered in relation to how they affect levels of violence. However, new research in the fields of anthropology, security, and development studies suggests that ceasefires can have many more ramifications. These range from their ability to influence governance institutions, property and citizenship rights, economic networks, and security mechanisms. Consequently, this article suggests that a broader legal framework is needed through which to consider ceasefires and their consequences. While canvassing the option of ceasefires being types of contractual documents or as special agreements under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the article concludes that the best way to regulate ceasefire agreements is through an expanded version of lex pacificatoria. Rather than being governed by hard international law, such a move would allow for the implementation of more flexible programmatic standards to influence the myriad ways ceasefires are negotiated, the conduct of belligerents, and their diverse effects on the ground during wartime.