The recognized benefits to a hegemon of working through an intergovernmental organization (IGO) include legitimating its policy preferences, disseminating them with efficiency, and promoting stability. While most would agree that international law is important in this process, it is less easy to map exactly how international law fulfils this role. Using the cognitive structures of co-operation (CSC) approach to the political interpretation of multilateral treaties, this article demonstrates at a relatively low level of abstraction the way in which a constitutive treaty embeds an ideational structure integral to the political relationships within the IGO. This can serve the interests of the hegemon but may also make it difficult for the hegemon to disseminate a fundamentally changed policy should its preferences alter. This paper uses the CSC theory of treaty interpretation to trace the under-recognized role of the United States in bringing about the 1982 adoption of a moratorium on commercial whaling by the International Whaling Commission.

This article examines the analytical framework and key arguments used by K. Ambos to conclude that witness proofing is neither a legally permissible nor necessary useful practice before the ICC in his reply to ‘Witness Proofing in International Criminal Tribunals: A Critical Analysis of Widening Procedural Divergence’. Contrary to Ambos, the article argues that witness proofing cannot be both acceptable at the UN international criminal tribunals and per se inappropriate at the ICC, given the ICC's procedural regime allowing for trials to be conducted in a form almost identical to those of the UN tribunals. A related argument is that the practice of witness proofing is not prohibited in the law governing the ICC, even if not provided for. Further arguments conclude that reliance upon spontaneity of a witness in court as a guarantee of reliability is misplaced, that the merits of national practices are irrelevant to the overall analysis, and that international judges are competent to manage the negligible risks associated with witness proofing.

The adoption of the 2004 budget of the International Criminal Court completed the first full budgetary process for the Court. The document sets out the framework and financial parameters that will determine how the Court will function and grow in future years and represents the first comprehensive vision of the fully operational Court. This article looks at the process of creating the document and, referring to the experiences of other international and internationalized courts, analyzes the substantive debates that occurred on ensuring the independence of the Prosecutor in the process and ensuring adequate resources for victims, outreach, and defence.

The case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, better known as the ‘Nicaragua case’ or simply Nicaragua, is arguably one of the most important and controversial cases ever to be heard by the International Court of Justice. Twenty-five years after the judgment on the merits was handed down, it is high time to reassess the impact of Nicaragua on international law. The joint efforts of the Grotius Centre of the Leiden Law School, the Centre on International Courts and Tribunals at University College London, the Netherlands Society of International Law, and the law firm Foley Hoag LLP resulted in a one-day conference, on 27 June 2011, the very day on which the judgment on the merits of the Nicaragua case was handed down, 25 years ago.

This article examines the role of domestic courts in addressing questions of international law concerning the content and implementation of state responsibility. Practice shows that domestic courts only play a limited role in developing the international law of state responsibility. This is partly due to the limited number of cases decided by domestic courts. Furthermore, the practice of domestic courts is quite disparate, reducing their value in generating consistent practice. There is also a general inclination of domestic courts to apply remedies under municipal rather than international law, which reduces their significance as agents of international law. It is only in exceptional cases that domestic courts may contribute to clarifying controversial norms and support the further development of international law. Domestic courts may furthermore take on the task of fine-tuning international norms on state responsibility. Probably the most important role domestic courts may play in applying secondary rules of state responsibility is that of strengthening the effectiveness of the international legal system and its individual rules.

Article 62 remained a deadletter for almost seventyyears. The Chamber constituted to settle the frontier dispute between El Salvador and Honduras has changed this picture, and has allowed Nicaragua to intervene with respect to the legal régime of the GulfofFonseca. But it only accorded a non-party status to Nicaragua. However, the full Court had refused permission to intervene in two earlier cases with arguments that were based on the premiss of a party status for the intervening State. Only a future decision on a request for permission to intervene can tell whether the full Court will endorse the stances taken by the Chamber.

This article focuses on state recognition in the European context and on the admission of states to the Council of Europe after the end of the Cold War. It argues that two global trends identified by John Dugard in the 1980s have continued since then: a common approach to state recognition has been adopted and the criteria for state recognition have increasingly been given normative content. This reflects that the constitutive theory of state recognition continued to be popular. The two trends have not automatically resulted in a more legal approach to the issues, as the case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates.

The Rwandan genocide remains one of the most horrific atrocities of the twentieth century, resulting in the death of an estimated 500–800,000 human beings, massacred over a 100-day period. In the fourteen years since the genocide, attempts at justice and reconciliation in Rwanda have involved a delicate interplay between national legal systems and the international legal order. This article examines three fora in which Rwandans have been tried for involvement in the genocide: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rwandan courts including Gacaca tribunals, and French attempts to exercise universal jurisdiction. Using Rwanda as a case study, the article illustrates the issues, concerns, and difficulties that arise when multiple jurisdictions assert a right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the perpetrators of serious atrocity crimes. Beginning with a discussion of the political context, this article considers what the competing narratives and litigation in various fora have meant for the project of international and transnational criminal justice. Cases involving the commission of atrocities pose unique challenges for the international legal order. As the normative structure of international criminal law has arguably been strengthened, political constraints increasingly come to the fore. As illustrated by Rwanda, universal jurisdiction or other bases of jurisdiction may remain necessary vehicles for justice and reconciliation, or, at the very least, they may serve as a catalyst for change in Rwanda itself.

This article argues that orthodox international law is committed to the state at the expense of the Other, that which is not the state, and, at a more philosophical level, to ontology at the expense of ethics. Drawing on the philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas, it seeks a shift from ontology, focusing on Being, to ethics, constituted by our responsibility to the Other. Section 1 argues that international law assumes the natural existence of a Being of the State and that this ontology of statehood constitutes the ontology of international law. Section 2 explains how the ontology of statehood having been transformed into an epistemology ultimately leads to the violent suppression of alterity. Section 3 proposes a number of projects and strategies through which we may pursue the ethics of alterity in international law. The article concludes with a discussion of three tensions within international law: statehood–alterity, ontology–ethics, and law–politics.

The international criminal courts and tribunals have heard thousands of witnesses in cases of extreme complexity and breadth. Their evidentiary record is overwhelming, with live witness testimony standing out as one of its defining features. Keeping in mind the arguments and policies of judicial efficiency and fairness, this article empirically examines the trends and patterns in viva voce witness numbers at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). We observe clear differences between institutions and individual cases, and discuss the underlying reasons for such divergences. As well as providing a general overview, we demonstrate the complex interaction between case-related characteristics, institutional and situational contexts, and the number of witnesses called at trial.

The international community's response to recent events in Eastern Europe might suggest that the right to self-determination is evolving in such a manner that it can be invoked by territorially cohesive, ethnic groups within States. The present analysis of whether the Kosovo Albanians have a right to internal and/or external self-determination tends to cast doubt on whether this evolution is taking place. While the international response to the Kosovo crisis may contribute to an emerging norm against the oppression of minorities it is doubtful whether it extends the right to self-determination beyond the existing beneficiaries of the right, namely, peoples organized as States and colonial peoples.

Inter-state use of force has always attracted much attention from international legal scholars. Many articles have been written on the subject. However, there are still a limited number of books addressing all the aspects of the contemporary prohibition on the use of force in a systematic way. Those written by Yoram Dinstein, Christine Gray, and Thomas Franck are certainly the best known in the English-speaking literature. This literature is now enriched following the publication of a new book entitled The Law against War by Olivier Corten. It is a translated and updated version of a book published in French and entitled Le droit contre la guerre, which explains why it has been published in the French Studies in International Law collection of Hart Publishing.

In 2018, the Dutch Government proposed to establish an independent international ombudsman, known as the International Ombuds for Humanitarian and Development Aid (IOHDA), to hold non-governmental organizations (NGOs) accountable for their safeguarding and accountability failures, notably the Oxfam GB sexual abuse scandal in Haiti (March 2018) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (April 2021). While establishing an international ombudsman would fill a regulatory and accountability gap in global governance, there are many legal and logistic challenges, some of which have been identified by the IOHDA proposal itself, that undermine the creation of this brand new body. Besides the legal and logistic challenges outlined in the proposal, this article argues that the IOHDA is unlikely to succeed because of three additional challenges. First, the IOHDA’s scope is too broad and misinterprets the ombudsman’s jurisdiction and traditional role. Second, the IOHDA neglects that existing ombudsman schemes present limitations in enacting accountability and does not learn any lessons from them. Third, the IOHDA lacks support from NGOs, a driving force, and the principal standard-setters for an international accountability mechanism, like the proposed ombudsman. This article provides a series of recommendations to mitigate these three challenges whilst identifying alternative routes to enact NGO accountability.

Against the context of pending judicial proceedings between the State of Palestine and the United States of America (US) at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), this article critically examines the United Nations (UN) commitment to the international rule of law through an examination of its consideration of Palestine’s 2011 application for membership in the organization. The universality of membership of the UN is a foundation upon which the organization rests. The international law governing UN admission has accordingly been marked by a liberal, flexible and permissive interpretation of the test for membership contained in the UN Charter. In contrast, an assessment of the UN’s consideration of Palestine’s application for membership demonstrates that it was subjected to an unduly narrow, strict and resultantly flawed application of the membership criteria. An examination of the contemporaneous debates of the Council demonstrates that the main driver of this was the US, which used its legal authority as a permanent member of the Council to block Palestine’s membership. The principle argument used against membership was the US’s view that Palestine does not qualify as a state under international law. Notwithstanding, the State of Palestine has been recognized by 139 member states of the UN and has acceded to a number of treaties that furnish it with access to the ICJ. While a number of articles have been written about Palestine’s statehood, little has been written on the UN’s consideration of Palestine’s 2011 application for membership. Palestine v. USA provides a renewed opportunity to do so.

The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child in November, 1989, bringing to a close ten years of debate and discussion over the merits of the project as well as the content of its main provisions. Although some representatives expressed misgivings about the content of several articles of the convention, it was adopted by a broad consensus among the member states of the United Nations. In fact, in less than one year, by September, 1990, the convention had been ratified by more than twenty countries, the threshold figure established by Article 49 of the convention, and it entered into force. This set in motion the process for the election of the ten-member Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the body that has been charged with implementing the convention, in February, 1991, and it is scheduled to begin functioning in the fall of 1991. As recently as March, 1991, the United Nations Secretary-General reported to the states parties that 71 states had either ratified or acceded to the convention and that almost 60 other states had signed it. By June, 1991, the ratification of the convention by Belgium brought the total of states parties to over 90.

Interdisciplinary scholarship at the intersection of international law (IL) and International Relations (IR) has illuminated the roles of politics in law, of law in politics, and of the shifting boundary between the two in various areas of international affairs. The boundary itself, however, has proven resilient. While critical approaches investigating the politics of international law have come to insist on the lasting significance of legality proper, IR approaches to legalization have returned to politics. Although the apparent limits to challenging the boundary between legality and politics are not new, we suggest that they are intimately related to another great divide, i.e., that between the state and the international. Together, these two cross-cutting lines have shaped the possibilities and constraints of articulating substantive positions ‘in’ (international) law and politics at least since the Interwar period. Reading these distinctions as intertwined ‘nested oppositions’, this article reconstructs the stylized but paradigmatic debates between Max Weber and Hans Kelsen over the nature of the state and between Hans Morgenthau and Hersch Lauterpacht over the nature of the international. We further illustrate how the same conceptual oppositions still enable and constrain current debates in IL and IR, discussing as examples the creation of states and the justiciability of international crimes. Crossing and contesting the boundaries ultimately reaffirms them as the matrix in which conflicts over states and the international are articulated as legal and political.

This article engages with the history of international investment law in the first half of the twentieth century. It traces how international lawyers inscribed their vision of an international legal order protecting private property of Western companies against attempts at nationalization in the wake of socialist revolutions and the decolonization of large parts of the world. The article focuses on the role of ‘general principles of law as recognized by civilized nations’ as building blocks for an international legal order today called international investment law. Rather than describing a direct line between contemporary standards of protection and the invocation of general principles, the article develops conditions of possibility for the emergent field of international investment law. These conditions are located both in arbitral practice, as well as in international legal scholarship of the early twentieth century. Based on the analysis of such arbitrations over disputes resulting from concession agreements and scholarly writings in the interwar period, the contribution draws out the modes of authorization upon which the legal claims advanced by international lawyers rested. At the heart of the vision were ideas of ‘modernity’, ‘civilization’, ‘equity’, and ‘justice’ that enabled a hierarchization of difference, locating Western claims to legality above rivalling claims of socialist and ‘newly independent’ states. These ideas ultimately constituted the paradox of a ‘modern law of nature’ that claimed timeless universality while authorizing the ordering of foreign property in line with Western conceptions of modernity.