In a series of papers, Mark Blaug has accused modern, mainstream economic theory of sterility because of the abandonment of “competition as a process,” tracing the cause to the Formalist Revolution of the 1950s. The paper agrees with the criticism but disagrees on the cause, which is, rather, to be found in the shift from the treatment of capital as a single factor of variable ‘form’ to a Walrasian specification of the capital endowment as a given vector, a datum incompatible with the role of equilibrium as a center of gravitation of time-consuming adjustments. The shift was due, as shown by Pierangelo Garegnani, to unease in the 1930s with the conception of capital as a single factor, a fact neglected by Blaug but historically evident and a cause of great uncertainty in capital theory in subsequent decades. The conclusion is that, to avoid the sterility of neo-Walrasian equilibria, one cannot return to Alfred Marshall with his inconsistent notion of capital as a single factor, but Blaug himself indicates another possible direction.

My comments on the papers given by Bob Coats, Roger Backhouse, and Sheila Dow will focus on the history and prospects of institutional economics, as that is the part of the heterodox world I know most about.

This paper investigates the influence of Allyn Abbott Young's theoretical work on the groundbreaking contributions of early development theorists, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan and Ragnar Nurkse. The work of Allyn Young had a significant impact on early development theory as the above-mentioned pioneers of development economics built substantial portions of their theories—the “big push” and “vicious circle and balanced growth,” respectively—on the dynamic external economies, an integral part of the vision of self-sustaining growth, as described in Young (1928).

This paper focuses on the teachings and admonitions regarding wisdom found in the sixth edition of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS). Following a mind-path marked by the seminal contributions of Glenn Morrow (1923), Donald Winch (1978), and Laurence Dickey (1986), the paper offers an interpretation of the higher moral standard (superior prudence) introduced by Smith in the last edition of TMS, as his response to the socio-economic and cultural changes that took place in Great Britain in the second half of the eighteenth century. Between the first and last editions of TMS the taste for luxury and conspicuous consumption became widespread and contagious both geographically and across ranks. Prudence and other-approbation, sufficient gatekeepers of moral conduct and character in the previous editions of TMS, became progressively less effective in keeping society away from moral deception and in regulating reputation and the distinction of ranks. The paper examines the introduction of superior prudence in the last edition of TMS as Smith’s vision of a dialectical process between external and internal approbation that is capable of transforming individual dependence on social praise into a dialogue between materialistic and moral concerns, which would lead to a progressively wiser, although conflictual, existence.

When François Quesnay began to publish on economics there were unmistakable indications that fundamental change was required in France. The finances of the State were in perpetual difficulty, and it had to borrow at higher interest rates than the private sector. Paris was the intellectual capital of Europe, and France was unquestionably one of Europe's great powers, but she had difficulty in simultaneously financing the Army and the Navy, which her international ambitions required. In the repeated wars with Great Britain in what has been described as the Second Hundred Years War (dating from 1688 until 1815) military weaknesses under the Bourbons associated with inadequacies of finance hampered France's efforts to match Britain in the colonization and exploitation of the wealth of North America and India. In the absence of representative institutions such as the British Parliament, the wealthy in France would not consent to the taxation required to establish the French State on a financial foundation commensurate with its political aspirations.

The continual interaction between economic change and economic policies designed to manage or guide this change seldom finds such dramatic expression as when one type of economy replaces another, e. g., when the industrial economy replaces the agrarian or is in turn supplanted by the “post-industrial” economy.

Thus, when the American economy was in the thick of its industrial revolution during the decades around the turn of this century, it was subjected to a series of government interventions the lowest common denominator of which has been summarized in the title of a book by Morton Keller, Regulating a New Economy (1996). In the United States as in all other countries, these interventions consisted of a glorious jumble of attempts to solve problems as they arose, of “bespoke jobs” in response to diverse economic interests, and of sundry ideologically-motivated efforts to move events in particular directions.

From 1759 to 1762, François Quesnay regularly appealed to Charles Richard de Butré (1725–1805) when he had to make numerical estimates or perform non-elementary computations (Charles and Théré 2008). Although scarcely mentioned in the secondary literature, Butré was indeed an important collaborator of Quesnay’s. The present article gives a detailed account of Butré’s contribution to Physiocracy by concentrating on the period from 1766 to 1768, when Quesnay conceived and published his last versions of the Tableau économique. We show that Butré developed a sophisticated economic model. Although his model contains significant deviations from Quesnay’s, Butré’s intent was to complement rather than criticize it.

In the current era of quantity theorists and inconvertible currencies, the real bills doctrine has received a surprising amount of recent attention (e.g., Sargent and Wallace, 1982; Smith, 1988; Selgin, 1989; Cunningham, 1992). While the real bills doctrine has a long history, the doctrine underwent considerable evolution during the period from the Bullionist debates of the Restriction Period, 1797–1819, to the Banking School versus Currency School debates surrounding the introduction of Peel's Act in 1844. The debates of the Restriction period are significant for being directly concerned with the workings of an inconvertible, real-bills-based paper currency while the later debates involved the real bills doctrine under convertibility. A primary objective of this paper is to explore the views that Robert Torrens held concerning the inconvertible and convertible versions of the real bills doctrine as a rule for central bank policy. Torrens's contributions as an anti-bullionist and, later, as a leading member of the Currency School reflect the importance that both convertibility and bank lending practices have for interpreting the real bills doctrine and the related law of reflux. The apparently paradoxical evolution of Torrens's monetary thought identified by Lionel Robbins (1958) is attributed primarily to the evolution of his views on bank lending practices.

There is a subset of scholarly literature that asserts that the title of Adam Smith’s famous work, The Wealth of Nations, is an allusion to passages from the Bible, such as Isaiah 60:5. Strong forms of the claim of this relationship between Smith and Scripture argue for a direct reliance of the former upon the latter. Weaker forms of the claim merely raise the possibility of the relationship or point more broadly to the significance and relevance of scriptural passages. This article sets these claims against the historical context of Smith and his work, finding that the relationship among “the wealth of nations,” Adam Smith, and English translations of the Bible demonstrates that Smith did not, in fact, allude to the passages in Isaiah. Thus, the rise of political economy itself, of which Smith’s work was an important element, was part of the background for, and preceded the appearance of, the phrase in English bibles.

In several reviews of my Classical Economics (1987; henceforth CE) a criticism recurs relating to my proposition that distribution in Ricardian economics is dependent upon the pattern of final demand. Anthony Brewer, who is convinced by the demonstration in the book of ‘a fundamentally important core of general equilibrium economics accounting for resource allocation in terms of the rationing function of relative prices,’ has stated the objection fairly and his formulation invites and deserves a response:

Employing different meanings of classical concepts of saving, capital, investment, and money, and incorrectly attributing the assumption of full employment of labor and a world of certainty to classical analysis, John Maynard Keynes ([1936] 1974) faulted Say’s Law as irrelevant to the real world. Roy Grieve (2016) ignores previous clarifications of Keynes’s misrepresentations and misunderstandings of John Stuart Mill’s restatements of the law. He employs similar misrepresentations and misunderstandings of Mill’s explanations as Keynes did. His model of Mill’s analysis is incapable of explaining how variations in relative prices, the value of money, and interest rates coordinate production, consumption, and savings decisions in a monetary economy.

In its brief history, the relation between game theory and economics has been characterized by phases of feverish elaboration of new contributions followed by periods in which an open skepticism concerning its usefulness prevailed. Moreover, this vaguely cyclical pattern of evolution has affected various research areas. After an initial period in which game theorists focused their attention on competitive market models, in the 1970s and 1980s they turned to the problems of oligopolistic markets and bargaining. Today the latter research areas are going through a phase of sedimentation and selection while other fields of study receive a strong impulse from the application of game theory.

During the sixteenth century, successive waves of gold and silver reached Spain from America and then rolled across Europe to the North and East. Contemporaries made two observations. First, the inflow of bullion was associated with inflation. Second, a given amount of money in a country with relatively low prices tended to exchange for a larger amount of money in a country with relatively high prices. The scholastic doctors in Salamanca who interpreted these observations are traditionally credited with two modern insights, namely the quantity theory of money, and the principle of purchasing-power parity.

It is clear from the enormous literature on the subject that Karl Marx believed that his law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall is applicable only to the capitalist mode of production. Is there, however, really anything in the law which confines it specifically to capitalist production? This is an important question which is not asked in an explicit manner in the literature on Marx's economics. His most important law or tendency about the internal contradictions of capitalist production might turn out to be a characteristic of production per se—including socialist production in its ideal form.

This paper critiques the way Alfred Marshall is presented in many histories of economic thought, in particular, the typical neglect of the relation of his economic theory and method to his public policy proposals and views on economic evolution. A good example is the textbook of Stanley L. Brue, The Evolution of Economic Thought, which is specifically policy oriented. He notes in his remarks on Marshall's life and method: “Marshall's thinking left room for cautious reform, that is, modest departures from laissez-faire” (2000, p. 295). But the only illustration of this is Marshall's discussion of the welfare effects of industry taxes and subsidies. However, even here Brue concludes (2000, p. 316) with a quote from Marshall: “These conclusions, it will be observed, do not by themselves afford a valid ground for government interference.”