This article transcripts and analyzes two hitherto unpublished letters by David Ricardo. The first one (6 December 1812), was addressed to Leonard Horner. In the second one (3 March 1813), Ricardo thanked Samuel Tertius Galton for having sent him the pamphlet on monetary questions Galton had just published. This second letter was very useful to identify the work discussed by Ricardo in the first letter. Indeed, in his writing to Horner, Ricardo commented extensively on Galton’s manuscript. He dealt with important monetary issues such as the distinction between a deteriorated and a depreciated currency, the determination of the par of exchange between countries admitting two different monetary standards, and the distinction between an increased issue of notes by the Bank of England and an increased quantity of money in circulation.

The lingering economic problem for economists in the 1920s and 1930s was unemployment. What caused it? More importantly, what could cure it? John Maynard Keynes's work offered new insights regarding both the reasons for, and the cures of, lingering and massive unemployment—what Keynes called “involuntary unemployment.” Keynes's definition of the term evolved as he gradually came to realize the role of the fallacy of composition in explaining why nominal wage rate adjustments might not induce full employment. I argue that it was Richard Kahn's multiplier article, more than anything, which guided Keynes's own understanding of the phenomenon. This paper, then, is a narrative history of how Keynes came to grips with the unprecedented level of unemployment in the 1920s and '30s interpreted through the lens of the Kahnian multiplier.

The conventional wisdom in economics holds, with Irving Fisher, that interest is explained jointly by the forces of time preference (thrift) and productivity. One school of thought, however, has held stubbornly to the assertion that interest is best understood as a result of time preference alone, time preference as the essential determinant of interest. This is the pure time preference approach to interest. And while most economists are inclined to dismiss this approach out of hand, the pure time preference approach has proved remarkably resilient. Part of the explanation for the persistence of rival theories can be found, not surprisingly, in terminological confusions and ambiguities, for example in deciding among candidates for essential causation. I hope in this article to improve the case for the pure time preference approach to interest by clarifying the argument. It appears that some of the confusion can be attributed to the approach of two theorists, Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard, and to their connecting the time preference approach to their particular a priori methodology.

Two years after her success in the Moral Sciences Tripos (two examiners placed her in the First class and two in the Second), Mary Paley was asked to write an economics textbook for Extension Lecture students. On her engagement, the book became a joint effort with her fiance, later husband, Alfred Marshall. It was published in October 1879 and reprinted nine times between 1879 and 1891, including a revised edition in 1881. A third edition was worked on, probably around 1885, but not published. According to John Maynard Keynes, 15,000 copies of the book were sold in all (Pigou 1925, p. 500). Sometime in the late 1880s or early 1890s, Marshall rejected the book, criticizing its elementary nature and brevity—it was impossible, he felt, “to tell the truth for half-a-crown” (M. P. Marshall 1947, p. 22). When he sent his brother-in-law, E. D. Guillebaud, a complimentary copy of the Principles in 1890, Marshall stipulated that the Economics of Industry must be returned for destruction (Guillebaud 1961,2, p. 12, note c). In 1892 he produced a small book “made chiefly by scissors and paste out of my Principles,” which on its spine bore the title Economics of Industry.

John Maynard Keynes’s essay “Relative Movements of Real Wages and Output” is widely believed to be an important amendment to his General Theory because, in this essay, Keynes relaxed his core assumption of decreasing marginal returns to labor. I discuss the reasons that prompted Keynes to do so and then examine the consequences of replacing decreasing with non-decreasing returns for the model of effective demand from chapter 3 of the General Theory. I conclude that non-decreasing marginal returns do not sit comfortably with the principle of effective demand. The view that Keynes’s 1939 essay constitutes an important amendment to his General Theory has thus to be put into perspective.

This Presidential Address revisits Paul Samuelson’s views on the history of science and history of economics, with the advantage of archival evidence from his papers now deposited at Duke. It suggests he was not impressed with historians in general; but also, that his faith in the orthodox neoclassical profession failed him towards the end of his life, when those in the profession started to treat him the way that he had treated the historians.

The modern Ricardian equivalence theorem focuses on the intertemporal equivalence between taxation and bond financing of government expenditures that David Ricardo considered practically irrelevant, rather than their contemporaneous equivalence in terms of the opportunity cost of government spending. Relying upon the implausible assumption of each individual’s future tax-capitalization behavior that Ricardo explicitly rejected, the modern Ricardian equivalence theorem reaches the exact opposite conclusions about government deficit spending than Ricardo argued. This paper explains these fundamental problems with the modern Ricardian equivalence proposition and shows an alternative method of arguing Robert Barro’s original point about the inefficacy of Keynesian deficit spending.

This paper addresses the question: How did the promising program set out in Leon Walras' mature writings come to be taken as laying the ground for a totally different line of problems in his later writings and in modern microeconomic theory? The study of Walras' mature work (see Walker, 1996) offers an instructive object lesson in the way in which an interesting line of enquiry leads gradually to analytical difficulties and then to “solutions” that evade issues and constitute a major diversion of analysis down roads not initially contemplated by its originator. This paper attempts to trace the development of that detour from the main road of economic analysis in Walras' mature work to the side road of abstract exercises in contemporary neowalrasian literature.

Through the 1930s, Frank H. Knight engaged the economic profession in a prodigious exchange over the nature and productivity of capital. Knight's efforts here were driven by three significant objectives: first, that capital theory had to be able to explain the broad fact of capital accumulation and growth as actually experienced by progressive societies; second, that existing doctrines had to be purged of the flawed vestiges of the classical-Ricardian theory of production if any progress was to be had in achieving the first objective; third, and last, that an alternative theory of capital needed to provide an explanation of the productivity of capital consistent with the fulfillment of the first two tasks. Knight failed in the third task or, at best, left the task incomplete.

In April 1909 Léon Walras (1834–1910) presented his last lecture before the Société Vaudoise des Sciences Naturelles at Lausanne. The subject dealt with in this lecture was the analogy between the mathematics used in economics and that employed in mechanics; it is reformulated in what turned out to be one of Walras's last publications, entitled ‘Economique et Mécanique.’

The present note is a development of a paper I presented some four years ago at the 1987 meeting of the History of Economics Society (Caravale 1987), and that was later published in Rivista di Politico Economica in an expanded version (Caravale 1988). The aim of these two writings was to emphasize that—contrary to what is often maintained—demand conditions play a fundamental role in classical and classical-type theories. This role is different from that played by demand in neoclassical theories (where equilibrium prices are determined by demand and supply functions), and is so to speak “internal” to the theory of natural equilibrium since it is connected with the definition, for each situation, of the Smithian “point of effectual demand.” Before turning to the specific object of this note, let me recall very briefly the main points of the general thesis developed in the above-mentioned papers.

Just over a century ago two noteworthy books in economics were published by women, contrary to the widespread modern impression that women's participation in economics is a recent phenomenon. Charlotte Perkins Gilman published Women and Economics (1898a, cf. Gilman 1898b), a landmark work of feminist and institutionalist economics (see M. A. Dimand 1995b). Rosa Luxemburg published The Industrial Development of Poland (1898) based on her 1897 Zurich doctoral dissertation. This distinguished contribution showed promise of the great abilities displayed in her magnum opus, The Accumulation of Capital (1913), a study that deserves recognition for its importance in macrodynamics and the theory of economic growth as well as in Marxian economics (see Joan Robinson's introduction to the 1951 translation). These two authors stand as giants in the history of economics–or would do so, if historians of economics were paying attention–but they were very far from being the only women contributing to economics in the 1890s.

In 1690, John Locke proclaimed, “Whatsoever [anyone]; removes out of the State that Nature hath provided … hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.” Ever since this dictum was pronounced philosophers, economists, and, especially, capital theorists have been embarrassed by the virtually universal disregard of it in practice. At the very inception of economic theorizing, Ricardo declared that explaining the division of the national income into wages, rents, and interest was “the principal problem in Political Economy.” He proposed an ingenious explanation, but was far from settling the matter. Some fifty years later, Marx, building on Ricardo's concept of value, brought the debate to a sharp focus; after him, it became largely an argument between Marxists and everyone else. Put starkly, Marx defined the value of any good or service to be the amount of labor required to produce it. Since a worker and his family can be supported for a year by the product of a good deal less than a full year's labor, this definition implies a gap between the value of a year's labor and the value of its products. Owners of land and capital are only too glad to close the gap by claiming the “surplus value.” Marx's diagnosis of the nature and origin of surplus value became the focus of discussions of the distribution of income for most of the following century.

The basic principles of Robbins's Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science are still present in most textbooks in economics. We thus face a combined problem of historical and contemporary nature. Robbins's assertion concerning the ethics–economics relationship has two main difficulties. Firstly, the presumption of means–ends analysis, which is oblivious of the ends people seek to promote, is not as neutral as it appears. Robbins chooses to ignore the ends by focusing on cost minimization. This implicitly (though not inherently) suggests another end—wealth, or means, maximization—which by no means can be considered as ethically neutral. Secondly, there is an implicit assumption that whatever the ends people seek to promote, there will always be a coordinated outcome to their actions. As competitive prices are the means to achieve waste minimization (through proper pricing by opportunity costs), the assumed coordination must be that of general equilibrium and, thus, cooperative-based coordination must be excluded.

It is a fact universally acknowledged that a woman's work is never done and often not counted. It is a fact equally universally acknowledged that most people in the economics profession are not terribly interested in such a fact. It is my purpose to explore this lack of interest by tracing it to the place of sexual division of labor in Adam Smith's work.

In “On the Concept of ‘Felicitas Publica’ in Eighteenth-Century Political Economy,” a recent paper in this journal, Federico D’Onofrio strongly criticizes the interpretation that Luigino Bruni and Stefano Zamagni have offered of the eighteenth-century Neapolitan tradition of civil economy and public happiness, as articulated by Antonio Genovesi. D’Onofrio claims that Bruni and colleagues have not fully explored the political meaning of public happiness within eighteenth-century economics, and that Bruni unfairly criticized methodological individualism on the basis of the intrinsically social character of happiness. This paper is a reply to D’Onofrio.