In their target article, Dixon et al. argue that the conceptualization of intergroup prejudice should not require the presence of intergroup animus. We seek to complement this discussion by drawing attention to the authors' emphasis on how animus can often be irrelevant to the perpetuation of group-based inequality and to develop an example from recent theory and research in economics. Although the authors emphasize the psychological and affective mechanisms that serve to reinforce inequality, we provide an example of how such approaches can be complemented by a rational-agent approach that assumes very little about the internal states of actors.
Given that minorities typically coexist quite closely with dominant majorities, minority individuals may seek to better their position via assimilation into the dominant group. By doing so, though, they risk weakening their ties to their ethnic group and its collective bargaining power or long-term viability. From the perspective of a dual-audience signaling framework (Austen-Smith & Fryer Reference Austen-Smith and Fryer2005), a person's educational attainment is an “honest signal” of characteristics that are attractive to the institutions of modern societies, such as conscientiousness, intelligence, and conformity to societal norms (Spence Reference Spence1973). However, individuals are also compelled to send signals of sociocultural competence to their ethnic group. Whereas signals of educational competence are exchanged for financial support, signals of sociocultural competence are exchanged for social support and friendship.
From this view, because dominant groups have had longer histories of codevelopment with societal institutions than minority groups, there is likely to be greater congruence in the information content (e.g., language dialect) of the signals needed to appease both institutional and ethnic groups. However, because ethnic groups are likely to have shorter histories of codevelopment with societal institutions due to discriminatory policies or recent immigration, such minorities experience less congruency between these two types of signals. Even if one has deep attachments to his or her group, increased time and effort spent on education necessarily diminishes the time and effort available to spend with peers and maintain cultural competence, thereby limiting the benefits gained from group membership. This problem is particularly acute when one considers the opposite must be true as well: that time and energetic resources devoted to social competence within one's social groups takes away from one's limited resources for increasing educational competence. For some, the social consequences of group exclusion might be offset by increases in economic benefits, but for others, economic utility pales in comparison to the cost of losing social support. This Faustian trade-off necessarily places limits on economic mobility for minority group members, but not for majority group members.
This model makes only two core assumptions: (1) individuals seek to increase their own economic standing, and (2) individuals prefer social interaction with, and the social support of, members of similar social categories (Becker Reference Becker1957). Fryer (Reference Fryer2010) describes several important predictions that are generated when applying this model of behavior to black and Latino versus white American students in the United States. Because there is no trade-off between academic achievement and peer-group acceptance for white students, and they are overrepresented in high-achieving environments, achievement should be positively related to peer group acceptance for whites. However, the link between achievement and friendship is expected to be tenuous for minority students, and may even trend negative, as their racial groups are underrepresented in high-achieving environments. Additionally, and consistent with the challenges associated with intergroup contact described by Dixon et al., the erosion of same-race friendships for minorities should be exacerbated in contexts that foster greater intergroup contact, such as in racially integrated schools.
In an analysis of data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health involving over 90,000 research subjects, Fryer (Reference Fryer2010) tested these predictions on white, black, and Latino American high school students. Fryer found that the strong, positive correlation between grade point average and popularity typically found among white American students in public schools is less strong for black American students. Furthermore, among the highest achieving black students (GPA>3.5), the relationship between academic achievement and popularity trended negative. The link between GPA and friendship was even more tenuous for Latino American students, with popularity trending negative at even average levels of achievement, with the highest performing Latino students having the fewest friends.
Of particular relevance to the target article, Fryer (Reference Fryer2010) found that the trade-off between signaling educational competence versus social support among minorities was strongest and, in some cases, only detectable in schools with a high degree of ethnic integration. Intriguingly, high-achieving minorities were found to have more other-race friends than did lower achievers. However, the increase in cross-race friendships did not make up for the loss in same-race peers, implying same-race preferences among white high-achieving students or among high-achieving students of all groups. We note that there is little reason to assume that minorities are “punished” by same-race peers for demonstrating success and competence in domains important to the majority group (sensu Fordham & Ogbu Reference Fordham and Ogbu1986). But, rather, network dynamics between majority and minority groups are sufficient to produce incentive structures that perpetuate inequality merely by assuming that we want economic resources, as well as group-based social support from others like ourselves.
Our description of the challenges faced by minority youth complement the approach described by Dixon et al. in that we provide an example of how intergroup animus can be irrelevant and intergroup contact can have its downside. At root, this model is not specific to race relations in the United States, but should be applicable anywhere where similar conditions apply (e.g., Buruku in Japan, Aboriginals in Australia/New Zealand). If there is a point of incongruence between the strategic approach we describe and other advocates for equality, it is of emphasis on the idea that there can sometimes be clear victims of the network dynamics of strategic action, but it can be quite difficult to see who the winners are, let alone the blameworthy villains. We are curious as to how Dixon et al. might incorporate this perspective into their analysis for future directions in theory and research in this area.
You have
Access
In their target article, Dixon et al. argue that the conceptualization of intergroup prejudice should not require the presence of intergroup animus. We seek to complement this discussion by drawing attention to the authors' emphasis on how animus can often be irrelevant to the perpetuation of group-based inequality and to develop an example from recent theory and research in economics. Although the authors emphasize the psychological and affective mechanisms that serve to reinforce inequality, we provide an example of how such approaches can be complemented by a rational-agent approach that assumes very little about the internal states of actors.
Given that minorities typically coexist quite closely with dominant majorities, minority individuals may seek to better their position via assimilation into the dominant group. By doing so, though, they risk weakening their ties to their ethnic group and its collective bargaining power or long-term viability. From the perspective of a dual-audience signaling framework (Austen-Smith & Fryer Reference Austen-Smith and Fryer2005), a person's educational attainment is an “honest signal” of characteristics that are attractive to the institutions of modern societies, such as conscientiousness, intelligence, and conformity to societal norms (Spence Reference Spence1973). However, individuals are also compelled to send signals of sociocultural competence to their ethnic group. Whereas signals of educational competence are exchanged for financial support, signals of sociocultural competence are exchanged for social support and friendship.
From this view, because dominant groups have had longer histories of codevelopment with societal institutions than minority groups, there is likely to be greater congruence in the information content (e.g., language dialect) of the signals needed to appease both institutional and ethnic groups. However, because ethnic groups are likely to have shorter histories of codevelopment with societal institutions due to discriminatory policies or recent immigration, such minorities experience less congruency between these two types of signals. Even if one has deep attachments to his or her group, increased time and effort spent on education necessarily diminishes the time and effort available to spend with peers and maintain cultural competence, thereby limiting the benefits gained from group membership. This problem is particularly acute when one considers the opposite must be true as well: that time and energetic resources devoted to social competence within one's social groups takes away from one's limited resources for increasing educational competence. For some, the social consequences of group exclusion might be offset by increases in economic benefits, but for others, economic utility pales in comparison to the cost of losing social support. This Faustian trade-off necessarily places limits on economic mobility for minority group members, but not for majority group members.
This model makes only two core assumptions: (1) individuals seek to increase their own economic standing, and (2) individuals prefer social interaction with, and the social support of, members of similar social categories (Becker Reference Becker1957). Fryer (Reference Fryer2010) describes several important predictions that are generated when applying this model of behavior to black and Latino versus white American students in the United States. Because there is no trade-off between academic achievement and peer-group acceptance for white students, and they are overrepresented in high-achieving environments, achievement should be positively related to peer group acceptance for whites. However, the link between achievement and friendship is expected to be tenuous for minority students, and may even trend negative, as their racial groups are underrepresented in high-achieving environments. Additionally, and consistent with the challenges associated with intergroup contact described by Dixon et al., the erosion of same-race friendships for minorities should be exacerbated in contexts that foster greater intergroup contact, such as in racially integrated schools.
In an analysis of data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health involving over 90,000 research subjects, Fryer (Reference Fryer2010) tested these predictions on white, black, and Latino American high school students. Fryer found that the strong, positive correlation between grade point average and popularity typically found among white American students in public schools is less strong for black American students. Furthermore, among the highest achieving black students (GPA>3.5), the relationship between academic achievement and popularity trended negative. The link between GPA and friendship was even more tenuous for Latino American students, with popularity trending negative at even average levels of achievement, with the highest performing Latino students having the fewest friends.
Of particular relevance to the target article, Fryer (Reference Fryer2010) found that the trade-off between signaling educational competence versus social support among minorities was strongest and, in some cases, only detectable in schools with a high degree of ethnic integration. Intriguingly, high-achieving minorities were found to have more other-race friends than did lower achievers. However, the increase in cross-race friendships did not make up for the loss in same-race peers, implying same-race preferences among white high-achieving students or among high-achieving students of all groups. We note that there is little reason to assume that minorities are “punished” by same-race peers for demonstrating success and competence in domains important to the majority group (sensu Fordham & Ogbu Reference Fordham and Ogbu1986). But, rather, network dynamics between majority and minority groups are sufficient to produce incentive structures that perpetuate inequality merely by assuming that we want economic resources, as well as group-based social support from others like ourselves.
Our description of the challenges faced by minority youth complement the approach described by Dixon et al. in that we provide an example of how intergroup animus can be irrelevant and intergroup contact can have its downside. At root, this model is not specific to race relations in the United States, but should be applicable anywhere where similar conditions apply (e.g., Buruku in Japan, Aboriginals in Australia/New Zealand). If there is a point of incongruence between the strategic approach we describe and other advocates for equality, it is of emphasis on the idea that there can sometimes be clear victims of the network dynamics of strategic action, but it can be quite difficult to see who the winners are, let alone the blameworthy villains. We are curious as to how Dixon et al. might incorporate this perspective into their analysis for future directions in theory and research in this area.