The context of the relationship between Jews and Arabs in Israel makes for an interesting and resonant example of the dynamics discussed by Dixon et al. in which attempts at achieving intergroup “harmony” through prejudice reduction interventions may intentionally or unintentionally mitigate sociopolitical change. My empirical research on contact interventions between Israeli Jews and Arabs enables me to extend on Dixon et al.'s discussion in the context of a realistic asymmetric intergroup conflict. In particular, it allows me to further address the important questions posed by Dixon et al. (see sect. 4.2., para. 4) regarding the nature of the underlying mechanisms and the psychological processes through which contact interventions that attempt to promote harmony may in fact safeguard and perpetuate the existing status quo of asymmetric power relations.
As a social psychologist interested in intergroup relations, I have been researching, for the past 25 years, structured intergroup encounters aimed at reducing hostility and increasing understanding and cooperation between Israeli-Jews and Israeli Arabs. My research relies on systematically analyzed empirical data derived from a series of research programs I have conducted between 1988 and 2012, tracing the evolution of models of planned contact interventions between these two groups. The research tools used include: in-depth interviews, discussions, and conversations that have been conducted over the years with organizers, directors, facilitators, and participants of Jewish–Arab encounter programs; questionnaires and surveys, including measures of attitudes and attitude change; and observations of encounter activities and encounter program staff meetings, as well as analysis of documents related to encounter programs.
Structured encounters between Israeli Jews and Arabs are encounters that take place between two groups with asymmetric power-relations, engaged in competition over scarce resources; the Jewish majority (some 80 percent of the Israeli population) is in control of most material and political resources and determines the national character of the country (Abu-Nimer Reference Abu-Nimer1999). The relationship between the Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel is also significantly affected by the larger protracted, asymmetrical conflict between the State of Israel and the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories. Hence, like other contact interventions conducted in settings of intergroup conflict, encounters between Israeli Jews and Arabs represent a paradoxical project that aims to produce equality and cooperation between groups embedded in a reality of conflict and asymmetry (Maoz Reference Maoz2000a; Reference Maoz2000b; Reference Maoz2011).
Inspired by a recent school of thought that examines processes and effects of contact in deeply divided societies (Dixon et al. Reference Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux2005; Reference Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux2007), the major questions that lead my research concern the extent to which these interventions – which aim at improving intergroup relations – perpetuate the existing reality of asymmetric power relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in Israel, or present transformative potential towards more symmetrical Jewish–Arab relations.
A primary model used in Jewish–Arab contact interventions is the coexistence model, which seeks to promote mutual understanding and tolerance between Jews and Arabs, reduce stereotypes, foster positive intergroup attitudes, and advance other goals in the spirit of the contact hypothesis (Allport Reference Allport1954; Pettigrew 1988). This model was imported to Israel from the United States in the 1980s; it constitutes the first and the most dominant model, guiding the majority of these contact interventions (Maoz Reference Maoz, Podeh and Kaufman2006).
The coexistence model emphasizes interpersonal similarities (“we are all human beings”) and cultural and language commonalties, as well as supporting notions of togetherness and cooperation. Critics cynically refer to it as “the Hummus and Falafel model” because of its promotion of folkloristic, seemingly superficial aspects that join Jews and Arabs. As this model focuses on interpersonal interaction and on personal identities (Tajfel & Turner Reference Tajfel, Turner, Worchel and Austin1986), it does not tend to confront issues such as the conflict between Israeli Jews and Arabs, dilemmas of national identity, and claims concerning discrimination towards the Arab citizens of Israel (Maoz Reference Maoz2011). Consequently, the coexistence model tends to support the status quo of the existing structural relations between Jews and Palestinian-Arabs in Israel rather than seeking social or political change (Abu-Nimer Reference Abu-Nimer1999; Halabi & Sonnenschein Reference Halabi and Sonnenschein2004) At worst, this model can be viewed as intentionally perpetuating existing asymmetrical power relations by focusing on changing individual-level prejudice while ignoring the need to address collective and institutionalized bases of discrimination (Bekerman Reference Bekerman2007; Dixon et al. Reference Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux2005; Maoz Reference Maoz2011).
Indeed, research shows that contact interventions guided by the coexistence model tend to preserve and perpetuate Jewish dominance and control while encouraging Arab submissiveness and passivity, thus strengthening existing stereotypes of Jews as overdominant and controlling and of Arabs as lazy and passive (Maoz Reference Maoz2000a; Reference Maoz2000b; Reference Maoz2004). Furthermore, organizational structural analyses indicate that the vast majority of organizations that employ the coexistence model display high Jewish dominance in their hierarchy and distribution of resources and very low to no representation of Arabs in the different levels of management and decision making (Maoz Reference Maoz2004).
Analysis of the discourse characterizing such coexistence model encounters makes visible the tactics and practices of the Jewish directors, showing how these restrict discussion of inequalities and of the conflict between the sides. Such discussion was defined by the Jewish directors as destructive, subversive, and as bound to spoil the good atmosphere of the encounter, and thus as contradicting the goal of fostering coexistence. The Arab participants, for their part, expressed a lack of identification with the goal of advancing coexistence and fostering rapprochement: these goals were perceived as forced upon them, as unrepresentative of the true reality of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel, and as restricting their ability to express their national identity and present the minority's point of view – the less legitimized Palestinian version of the history and current realities of the conflict (Maoz Reference Maoz2000a; Reference Maoz2011).
Thus, the empirical data derived from studies of the coexistence model between Jews and Arabs in Israel can help describe and empirically ground the paradoxical effects of this kind of “harmonious” encounter. By explicitly illustrating the consequences of delegitimizing the discussion of inequalities within these contact interventions, these studies help to support and extend Dixon et al.'s broader argument about the paradoxical interrelations between harmony and sociopolitical change.
The context of the relationship between Jews and Arabs in Israel makes for an interesting and resonant example of the dynamics discussed by Dixon et al. in which attempts at achieving intergroup “harmony” through prejudice reduction interventions may intentionally or unintentionally mitigate sociopolitical change. My empirical research on contact interventions between Israeli Jews and Arabs enables me to extend on Dixon et al.'s discussion in the context of a realistic asymmetric intergroup conflict. In particular, it allows me to further address the important questions posed by Dixon et al. (see sect. 4.2., para. 4) regarding the nature of the underlying mechanisms and the psychological processes through which contact interventions that attempt to promote harmony may in fact safeguard and perpetuate the existing status quo of asymmetric power relations.
As a social psychologist interested in intergroup relations, I have been researching, for the past 25 years, structured intergroup encounters aimed at reducing hostility and increasing understanding and cooperation between Israeli-Jews and Israeli Arabs. My research relies on systematically analyzed empirical data derived from a series of research programs I have conducted between 1988 and 2012, tracing the evolution of models of planned contact interventions between these two groups. The research tools used include: in-depth interviews, discussions, and conversations that have been conducted over the years with organizers, directors, facilitators, and participants of Jewish–Arab encounter programs; questionnaires and surveys, including measures of attitudes and attitude change; and observations of encounter activities and encounter program staff meetings, as well as analysis of documents related to encounter programs.
Structured encounters between Israeli Jews and Arabs are encounters that take place between two groups with asymmetric power-relations, engaged in competition over scarce resources; the Jewish majority (some 80 percent of the Israeli population) is in control of most material and political resources and determines the national character of the country (Abu-Nimer Reference Abu-Nimer1999). The relationship between the Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel is also significantly affected by the larger protracted, asymmetrical conflict between the State of Israel and the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories. Hence, like other contact interventions conducted in settings of intergroup conflict, encounters between Israeli Jews and Arabs represent a paradoxical project that aims to produce equality and cooperation between groups embedded in a reality of conflict and asymmetry (Maoz Reference Maoz2000a; Reference Maoz2000b; Reference Maoz2011).
Inspired by a recent school of thought that examines processes and effects of contact in deeply divided societies (Dixon et al. Reference Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux2005; Reference Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux2007), the major questions that lead my research concern the extent to which these interventions – which aim at improving intergroup relations – perpetuate the existing reality of asymmetric power relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in Israel, or present transformative potential towards more symmetrical Jewish–Arab relations.
A primary model used in Jewish–Arab contact interventions is the coexistence model, which seeks to promote mutual understanding and tolerance between Jews and Arabs, reduce stereotypes, foster positive intergroup attitudes, and advance other goals in the spirit of the contact hypothesis (Allport Reference Allport1954; Pettigrew 1988). This model was imported to Israel from the United States in the 1980s; it constitutes the first and the most dominant model, guiding the majority of these contact interventions (Maoz Reference Maoz, Podeh and Kaufman2006).
The coexistence model emphasizes interpersonal similarities (“we are all human beings”) and cultural and language commonalties, as well as supporting notions of togetherness and cooperation. Critics cynically refer to it as “the Hummus and Falafel model” because of its promotion of folkloristic, seemingly superficial aspects that join Jews and Arabs. As this model focuses on interpersonal interaction and on personal identities (Tajfel & Turner Reference Tajfel, Turner, Worchel and Austin1986), it does not tend to confront issues such as the conflict between Israeli Jews and Arabs, dilemmas of national identity, and claims concerning discrimination towards the Arab citizens of Israel (Maoz Reference Maoz2011). Consequently, the coexistence model tends to support the status quo of the existing structural relations between Jews and Palestinian-Arabs in Israel rather than seeking social or political change (Abu-Nimer Reference Abu-Nimer1999; Halabi & Sonnenschein Reference Halabi and Sonnenschein2004) At worst, this model can be viewed as intentionally perpetuating existing asymmetrical power relations by focusing on changing individual-level prejudice while ignoring the need to address collective and institutionalized bases of discrimination (Bekerman Reference Bekerman2007; Dixon et al. Reference Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux2005; Maoz Reference Maoz2011).
Indeed, research shows that contact interventions guided by the coexistence model tend to preserve and perpetuate Jewish dominance and control while encouraging Arab submissiveness and passivity, thus strengthening existing stereotypes of Jews as overdominant and controlling and of Arabs as lazy and passive (Maoz Reference Maoz2000a; Reference Maoz2000b; Reference Maoz2004). Furthermore, organizational structural analyses indicate that the vast majority of organizations that employ the coexistence model display high Jewish dominance in their hierarchy and distribution of resources and very low to no representation of Arabs in the different levels of management and decision making (Maoz Reference Maoz2004).
Analysis of the discourse characterizing such coexistence model encounters makes visible the tactics and practices of the Jewish directors, showing how these restrict discussion of inequalities and of the conflict between the sides. Such discussion was defined by the Jewish directors as destructive, subversive, and as bound to spoil the good atmosphere of the encounter, and thus as contradicting the goal of fostering coexistence. The Arab participants, for their part, expressed a lack of identification with the goal of advancing coexistence and fostering rapprochement: these goals were perceived as forced upon them, as unrepresentative of the true reality of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel, and as restricting their ability to express their national identity and present the minority's point of view – the less legitimized Palestinian version of the history and current realities of the conflict (Maoz Reference Maoz2000a; Reference Maoz2011).
Thus, the empirical data derived from studies of the coexistence model between Jews and Arabs in Israel can help describe and empirically ground the paradoxical effects of this kind of “harmonious” encounter. By explicitly illustrating the consequences of delegitimizing the discussion of inequalities within these contact interventions, these studies help to support and extend Dixon et al.'s broader argument about the paradoxical interrelations between harmony and sociopolitical change.