Stanford proposes that cooperators achieve and maintain correlated interaction through the objectification of moral norms (target article, sect. 5, para. 7). We argue that the notion of objectification is idle in explaining how cooperators come to interact with each other to the exclusion of non-cooperators.
Stanford frames his argument in terms of a distinction between moral and non-moral norms, and takes Turiel (Reference Turiel1983) and Skitka et al. (Reference Skitka, Bauman and Sargis2005), among others, as evidence that this distinction is central to human psychology (sect. 2). We are skeptical (Machery Reference Machery, Gray and Graham2018; Machery & Mallon Reference Machery, Mallon and Doris2010; O'Neill & Machery, Reference O'Neill, Machery, Zimmerman, Jones and Timmonsforthcoming). While there is no doubt that Westerners distinguish moral and non-moral norms, this distinction appears to be culturally specific. As Stanford himself notes, Turiel's work has come under serious criticism (Kelly et al. Reference Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng and Fessler2007). Furthermore, many languages do not lexicalize the distinction between moral and non-moral norms (Wierzbicka Reference Wierzbicka2007, p. 68), a surprising fact if the moral domain were a fundamental feature of human cognition. Furthermore, unpublished results suggest that Indian as well as Muslim participants (of various national origins) do not draw any distinction between moral and non-moral norms (see Machery [Reference Machery2012] for a description of the research project).
Given this evidence, it is a virtue of Stanford's argument that it does not need to be framed in terms of moral norms; it only requires that norms related to cooperation be objectified and that their objectification explains correlated interaction without exploitation. One problem in assessing this argument is that Stanford employs at least two notions of objectification. He begins by endorsing a thin notion of objectification: “We see ourselves as obligated to [satisfy the demands of morality] regardless of our subjective preferences and desires, and we regard such demands as imposing unconditional obligations not only on ourselves, but also on any and all agents whatsoever, regardless of their preferences and desires” (sect. 1, para. 2, emphasis in the original). This Kantian notion combines the “categorical nature” of norms (norms apply to us independently or our desires) and their universality (they apply to everybody). However, when discussing Nichols and Folds-Bennett (Reference Nichols and Folds-Bennett2003), Stanford endorses a stronger notion: Moral facts are not response-dependent in contrast to facts about what is boring or yucky. He also comments approvingly on Goodwin and Darley's (Reference Goodwin and Darley2008) results, according to which moral norms are judged to be almost as objective as empirical facts. Here objectification is closer to what is known as “projectivism,” the tendency to treat subjective impressions as if they were mind-independent properties of objects (e.g., Hume Reference Hume, Selby-Bigge and Nidditch1738/1975).
We do not doubt that in some sense objectification is a universal phenomenon (O'Neill & Machery, Reference O'Neill, Machery, Zimmerman, Jones and Timmonsforthcoming) – in all cultures, some norms (probably not the same across cultures) are objectified in some sense – but we doubt that objectification is the key to interaction among cooperators without exploitation, contrary to what Stanford proposes (sect. 5, para. 7).
First, projectivism is stronger than needed to explain correlated interaction among cooperators. Correlated interaction is routinely achieved by means of norms cooperators understand as conventional. People routinely view tipping, giving up one's seat in the bus to an elderly person, holding the door for someone else, and so forth, as conventional norms that vary from one culture to another. In all such cases, those within a given community demand norm-conforming behavior from each other, thereby generating correlated interaction within the community, but do not demand such behavior from foreign communities. We are also skeptical that people really project their norms in the first place. For example, people in the United States and in Singapore view moral disagreements between extremely different groups as faultless, a fact that is difficult to account for if people treat norms as response-independent (Sarkissian et al. Reference Sarkissian, Park, Tien, Wright and Knobe2011).
Stanford may respond that even conventional norms are objectified in some sense: People view conventional norms as holding independently of their own subjective preferences (they are categorical) and expect others in their own community to comply with them independently of their subjective preferences. Whether I like it or not, I must drive on the right in the United States, and I expect other Americans to do the same, whether or not they like it. Although such norms do not have universal application, and so fail to live up to Stanford's thin objectification, they nevertheless resemble thinly objectified norms insofar as they have a general application (they apply to all group members).
But we doubt that even this form of thin objectification has much to do with correlated interaction among cooperators. First, norms in general (be those about dress code, politeness, taboos, etc.) are objectified in the sense of being categorical and generalized to others, whether or not they bear on cooperation (Foot Reference Foot1972). Second, the best explanation of cooperative behavior – in terms of punishment and reputation-tracking (e.g., Balliet et al. Reference Balliet, Mulder and Van Lange2011) – requires no appeal to even this form of objectification. Indeed, Stanford criticizes such accounts on the ground that they do not require that agents objectify norms (sect. 3, para. 5). We think Stanford's criticism only serves as grist for our mill: Since punishment and reputation-tracking provide for a robust explanation of cooperative behavior, and since such explanations can be parsed in terms of subjective preferences, we should expect from the outset that objectified norms will be idle in explaining correlated interaction among cooperators.
Our discussion cleaves apart the objectification of norms from correlated interaction among cooperators. We are left with the question that motivates Stanford's research: What evolutionary reason do we have to treat some norms as objective, at least in the thin sense we have identified? Although we have no space to develop this point here, we believe that thin objectification (the categorical nature of norms plus their generalization to a given group) has more to do with the evolutionary importance of capacities to make promises and engage in contracts. When people make a promise, they commit themselves to fulfill it independently of their current and future desires; similarly, when two parties engage in a contract, they commit themselves to respect it, independently of their current and future desires.
Stanford proposes that cooperators achieve and maintain correlated interaction through the objectification of moral norms (target article, sect. 5, para. 7). We argue that the notion of objectification is idle in explaining how cooperators come to interact with each other to the exclusion of non-cooperators.
Stanford frames his argument in terms of a distinction between moral and non-moral norms, and takes Turiel (Reference Turiel1983) and Skitka et al. (Reference Skitka, Bauman and Sargis2005), among others, as evidence that this distinction is central to human psychology (sect. 2). We are skeptical (Machery Reference Machery, Gray and Graham2018; Machery & Mallon Reference Machery, Mallon and Doris2010; O'Neill & Machery, Reference O'Neill, Machery, Zimmerman, Jones and Timmonsforthcoming). While there is no doubt that Westerners distinguish moral and non-moral norms, this distinction appears to be culturally specific. As Stanford himself notes, Turiel's work has come under serious criticism (Kelly et al. Reference Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng and Fessler2007). Furthermore, many languages do not lexicalize the distinction between moral and non-moral norms (Wierzbicka Reference Wierzbicka2007, p. 68), a surprising fact if the moral domain were a fundamental feature of human cognition. Furthermore, unpublished results suggest that Indian as well as Muslim participants (of various national origins) do not draw any distinction between moral and non-moral norms (see Machery [Reference Machery2012] for a description of the research project).
Given this evidence, it is a virtue of Stanford's argument that it does not need to be framed in terms of moral norms; it only requires that norms related to cooperation be objectified and that their objectification explains correlated interaction without exploitation. One problem in assessing this argument is that Stanford employs at least two notions of objectification. He begins by endorsing a thin notion of objectification: “We see ourselves as obligated to [satisfy the demands of morality] regardless of our subjective preferences and desires, and we regard such demands as imposing unconditional obligations not only on ourselves, but also on any and all agents whatsoever, regardless of their preferences and desires” (sect. 1, para. 2, emphasis in the original). This Kantian notion combines the “categorical nature” of norms (norms apply to us independently or our desires) and their universality (they apply to everybody). However, when discussing Nichols and Folds-Bennett (Reference Nichols and Folds-Bennett2003), Stanford endorses a stronger notion: Moral facts are not response-dependent in contrast to facts about what is boring or yucky. He also comments approvingly on Goodwin and Darley's (Reference Goodwin and Darley2008) results, according to which moral norms are judged to be almost as objective as empirical facts. Here objectification is closer to what is known as “projectivism,” the tendency to treat subjective impressions as if they were mind-independent properties of objects (e.g., Hume Reference Hume, Selby-Bigge and Nidditch1738/1975).
We do not doubt that in some sense objectification is a universal phenomenon (O'Neill & Machery, Reference O'Neill, Machery, Zimmerman, Jones and Timmonsforthcoming) – in all cultures, some norms (probably not the same across cultures) are objectified in some sense – but we doubt that objectification is the key to interaction among cooperators without exploitation, contrary to what Stanford proposes (sect. 5, para. 7).
First, projectivism is stronger than needed to explain correlated interaction among cooperators. Correlated interaction is routinely achieved by means of norms cooperators understand as conventional. People routinely view tipping, giving up one's seat in the bus to an elderly person, holding the door for someone else, and so forth, as conventional norms that vary from one culture to another. In all such cases, those within a given community demand norm-conforming behavior from each other, thereby generating correlated interaction within the community, but do not demand such behavior from foreign communities. We are also skeptical that people really project their norms in the first place. For example, people in the United States and in Singapore view moral disagreements between extremely different groups as faultless, a fact that is difficult to account for if people treat norms as response-independent (Sarkissian et al. Reference Sarkissian, Park, Tien, Wright and Knobe2011).
Stanford may respond that even conventional norms are objectified in some sense: People view conventional norms as holding independently of their own subjective preferences (they are categorical) and expect others in their own community to comply with them independently of their subjective preferences. Whether I like it or not, I must drive on the right in the United States, and I expect other Americans to do the same, whether or not they like it. Although such norms do not have universal application, and so fail to live up to Stanford's thin objectification, they nevertheless resemble thinly objectified norms insofar as they have a general application (they apply to all group members).
But we doubt that even this form of thin objectification has much to do with correlated interaction among cooperators. First, norms in general (be those about dress code, politeness, taboos, etc.) are objectified in the sense of being categorical and generalized to others, whether or not they bear on cooperation (Foot Reference Foot1972). Second, the best explanation of cooperative behavior – in terms of punishment and reputation-tracking (e.g., Balliet et al. Reference Balliet, Mulder and Van Lange2011) – requires no appeal to even this form of objectification. Indeed, Stanford criticizes such accounts on the ground that they do not require that agents objectify norms (sect. 3, para. 5). We think Stanford's criticism only serves as grist for our mill: Since punishment and reputation-tracking provide for a robust explanation of cooperative behavior, and since such explanations can be parsed in terms of subjective preferences, we should expect from the outset that objectified norms will be idle in explaining correlated interaction among cooperators.
Our discussion cleaves apart the objectification of norms from correlated interaction among cooperators. We are left with the question that motivates Stanford's research: What evolutionary reason do we have to treat some norms as objective, at least in the thin sense we have identified? Although we have no space to develop this point here, we believe that thin objectification (the categorical nature of norms plus their generalization to a given group) has more to do with the evolutionary importance of capacities to make promises and engage in contracts. When people make a promise, they commit themselves to fulfill it independently of their current and future desires; similarly, when two parties engage in a contract, they commit themselves to respect it, independently of their current and future desires.