Stanford is providing an evolutionary account for a peculiar feature of morality – namely, that we view the motivations for moral actions, both in ourselves and in others, as originating externally. Being externally motivated means that an action is right or wrong not because it exclusively aligns with one's preferences, but because it is right. It seems puzzling to explain moral externalism from an evolutionary perspective, since it appears that subjective states alone would be strong enough to motivate action (Stanford raises the example of pain responses, which are subjective and can be strongly motivational). Therefore, why would moral externalism arise if existent mechanisms, like subjective preferences, can provide the same function? The answer Stanford gives is that moral externalism was selected for as a guide to identify conspecifics with whom it would be good to collaborate. Group members whose actions align with justice, rights, and other externally sanctioned norms would likely be good partners for cooperative actions and also, and perhaps more importantly, less apt to exploit others.
I will argue that a more parsimonious explanation of moral externalism is that it is merely a psychological by-product of underlying affective responses; it is a story we tell ourselves to make sense of a particular class of pre-existing subjective states. This view is predicated on the dual-process model of the mind (for an overview, see Kahneman Reference Kahneman2011). In rough outline, the dual-process model suggests that our mind consists of both an automatic, non-conscious processing system and an executive, rational control center, which we experience as our mental selves. The revolutionary nature of this view is that a surprising amount of our decision-making is conducted by our automatic, non-conscious system, which is, only after the initial decision is made, endorsed, ignored, or revised by our conscious selves. Relating the dual-process model to moral psychology, Haidt (Reference Haidt2007) nicely summarizes: “[The] basic point is that brains are always and automatically evaluating everything they perceive, and that higher-level thinking is preceded, permeated, and influenced by affective reactions (simply feelings of like and dislike) which push us gently (or not so gently) toward approach or avoidance” (p. 998).
This view aligns with a popular evolutionary approach to grounding our moral intuitions in our affective responses, in terms of emotions, disgust, or intuitions (Greene Reference Greene2013; Haidt Reference Haidt2001; Joyce Reference Joyce2006; Nichols Reference Nichols2004; Prinz Reference Prinz2007). The problem with this approach, as Stanford emphasizes, is that if our affective responses motivate moral behavior, why do we then have this “extra” feeling that some of our moral intuitions are motivated externally? A dual-system response could be that our executive, conscious system has to make sense of what our automatic, non-conscious system has decided. We have an inclination, perhaps as a result of natural selection, to have certain affective responses, and then, after we experience the affect, our rational selves have to go about explaining why it is that we have this moral intuition. The conscious explaining of our innate intuitions is called confabulation, which has also been experimentally identified in other non-moral situations (Haidt Reference Haidt2001; Nisbett & Wilson Reference Nisbett and Wilson1977).
An important point from Stanford remains, which is: Why have this extra step for a certain class of affective response? An answer might be that the moral intuitions that invoke an externalist motivation differ in a salient way from those that do not. My favorable response to peanut butter ice-cream is justified by my subjective approval upon consuming it. My moral rebuke of the Ku Klux Klan, as Stanford suggests, is more than me disliking it, but that I judge that it is wrong apart from what I or anyone else might feel. The difference in the affective responses between the two cases might be that the latter response is other-centered whereas the prior response is wholly subjective. My conscious, executive self struggles to find an explanation for this strong affective response that is seemingly concerned with the well-being of others (or concerns with justice, fairness, etc.). The answer we tell ourselves, given that the motivation seems to explicitly rule out merely self-centered motivation, is that justification for such preferences must be external. What else, my conscious self contends, could ground these other-centered affective responses?
The significance of this approach suggests that Stanford has the causal relationship backwards. For Stanford, we derive motivation apart from our affective responses. On the dual-process account, the cause of externalized motivation is the underlying affective responses combined with a post-hoc explanation from our conscious, rational self. This approach has a two-fold advantage on Stanford's account. First, natural selection could simply work on a pre-existing system of affective responses identified even in chimpanzees (De Waal Reference De Waal1996). Second, it is more challenging, it would seem, for natural selection to select a higher-order cognitive feature like “external motivation” for a set of moral judgments. Third, the motivations for behaviors are often opaque, so selection may be blind to this distinction (in trying to identify others who adhere to externalized moral principles).
A final reason for seeing affect as driving moral externalism is that it seems strange for “motivation” to be external. Hume famously claimed that reason is and must be a “slave of the passions” (Hume Reference Hume, Selby-Bigge and Selby-Bigge1738/1975, p. 415). It seems like Stanford is collapsing justification of moral intuitions with motivation for moral intuitions. Even if you acknowledge externally sanctioned moral principles, you still have to want to follow them. Understanding that moral externalization is a confabulation would avoid this problem.
So Stanford may be right in arguing that the distinctive features of human morality arose as a selective function to facilitate prosocial behavior, promote cooperation, and to avoid exploitation. This alone is an interesting and important contribution to our understanding of the evolutionary roots of morality. There is no need, however, to attribute this to moral externalism, but to the affective responses that underlie such behavior. Why give an evolutionary explanation of our sense of moral externalism when it can be explained away?
You have
Access
Stanford is providing an evolutionary account for a peculiar feature of morality – namely, that we view the motivations for moral actions, both in ourselves and in others, as originating externally. Being externally motivated means that an action is right or wrong not because it exclusively aligns with one's preferences, but because it is right. It seems puzzling to explain moral externalism from an evolutionary perspective, since it appears that subjective states alone would be strong enough to motivate action (Stanford raises the example of pain responses, which are subjective and can be strongly motivational). Therefore, why would moral externalism arise if existent mechanisms, like subjective preferences, can provide the same function? The answer Stanford gives is that moral externalism was selected for as a guide to identify conspecifics with whom it would be good to collaborate. Group members whose actions align with justice, rights, and other externally sanctioned norms would likely be good partners for cooperative actions and also, and perhaps more importantly, less apt to exploit others.
I will argue that a more parsimonious explanation of moral externalism is that it is merely a psychological by-product of underlying affective responses; it is a story we tell ourselves to make sense of a particular class of pre-existing subjective states. This view is predicated on the dual-process model of the mind (for an overview, see Kahneman Reference Kahneman2011). In rough outline, the dual-process model suggests that our mind consists of both an automatic, non-conscious processing system and an executive, rational control center, which we experience as our mental selves. The revolutionary nature of this view is that a surprising amount of our decision-making is conducted by our automatic, non-conscious system, which is, only after the initial decision is made, endorsed, ignored, or revised by our conscious selves. Relating the dual-process model to moral psychology, Haidt (Reference Haidt2007) nicely summarizes: “[The] basic point is that brains are always and automatically evaluating everything they perceive, and that higher-level thinking is preceded, permeated, and influenced by affective reactions (simply feelings of like and dislike) which push us gently (or not so gently) toward approach or avoidance” (p. 998).
This view aligns with a popular evolutionary approach to grounding our moral intuitions in our affective responses, in terms of emotions, disgust, or intuitions (Greene Reference Greene2013; Haidt Reference Haidt2001; Joyce Reference Joyce2006; Nichols Reference Nichols2004; Prinz Reference Prinz2007). The problem with this approach, as Stanford emphasizes, is that if our affective responses motivate moral behavior, why do we then have this “extra” feeling that some of our moral intuitions are motivated externally? A dual-system response could be that our executive, conscious system has to make sense of what our automatic, non-conscious system has decided. We have an inclination, perhaps as a result of natural selection, to have certain affective responses, and then, after we experience the affect, our rational selves have to go about explaining why it is that we have this moral intuition. The conscious explaining of our innate intuitions is called confabulation, which has also been experimentally identified in other non-moral situations (Haidt Reference Haidt2001; Nisbett & Wilson Reference Nisbett and Wilson1977).
An important point from Stanford remains, which is: Why have this extra step for a certain class of affective response? An answer might be that the moral intuitions that invoke an externalist motivation differ in a salient way from those that do not. My favorable response to peanut butter ice-cream is justified by my subjective approval upon consuming it. My moral rebuke of the Ku Klux Klan, as Stanford suggests, is more than me disliking it, but that I judge that it is wrong apart from what I or anyone else might feel. The difference in the affective responses between the two cases might be that the latter response is other-centered whereas the prior response is wholly subjective. My conscious, executive self struggles to find an explanation for this strong affective response that is seemingly concerned with the well-being of others (or concerns with justice, fairness, etc.). The answer we tell ourselves, given that the motivation seems to explicitly rule out merely self-centered motivation, is that justification for such preferences must be external. What else, my conscious self contends, could ground these other-centered affective responses?
The significance of this approach suggests that Stanford has the causal relationship backwards. For Stanford, we derive motivation apart from our affective responses. On the dual-process account, the cause of externalized motivation is the underlying affective responses combined with a post-hoc explanation from our conscious, rational self. This approach has a two-fold advantage on Stanford's account. First, natural selection could simply work on a pre-existing system of affective responses identified even in chimpanzees (De Waal Reference De Waal1996). Second, it is more challenging, it would seem, for natural selection to select a higher-order cognitive feature like “external motivation” for a set of moral judgments. Third, the motivations for behaviors are often opaque, so selection may be blind to this distinction (in trying to identify others who adhere to externalized moral principles).
A final reason for seeing affect as driving moral externalism is that it seems strange for “motivation” to be external. Hume famously claimed that reason is and must be a “slave of the passions” (Hume Reference Hume, Selby-Bigge and Selby-Bigge1738/1975, p. 415). It seems like Stanford is collapsing justification of moral intuitions with motivation for moral intuitions. Even if you acknowledge externally sanctioned moral principles, you still have to want to follow them. Understanding that moral externalization is a confabulation would avoid this problem.
So Stanford may be right in arguing that the distinctive features of human morality arose as a selective function to facilitate prosocial behavior, promote cooperation, and to avoid exploitation. This alone is an interesting and important contribution to our understanding of the evolutionary roots of morality. There is no need, however, to attribute this to moral externalism, but to the affective responses that underlie such behavior. Why give an evolutionary explanation of our sense of moral externalism when it can be explained away?