Stanford astutely identifies a problem that has not been adequately addressed: Why is it that people objectify (or “externalize”) moral demands? Although ample evidence exists documenting this tendency, a satisfying explanation for it has not yet been produced. Indeed, the question itself has not been seriously considered by experimentalists working on meta-ethical belief. Stanford's theory is that this tendency emerged because it facilitates human social cooperation. Specifically, it promotes “correlated interaction” between social partners who share the same moral norms. In this commentary, I raise two questions regarding this original and thought-provoking thesis – one regarding the precise mechanics of how moral objectification gives rise to correlated interactions, and the other regarding the link between objectification and social interaction.
How is it that the objectification of moral norms gives rise to correlated interactions between individuals who share them? Stanford emphasizes one mechanism primarily – namely, that the objectification of moral norms automates the demand for others to conform to such norms, thereby protecting potential cooperators from exploitation by individuals who do not share these norms. A mere subjective preference, he argues, could underpin a similar desire for others’ conformity, but it is unlikely to do so automatically. In essence, the objectification of moral norms produces a reliable, internal mechanism by which cooperative individuals can select among potential interaction partners. Stanford also intimates at the possibility of a more social psychological mechanism – namely, that by objectifying certain moral norms, individuals advertise themselves as desirable social partners (i.e., their objectification indicates their commitment to moral norms). However, it is not clear that objectification is critical here, for the same reason that Stanford regards it as unnecessary for producing individual commitment to moral norms – communicating one's own commitment to a moral norm could equally well be achieved by indicating a strong subjective preference to abide by it. This is perhaps why Stanford does not stress the importance of this advertising mechanism.
There are, however, two further social psychological mechanisms stemming from moral objectification that might make correlated interactions more likely. Both extend a point Stanford emphasizes in describing his primary mechanism. The objectification of a moral norm creates a strong expectation that others abide by this norm, but it also conveys this social expectation. Hence, apart from the effect that objectification has on the holder of such an expectation, it should also have a powerful effect on its targets, by exerting social pressure on them to abide by the norm. This may, in turn, shape and constrain the norms endorsed and followed by others in society (“lifting all boats”). Here, objectification does seem critical. Broadcasting a mere subjective preference would not imply the same strength of expectation that others should conform.
A second, related mechanism, is that accordant targets of such expectations should subsequently direct more social attention to the person doing the objectification, in the hopes of cooperating with them. The proclamation of an objectified moral norm thereby enables assortative matching among like-minded social partners. However, unlike Stanford's primary assortative mechanism, which relies on processes internal to the person doing the objectification, this effect is mediated by a change in the minds of those who observe the objectification of a moral norm. Once again, though, objectification itself seems critical. In contrast to a mere preference, objectification conveys a particularly strong expectation that others abide by the norm. It therefore informs others who share this norm that they themselves are especially socially desirable in the eyes of the original norm holder. Therefore, I suggest that these two social psychological mechanisms complement Stanford's theory, in addition to the primary mechanism he identifies.
A second question concerns the documented tendency for moral objectification to predict relevant social attitudes. In existing analyses across moral norms, the more strongly a norm is objectified, the more people feel uncomfortable with another person who disagrees with it (Goodwin & Darley Reference Goodwin and Darley2012). This result is highly pertinent to Stanford's theory, as he notes, because it demonstrates a clear link between objectification and social exclusion. But does (and should) this link vary as a function of the content of particular norms? Are there some moral norms for which there is an especially strong coupling between objectification and discomfort with disagreement?
To provide some preliminary data, I re-analyzed these correlations at the level of each individual norm (rather than across norms) in three relevant experiments reported in Goodwin and Darley (Reference Goodwin and Darley2012; Study 1 and its two follow-ups). The correlations between objectification and discomfort with a disagreeing party were significant for each norm, but there was also considerable heterogeneity in their size – they ranged from 0.12 and 0.20 in the case of norms pertaining to the wrongness of robbing a convenience store, and the wrongness of flag-burning; and up to 0.70 and 0.72, in the case of norms pertaining to the goodness of donating significant income to charity, and the wrongness of punching someone in the face at a bar. What explains this variation? One possibility is valence – given that, overall, negative norms are typically objectified to a greater degree than positive norms, even when matched on how strongly people agree with them (Goodwin & Darley Reference Goodwin and Darley2012). However, there was no overall difference in the average strength of these correlations for positive (r = 0.45) and negative (r = 0.43) norms, t(30) = 0.26, p = 0.80. This null result in fact seems consistent with Stanford's theory. After all, when gauging another person's cooperative potential, it is instructive to know not only how strongly they objectify norms pertaining to the wrongness of harm and exploitation, but also how strongly they objectify norms that encourage kindness and generosity.
But it leaves a lingering question: Is it possible to predict or explain the heterogeneity in these observed correlations? Why should objectification be tied closely to social exclusion for some moral norms and not for others? We do not yet have a full characterization of this variation, but when we do, it will be instructive to learn whether Stanford's theory might elucidate it.
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Stanford astutely identifies a problem that has not been adequately addressed: Why is it that people objectify (or “externalize”) moral demands? Although ample evidence exists documenting this tendency, a satisfying explanation for it has not yet been produced. Indeed, the question itself has not been seriously considered by experimentalists working on meta-ethical belief. Stanford's theory is that this tendency emerged because it facilitates human social cooperation. Specifically, it promotes “correlated interaction” between social partners who share the same moral norms. In this commentary, I raise two questions regarding this original and thought-provoking thesis – one regarding the precise mechanics of how moral objectification gives rise to correlated interactions, and the other regarding the link between objectification and social interaction.
How is it that the objectification of moral norms gives rise to correlated interactions between individuals who share them? Stanford emphasizes one mechanism primarily – namely, that the objectification of moral norms automates the demand for others to conform to such norms, thereby protecting potential cooperators from exploitation by individuals who do not share these norms. A mere subjective preference, he argues, could underpin a similar desire for others’ conformity, but it is unlikely to do so automatically. In essence, the objectification of moral norms produces a reliable, internal mechanism by which cooperative individuals can select among potential interaction partners. Stanford also intimates at the possibility of a more social psychological mechanism – namely, that by objectifying certain moral norms, individuals advertise themselves as desirable social partners (i.e., their objectification indicates their commitment to moral norms). However, it is not clear that objectification is critical here, for the same reason that Stanford regards it as unnecessary for producing individual commitment to moral norms – communicating one's own commitment to a moral norm could equally well be achieved by indicating a strong subjective preference to abide by it. This is perhaps why Stanford does not stress the importance of this advertising mechanism.
There are, however, two further social psychological mechanisms stemming from moral objectification that might make correlated interactions more likely. Both extend a point Stanford emphasizes in describing his primary mechanism. The objectification of a moral norm creates a strong expectation that others abide by this norm, but it also conveys this social expectation. Hence, apart from the effect that objectification has on the holder of such an expectation, it should also have a powerful effect on its targets, by exerting social pressure on them to abide by the norm. This may, in turn, shape and constrain the norms endorsed and followed by others in society (“lifting all boats”). Here, objectification does seem critical. Broadcasting a mere subjective preference would not imply the same strength of expectation that others should conform.
A second, related mechanism, is that accordant targets of such expectations should subsequently direct more social attention to the person doing the objectification, in the hopes of cooperating with them. The proclamation of an objectified moral norm thereby enables assortative matching among like-minded social partners. However, unlike Stanford's primary assortative mechanism, which relies on processes internal to the person doing the objectification, this effect is mediated by a change in the minds of those who observe the objectification of a moral norm. Once again, though, objectification itself seems critical. In contrast to a mere preference, objectification conveys a particularly strong expectation that others abide by the norm. It therefore informs others who share this norm that they themselves are especially socially desirable in the eyes of the original norm holder. Therefore, I suggest that these two social psychological mechanisms complement Stanford's theory, in addition to the primary mechanism he identifies.
A second question concerns the documented tendency for moral objectification to predict relevant social attitudes. In existing analyses across moral norms, the more strongly a norm is objectified, the more people feel uncomfortable with another person who disagrees with it (Goodwin & Darley Reference Goodwin and Darley2012). This result is highly pertinent to Stanford's theory, as he notes, because it demonstrates a clear link between objectification and social exclusion. But does (and should) this link vary as a function of the content of particular norms? Are there some moral norms for which there is an especially strong coupling between objectification and discomfort with disagreement?
To provide some preliminary data, I re-analyzed these correlations at the level of each individual norm (rather than across norms) in three relevant experiments reported in Goodwin and Darley (Reference Goodwin and Darley2012; Study 1 and its two follow-ups). The correlations between objectification and discomfort with a disagreeing party were significant for each norm, but there was also considerable heterogeneity in their size – they ranged from 0.12 and 0.20 in the case of norms pertaining to the wrongness of robbing a convenience store, and the wrongness of flag-burning; and up to 0.70 and 0.72, in the case of norms pertaining to the goodness of donating significant income to charity, and the wrongness of punching someone in the face at a bar. What explains this variation? One possibility is valence – given that, overall, negative norms are typically objectified to a greater degree than positive norms, even when matched on how strongly people agree with them (Goodwin & Darley Reference Goodwin and Darley2012). However, there was no overall difference in the average strength of these correlations for positive (r = 0.45) and negative (r = 0.43) norms, t(30) = 0.26, p = 0.80. This null result in fact seems consistent with Stanford's theory. After all, when gauging another person's cooperative potential, it is instructive to know not only how strongly they objectify norms pertaining to the wrongness of harm and exploitation, but also how strongly they objectify norms that encourage kindness and generosity.
But it leaves a lingering question: Is it possible to predict or explain the heterogeneity in these observed correlations? Why should objectification be tied closely to social exclusion for some moral norms and not for others? We do not yet have a full characterization of this variation, but when we do, it will be instructive to learn whether Stanford's theory might elucidate it.