Make them believe, that offensive operations, often times, is the surest, if not the only … means of defence.
—George Washington (1799) George Washington understood that social reality depends crucially on social perception. For this reason, the perceptions of the attack-defense dynamics might matter far more than their actual underlying reality in determining the outcomes of intergroup conflict. This is especially true in identity-driven conflicts where interpretations of social factors determine group cohesion and collective action, as is the case in politics. We fully agree with De Dreu and Gross (D&G) that one potent way of mustering support for attack is to create the perception that one's group is under attack. This may solve group coordination problems by bolstering in-group identity and compliance, and instituting leadership hierarchies. This shift in perception occurs, for example, when powerful groups claim they are collective victims of external forces or groups. Our commentary will highlight the role of rhetoric, persuasion, and propaganda in changing perceptions and actions during intergroup conflict.
We speculate that one characteristic of effective leaders is having an intuitive grasp of the malleability of attack-defense dynamics and the ability to manipulate their followers’ perceptions (e.g., through identity leadership; Reicher et al. Reference Reicher, Haslam and Smith2012). For example, political leaders who use collective pronouns (we, us) are more likely to get elected to public office (Steffens & Haslam Reference Steffens and Haslam2013). Some leaders may go a step further and frame their side as victims – even after they win political office and control the levels of political power. For instance, a recent analysis of U.S. President Donald Trump's most viral messages on social media found that they contain collective victimization language in which he frames himself and his followers as victims (Brady et al. Reference Brady, Van Bavel, Jost and Wills2019). Thus, making one's own group feel attacked creates the perception that the attackers (e.g., with the goal of changing institutions or policy) are in fact the defenders in the conflict, and may serve as a cheap and effective means to generate a shared sense of identity and mobilize followers.
Another strategy for mobilizing followers is to alter their perception of the payoffs associated with attack versus defense. Take the situation where both groups choose to “cooperate” (CC) – attackers choose to not attack and defenders choose to not defend – which maintains the status quo. Based on D&G's model, there is some net difference, d, in the utilities to the groups, where the defender gains more than the attacker. However, if the attacking side can convince its members that the net difference is actually larger (formally, a transform F(d) such that F(d) > d), this will increase the perceived value of the attackers switching to an attacking strategy on the following round. An example of this leadership strategy is commonly deployed in Western Europe among populist movements or among the alt-right in the United States to motivate conflict against out-groups. It occurs when a societal issue, such as immigration, is framed as an existential threat to the native populace. This elicits perceptions of threat and prejudice from the majority group (see Craig & Richeson Reference Craig and Richeson2014; Shepherd et al. Reference Shepherd, Fasoli, Pereira and Branscombe2018), and motivates action. This was heard during a Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, when white supremacists chanted, “You will not replace us!”
It is important to note that not all members of a group will perceive threat to the same extent (Hibbing et al. Reference Hibbing, Smith and Alford2015). When these individual differences are unevenly distributed between two conflicting groups, one group may be more successful at mobilizing attack. Indeed, in the United States, conservatives tend to be more attuned to threats than liberals (Kanai et al. Reference Kanai, Feilden, Firth and Rees2011; Oxley et al. Reference Oxley, Smith, Alford, Hibbing, Miller, Scalora, Hatemi and Hibbing2008), and several theories argue that conservatives may place a greater premium on group loyalty and deference to authorities than liberals (Haidt Reference Haidt2012; Stern et al. Reference Stern, West, Jost and Rule2014). Such individual differences might help shed light on current success of various populist movements across Western liberal democracies. Even during periods of historically low crime and relatively high prosperity, certain groups may nonetheless perceive threats that allow them to mobilize politically.
When some people perceive threats to the very existence of their group, it can elicit aggression (Wohl et al. Reference Wohl, Squires and Caouette2012) or authoritarianism (Stenner Reference Stenner2005). This can occur when they perceive that rapid changes to a society, such as the racial/ethnic demographic shift within the United States, are undercutting social cohesion. Under such conditions, authoritarians feel more threat and will be more sensitive to strong identity leadership. In these cases, the normal dynamics of conflict may be reversed. Authoritarians initially may perceive themselves as defenders and later transition into the role of attackers as their cause grows stronger (Altemeyer Reference Altemeyer1988).
Accordingly, an important area for developing the theory of D&G is the dynamic nature of intergroup conflict. Using the most effective strategy requires an assessment of the current and future state of the conflict, and we expect some leaders to be better at this than others. Indeed, groups and, particularly, their leaders can use attack and defense strategies at different times or even simultaneously (as during a pre-emptive strike). The blurred nature of these strategies may also suggest that the fight-or-flight neural system, typically associated with defense, could also play a role in a successful attack – somewhat undermining the strong distinction that D&G draw between different neural systems and the roles of attacker or defender. Modeling the dynamics of repeated conflicts would also allow for group memberships to change over time, because mobilized groups might attract new members to their ranks, further changing the incentive structure of the conflict. Effective leaders will be able to exploit such changes in group identification, as when a party's membership and support ebb and flow between electoral cycles, with profound effects on the outcomes of future conflicts. Translating these dynamic processes fully into the game-theoretic framework suggested by D&G would strengthen the appeal and generalizability of their promising account of intergroup conflict, as well as provide fertile ground for further investigation.
Make them believe, that offensive operations, often times, is the surest, if not the only … means of defence.
—George Washington (1799)George Washington understood that social reality depends crucially on social perception. For this reason, the perceptions of the attack-defense dynamics might matter far more than their actual underlying reality in determining the outcomes of intergroup conflict. This is especially true in identity-driven conflicts where interpretations of social factors determine group cohesion and collective action, as is the case in politics. We fully agree with De Dreu and Gross (D&G) that one potent way of mustering support for attack is to create the perception that one's group is under attack. This may solve group coordination problems by bolstering in-group identity and compliance, and instituting leadership hierarchies. This shift in perception occurs, for example, when powerful groups claim they are collective victims of external forces or groups. Our commentary will highlight the role of rhetoric, persuasion, and propaganda in changing perceptions and actions during intergroup conflict.
We speculate that one characteristic of effective leaders is having an intuitive grasp of the malleability of attack-defense dynamics and the ability to manipulate their followers’ perceptions (e.g., through identity leadership; Reicher et al. Reference Reicher, Haslam and Smith2012). For example, political leaders who use collective pronouns (we, us) are more likely to get elected to public office (Steffens & Haslam Reference Steffens and Haslam2013). Some leaders may go a step further and frame their side as victims – even after they win political office and control the levels of political power. For instance, a recent analysis of U.S. President Donald Trump's most viral messages on social media found that they contain collective victimization language in which he frames himself and his followers as victims (Brady et al. Reference Brady, Van Bavel, Jost and Wills2019). Thus, making one's own group feel attacked creates the perception that the attackers (e.g., with the goal of changing institutions or policy) are in fact the defenders in the conflict, and may serve as a cheap and effective means to generate a shared sense of identity and mobilize followers.
Another strategy for mobilizing followers is to alter their perception of the payoffs associated with attack versus defense. Take the situation where both groups choose to “cooperate” (CC) – attackers choose to not attack and defenders choose to not defend – which maintains the status quo. Based on D&G's model, there is some net difference, d, in the utilities to the groups, where the defender gains more than the attacker. However, if the attacking side can convince its members that the net difference is actually larger (formally, a transform F(d) such that F(d) > d), this will increase the perceived value of the attackers switching to an attacking strategy on the following round. An example of this leadership strategy is commonly deployed in Western Europe among populist movements or among the alt-right in the United States to motivate conflict against out-groups. It occurs when a societal issue, such as immigration, is framed as an existential threat to the native populace. This elicits perceptions of threat and prejudice from the majority group (see Craig & Richeson Reference Craig and Richeson2014; Shepherd et al. Reference Shepherd, Fasoli, Pereira and Branscombe2018), and motivates action. This was heard during a Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, when white supremacists chanted, “You will not replace us!”
It is important to note that not all members of a group will perceive threat to the same extent (Hibbing et al. Reference Hibbing, Smith and Alford2015). When these individual differences are unevenly distributed between two conflicting groups, one group may be more successful at mobilizing attack. Indeed, in the United States, conservatives tend to be more attuned to threats than liberals (Kanai et al. Reference Kanai, Feilden, Firth and Rees2011; Oxley et al. Reference Oxley, Smith, Alford, Hibbing, Miller, Scalora, Hatemi and Hibbing2008), and several theories argue that conservatives may place a greater premium on group loyalty and deference to authorities than liberals (Haidt Reference Haidt2012; Stern et al. Reference Stern, West, Jost and Rule2014). Such individual differences might help shed light on current success of various populist movements across Western liberal democracies. Even during periods of historically low crime and relatively high prosperity, certain groups may nonetheless perceive threats that allow them to mobilize politically.
When some people perceive threats to the very existence of their group, it can elicit aggression (Wohl et al. Reference Wohl, Squires and Caouette2012) or authoritarianism (Stenner Reference Stenner2005). This can occur when they perceive that rapid changes to a society, such as the racial/ethnic demographic shift within the United States, are undercutting social cohesion. Under such conditions, authoritarians feel more threat and will be more sensitive to strong identity leadership. In these cases, the normal dynamics of conflict may be reversed. Authoritarians initially may perceive themselves as defenders and later transition into the role of attackers as their cause grows stronger (Altemeyer Reference Altemeyer1988).
Accordingly, an important area for developing the theory of D&G is the dynamic nature of intergroup conflict. Using the most effective strategy requires an assessment of the current and future state of the conflict, and we expect some leaders to be better at this than others. Indeed, groups and, particularly, their leaders can use attack and defense strategies at different times or even simultaneously (as during a pre-emptive strike). The blurred nature of these strategies may also suggest that the fight-or-flight neural system, typically associated with defense, could also play a role in a successful attack – somewhat undermining the strong distinction that D&G draw between different neural systems and the roles of attacker or defender. Modeling the dynamics of repeated conflicts would also allow for group memberships to change over time, because mobilized groups might attract new members to their ranks, further changing the incentive structure of the conflict. Effective leaders will be able to exploit such changes in group identification, as when a party's membership and support ebb and flow between electoral cycles, with profound effects on the outcomes of future conflicts. Translating these dynamic processes fully into the game-theoretic framework suggested by D&G would strengthen the appeal and generalizability of their promising account of intergroup conflict, as well as provide fertile ground for further investigation.