As Baumard et al. state in the target article, humans “don't just cooperate but cooperate in quite specific ways” (sect. 3.5, para. 2). The observation that humans appear uniquely motivated to act on behalf of others, in a variety of contexts, in response to a diversity of needs, and very early in development (e.g., Dunfield et al. Reference Dunfield, Kuhlmeier, O'Connell and Kelley2010; Svetlova et al. Reference Svetlova, Nichols and Brownell2010; Warneken & Tomasello Reference Warneken and Tomasello2006; Zahn-Waxler et al. Reference Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner and Chapman1992), has motivated much interest in explaining this distinctive human tendency (e.g., the target article; see also Tomasello Reference Tomasello2009). To this end, there have been a number of attempts to categorize and clarify the varieties of other-oriented behaviours that children engage in (e.g., Dunfield et al. Reference Dunfield, Kuhlmeier, O'Connell and Kelley2010; Hay & Cook Reference Hay, Cook., Brownell and Kopp2007; Warneken & Tomasello 2009), with the goal of providing a more comprehensive, unified account of early other-oriented behaviours. Importantly, in light of recent advances in understanding the many ways in which humans act on behalf of others, any comprehensive account of the origins of the human moral sense must consider all varieties of other-oriented behaviours, not simply a select few.
Although the target article presents a cogent, mutualistic theory of morality, we believe that there are two important issues that have not been adequately addressed: (1) The present proposal is almost exclusively based on economic behaviour (specifically sharing), despite the fact that humans engage in a wide variety of other-oriented behaviours; and, relatedly, (2) by limiting the examination of morality to economic behaviour, the target article has failed to address a growing body of supportive literature from developmental psychology. In this commentary, we briefly present some insights from the field of developmental psychology that we feel broaden and enrich the authors' present argument.
It is rather indisputable that human adults readily track and evaluate others based on their previous behaviour and modify interactions based on these evaluations. Moreover, as the authors note, economic games are a particularly good measure of human prosocial tendencies because the individual's moral motivation is clearly quantifiable (in regard to the amount of money given), allowing for fine-grained analysis of the effects of various manipulations on other-oriented motivations. Yet, giving up a desired resource (such as money) is only one of the forms that other-oriented behaviour can take.
Humans are thought to respond to at least three negative states (material desire, instrumental need, and emotional distress) with three varieties of prosocial behaviours: sharing, helping, and comforting, respectively (Dunfield et al. Reference Dunfield, Kuhlmeier, O'Connell and Kelley2010). Each of these various prosocial behaviours are hypothesized to rely on a unique suite of social cognitive skills (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, in press). Importantly, unlike sharing, the unique characteristics of responding to instrumental need and emotional distress can make it difficult to determine the “value” of helping and comforting acts, making it harder to determine if an act has been fairly reciprocated. Indeed, no model can claim to truly account for the breadth of human morality without consideration of all the other-oriented behaviours that humans engage in.
Baumard et al. discuss children's failures to show selective sharing (e.g., Bernhard et al. Reference Bernhard, Fischbacher and Fehr2006; Blake & Rand Reference Blake and Rand2010); however, it is necessary to consider that sharing is one of the last prosocial behaviours to develop (e.g., Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, in press). Moreover, early sharing behaviours are often less spontaneous than other prosocial measures, relying heavily on the recipient's vocalization of their desire (Brownell et al. Reference Brownell, Svetlova and Nichols2009), suggesting that they may not be the best measure to assess children's moral motivations. Indeed, if we look at earlier emerging prosocial behaviours, such as helping or comforting, we can observe nuanced interactions earlier in development, which suggests that Baumard et al.'s proposed proximate mechanisms for a mutualistic morality may motivate some of the earliest examples of other-oriented behaviour.
Support for the existence of proximal mechanisms necessary to engage in mutualistic morality can be found when looking at children's helping behaviour. Children begin to reliably help others in response to the observation of need early in the second year of life (e.g., 18 months; Warneken & Tomasello Reference Warneken and Tomasello2006). Yet, prior to the ability to produce helping behaviours, children are already able to differentiate between helpers and hinderers (Hamlin et al. Reference Hamlin, Wynn and Bloom2007) and make predictions about future interactions based on their observations of previous helping and hindering acts (Kuhlmeier et al. Reference Kuhlmeier, Wynn and Bloom2003). Thus, even before children are actively helping, they are already tracking the quality of others' moral acts. Further, very shortly after children start helping others, their helpful acts are produced selectively based on the recipient's previous behaviour; children have been shown to avoid helping individuals who have demonstrated negative intentions, across a variety of contexts (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier Reference Dunfield and Kuhlmeier2010; Vaish et al. Reference Vaish, Carpenter and Tomasello2010). Taken together, recent research supports the idea that, under certain circumstances (e.g., instrumental need as opposed to material desire), early prosocial behaviours conform to the predictions of the presented mutualistic approach to morality. Moreover, it suggests an important role for future research in clarifying the particular task demands that affect the production of nuanced moral acts in early development.
In sum, the target article presents an exciting new approach to understanding the proximate and ultimate explanations for human morality. We believe that an integration of recent research in the area of social cognitive development both supports and enriches the understanding of “morality as an adaptation to an environment in which individuals were in competition to be chosen and recruited in mutually advantageous cooperative interactions” (target article, Abstract). Indeed, by considering the full breadth of human other-oriented behaviours, we can find support for the proposed mechanisms in the earliest instances of children's moral behaviour and gain better insight into the evolution, maintenance, and production of these unique human tendencies.
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As Baumard et al. state in the target article, humans “don't just cooperate but cooperate in quite specific ways” (sect. 3.5, para. 2). The observation that humans appear uniquely motivated to act on behalf of others, in a variety of contexts, in response to a diversity of needs, and very early in development (e.g., Dunfield et al. Reference Dunfield, Kuhlmeier, O'Connell and Kelley2010; Svetlova et al. Reference Svetlova, Nichols and Brownell2010; Warneken & Tomasello Reference Warneken and Tomasello2006; Zahn-Waxler et al. Reference Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner and Chapman1992), has motivated much interest in explaining this distinctive human tendency (e.g., the target article; see also Tomasello Reference Tomasello2009). To this end, there have been a number of attempts to categorize and clarify the varieties of other-oriented behaviours that children engage in (e.g., Dunfield et al. Reference Dunfield, Kuhlmeier, O'Connell and Kelley2010; Hay & Cook Reference Hay, Cook., Brownell and Kopp2007; Warneken & Tomasello 2009), with the goal of providing a more comprehensive, unified account of early other-oriented behaviours. Importantly, in light of recent advances in understanding the many ways in which humans act on behalf of others, any comprehensive account of the origins of the human moral sense must consider all varieties of other-oriented behaviours, not simply a select few.
Although the target article presents a cogent, mutualistic theory of morality, we believe that there are two important issues that have not been adequately addressed: (1) The present proposal is almost exclusively based on economic behaviour (specifically sharing), despite the fact that humans engage in a wide variety of other-oriented behaviours; and, relatedly, (2) by limiting the examination of morality to economic behaviour, the target article has failed to address a growing body of supportive literature from developmental psychology. In this commentary, we briefly present some insights from the field of developmental psychology that we feel broaden and enrich the authors' present argument.
It is rather indisputable that human adults readily track and evaluate others based on their previous behaviour and modify interactions based on these evaluations. Moreover, as the authors note, economic games are a particularly good measure of human prosocial tendencies because the individual's moral motivation is clearly quantifiable (in regard to the amount of money given), allowing for fine-grained analysis of the effects of various manipulations on other-oriented motivations. Yet, giving up a desired resource (such as money) is only one of the forms that other-oriented behaviour can take.
Humans are thought to respond to at least three negative states (material desire, instrumental need, and emotional distress) with three varieties of prosocial behaviours: sharing, helping, and comforting, respectively (Dunfield et al. Reference Dunfield, Kuhlmeier, O'Connell and Kelley2010). Each of these various prosocial behaviours are hypothesized to rely on a unique suite of social cognitive skills (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, in press). Importantly, unlike sharing, the unique characteristics of responding to instrumental need and emotional distress can make it difficult to determine the “value” of helping and comforting acts, making it harder to determine if an act has been fairly reciprocated. Indeed, no model can claim to truly account for the breadth of human morality without consideration of all the other-oriented behaviours that humans engage in.
Baumard et al. discuss children's failures to show selective sharing (e.g., Bernhard et al. Reference Bernhard, Fischbacher and Fehr2006; Blake & Rand Reference Blake and Rand2010); however, it is necessary to consider that sharing is one of the last prosocial behaviours to develop (e.g., Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, in press). Moreover, early sharing behaviours are often less spontaneous than other prosocial measures, relying heavily on the recipient's vocalization of their desire (Brownell et al. Reference Brownell, Svetlova and Nichols2009), suggesting that they may not be the best measure to assess children's moral motivations. Indeed, if we look at earlier emerging prosocial behaviours, such as helping or comforting, we can observe nuanced interactions earlier in development, which suggests that Baumard et al.'s proposed proximate mechanisms for a mutualistic morality may motivate some of the earliest examples of other-oriented behaviour.
Support for the existence of proximal mechanisms necessary to engage in mutualistic morality can be found when looking at children's helping behaviour. Children begin to reliably help others in response to the observation of need early in the second year of life (e.g., 18 months; Warneken & Tomasello Reference Warneken and Tomasello2006). Yet, prior to the ability to produce helping behaviours, children are already able to differentiate between helpers and hinderers (Hamlin et al. Reference Hamlin, Wynn and Bloom2007) and make predictions about future interactions based on their observations of previous helping and hindering acts (Kuhlmeier et al. Reference Kuhlmeier, Wynn and Bloom2003). Thus, even before children are actively helping, they are already tracking the quality of others' moral acts. Further, very shortly after children start helping others, their helpful acts are produced selectively based on the recipient's previous behaviour; children have been shown to avoid helping individuals who have demonstrated negative intentions, across a variety of contexts (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier Reference Dunfield and Kuhlmeier2010; Vaish et al. Reference Vaish, Carpenter and Tomasello2010). Taken together, recent research supports the idea that, under certain circumstances (e.g., instrumental need as opposed to material desire), early prosocial behaviours conform to the predictions of the presented mutualistic approach to morality. Moreover, it suggests an important role for future research in clarifying the particular task demands that affect the production of nuanced moral acts in early development.
In sum, the target article presents an exciting new approach to understanding the proximate and ultimate explanations for human morality. We believe that an integration of recent research in the area of social cognitive development both supports and enriches the understanding of “morality as an adaptation to an environment in which individuals were in competition to be chosen and recruited in mutually advantageous cooperative interactions” (target article, Abstract). Indeed, by considering the full breadth of human other-oriented behaviours, we can find support for the proposed mechanisms in the earliest instances of children's moral behaviour and gain better insight into the evolution, maintenance, and production of these unique human tendencies.