Murayama and Jach (M&J) critically evaluate the idea that motivation is a dynamic that determines behavior and propose alternatively that motivation might be an emergent property that people construe through perceived regularities in experience and action, which themselves derive from underlying mental computations. Their critique is thought provoking and well taken in multiple respects. Moreover, their alternative proposal is well worth considering. However, in our view, the critique fails to appreciate the considerable progress that has been made in moving beyond the idea of which the authors are critical. The progress constrains the scope of the critique and suggests that motivation science can comfortably proceed assuming that motivation is more than a reflective construal.

M&J's critique centers around the concern that when motivational constructs are identified as causal, they suffer a black-box problem. Conceptual black boxes can predict designated outcomes but they cannot tell us how the outcomes are generated. In other words, they cannot explain the outcomes that they predict. We endorse this concern but feel that it has been addressed to a greater degree than the authors might realize.

One way the concern has been addressed is through prior recognition of the black-box problem in the motivation sphere. Perhaps most visibly, the problem was recognized by Lewin (Reference Lewin1931) in his landmark call for a transition from (static) Aristotelian thinking in psychology to (dynamic) Galilean thought. It also was recognized, for example, by Wicklund (Reference Wicklund1990) in his less well-known, but powerful, critique of “zero-variable” theories in psychology. Another way the concern has been addressed is through the development of motivational theories that identify motivation not as an animating dynamic but rather as a state of goal-oriented animation. By casting motivation as something to be explained, instead of something that explains, these theories have allowed specification of compelling causal processes that generate subjective, physiological, and behavioral outcomes of interest.

Early examples of the motivational theories that do not suffer the black-box problem are Festinger's (Reference Festinger1957) theory of cognitive dissonance and Atkinson's theory of achievement motivation (Atkinson, Reference Atkinson1964; Atkinson & Feather, Reference Atkinson and Feather1966). Festinger's theory articulated processes that lead people to alter their belief systems in predictable fashions. The theory has sometimes been understood to have assumed a driving (determinative) need for cognitive consistency. However, as M&J observe, it did not. Atkinson's theory articulated how emergent motives to achieve and avoid failure combine with expectancies of success to determine achievement striving. Like Festinger's theory, Atkinson's theory did not assume driving needs. Rather, it assumed trait-like tendencies to place different value on favorable and unfavorable performance outcomes. This stands contrary to M&J's suggestion that the theory is paradigmatic of “black box” reasoning.

More recent examples of theories that do not suffer the black-box problem are Wicklund and Gollwitzer's (Reference Wicklund and Gollwitzer1982) theory of symbolic self-completion and a general analysis of motivation that derives from Brehm's theories of motivation and emotion intensity (Brehm, Reference Brehm1999; Brehm & Self, Reference Brehm and Self1989; Brehm, Wright, Solomon, Silka, & Greenberg, Reference Brehm, Wright, Solomon, Silka and Greenberg1983). Symbolic self-completion theory articulates dynamic processes that influence tendencies to seek and display symbols of one's desired identity (Sciara, Contu, Regalia, & Gollwitzer, Reference Sciara, Contu, Regalia and Gollwitzer2023; Sciara, Regalia, & Gollwitzer, Reference Sciara, Regalia and Gollwitzer2022). The general analysis extends beyond specific goal pursuits (e.g., involving achievement or identity symbols) and is especially noteworthy here because it distinguishes motivational constructs that sometimes are muddled, and identifies mechanisms that can cause performers to be animated to different degrees and in different respects at different points in time (for relevant discussions, see also, e.g., Gollwitzer, Reference Gollwitzer, Higgins and Sorrentino1990; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, Reference Heckhausen, Gollwitzer, Klix and Hagendorf1986).

In quick summary, as described by Wright (Reference Wright2016), the general analysis identifies motives as reasons to act that can vary in strength, or importance, and have the capacity to (1) be either active or inactive (quiescent), and (2) operate explicitly (consciously) or implicitly (non-consciously). When motives are active, they guide behavior; when they are inactive, they only hold potential for doing so. Motives are distinguished from motivation by virtue of their ability to be inactive. Active motives are states of motivation (animation), whereas inactive motives are not. Motive strength (importance) is proposed to be determined by a set of factors, including the perceived value of available (e.g., financial) incentives (e.g., 5 USD as compared to 500 USD) and perceived need with respect to those incentives (e.g., poverty as compared to wealth). The analysis holds that momentary effort (forceful exertion) can, but will not necessarily, correspond to motive strength and engenders physiological adjustments indicative of energization (energy mobilization). It also addresses the relationship between motive strength and desire, suggesting that the latter is not a simple linear function of the former.

Although we feel that the black-box concern that M&J raise has been addressed to a greater degree than they might realize, this is not at all to say that we think their discussion of the concern has no value. Our thoughts in this regard are very much to the contrary. For one, we believe it is useful to draw attention to the black-box problem at intervals in hopes of discouraging new investigators from falling into old theoretical traps. For another, we believe that discussions along these lines draw attention to another serious problem in the field, the jingle-jangle terminological problem that M&J reference at points (Pekrun, Reference Pekrun, Bong, Reeve and Kim2023).

For a long while, motivation science has been conducted by scholars functioning in different academic units, such as business, economics, education, psychology, and neuroscience. This has been beneficial insofar as it has allowed questions to be addressed from diverse scholarly perspectives. However, it has been harmful insofar as it has fostered the development of insulated intellectual eco-systems that employ distinctive and, often confusing, lexicons. One contemporary challenge is to improve this state of affairs by developing a common language for discussing phenomena and processes of interest. Development of such a language would facilitate idea exchange and advance the scientific endeavor. Good science is fraught with definitional devils and detail. Linguistic congruency would address many of those that currently impede progress within the motivation scientific community.