Resurrecting the “black-box” conundrum

In their provocative treatise entitled, “A critique of motivation constructs to explain higher-order behavior: We should unpack the black box,” Murayama and Jach (M&J) offer a detailed analysis of the motivation research and the causal claims populating that literature regarding the initiating of behaviors. The “black box” to which the authors refer is the longstanding contention that aspects of human mental functioning are not accessible for reflection or analysis (Skinner, Reference Skinner1989), even by individuals executing those functions. As a counterpoint to the black-box argument, the authors offer an alternative framework for investigating the complex “motivation-behavior” enigma based on mental computational modeling. Their mental computational model promises nothing short of a solution to the black-box problem. As the authors boldly stated:

As I will discuss, I agree with several insights the authors draw from their critical analysis of motivation research. That agreement notwithstanding, my principal contention is that the authors' bold claim of unpacking or dismantling the black box of the human mind has been constructed on theoretically shaky grounds. The justifications for this counter-position are the authors' oversimplification of the complex and dynamic nature of mental functioning and the questionable conceptualizations guiding their mental computational model.

Points of agreement

As noted, several of M&J's critiques of the motivation literature and its explanation of human behavior are well-founded. For one, motivation is not a unitary construct. As well documented in the philosophical and psychological literature (Skinner, Reference Skinner2023), motivation is a meta-term encompassing innumerable constructs and sub-constructs. Those constructs and sub-constructs can be domain-general or domain- and task-specific, trait-like or state-like, and tacit or explicit. This plethora of terms means that there is an inherent vagueness when we speak about human motivation that has been exacerbated by the multitude of labels generated to identify this ever-growing litany of forms (Alexander, Reference Alexander2024; Alexander, Grossnickle, & List, Reference Alexander, Grossnickle, List, Richardson, Karabenick and Watt2014). Broadening this conceptual morass, researchers frequently fail to define what aspect of motivation they are addressing, coin a new term when relevant labels exist, or use an existing word to mean something else (Dinsmore, Alexander, & Loughlin, Reference Dinsmore, Alexander and Loughlin2008; Murphy & Alexander, Reference Murphy and Alexander2000). Some refer to this phenomenon, which my colleagues and I have repeatedly documented, as the “jingle-jangle fallacy” (Bong, Reference Bong1996; Pekrun, Reference Pekrun, Bong, Reeve and Kim2023). I prefer to identify this simply as “poor science.” Moreover, such conceptual ambiguity carries over into research measures and procedures, as M&J assert.

One of the persistent criticisms of motivation is that researchers often rely on participants' self-reports as the primary or sole evidence (King & Fryer, Reference King and Fryer2024). In their defense, motivation theorists and researchers counter this criticism by arguing that motivation remains largely in the realm of beliefs or perceptions, which are potent forces in how humans think and act (Greene, Reference Greene2015; Van Meter, Reference Van Meter2020). I do not deny that perceptions can, at times, be more powerful than reality in explaining human thoughts and actions (Alexander & Baggetta, Reference Alexander, Baggetta, Rapp and Baasch2014; Hurley, Reference Hurley2001). Nonetheless, I agree with M&J that corroborating those self-reports with biophysiological or neurocognitive data would strengthen what can be inferred or predicted about why humans think and act as they do.

M&J also asserted that “when the target construct is not unambiguously defined, we can never make a solid causal inference from empirical data”; another point of consensus with the authors (Alexander, Reference Alexander2013, Reference Alexander2024). However, meeting standards that allow for causal claims is challenging even when researchers explicitly define their constructs (Steiner, Shadish, & Sullivan, Reference Steiner, Shadish, Sullivan, Cooper, Coutanche, McMullen, Panter, Rindskopf and Sher2023).

Counterpoints

Agreements aside, I ultimately take issue with the authors' overall contention that their proposed mental computational model will effectively dismantle the black box of the human mind and provide solutions to “why” questions about motivation and behavior. First and foremost, the functioning of the mind cannot be reduced to simple linear or reciprocal models like those M&J promote. In effect, even seemingly uncomplicated behaviors can arise from a confluence of internal and external forces that operate dynamically and that can remain below human awareness.

Regrettably, the authors' efforts to narrow the scope of their modeling to what they regard as high-level motivations and higher-order behaviors cannot constrain mental functioning to the degree required to resolve the black-box problem. For one, the defining attributes of high-level versus low-level motivation constructs are notoriously nebulous, as the authors rightfully acknowledged. Further, even if a more defensible distinction for high-level motivation constructs were possible, the most basic or primary drives underlying human functioning could align with intentional and complex goals and, thus, with subsequent behaviors (Butler & Rice, Reference Butler, Rice, Wepman and Heine1963). Additionally, there can be competing goals or mixed motives that accompany non-automatic or reflexive thoughts and actions (Linnenbrink & Pintrich, Reference Linnenbrink, Pintrich, Volet and Järvelä2001). Thus, singular paths or directional hypotheses about the “motivation-behavior” enigma are not theoretically defensible even if they can be empirically demonstrated.

Finally, there are too many intervening and unacknowledged internal and external factors that can morph or redirect individuals' motivations and their concomitant actions. Consequently, the claim that motivation is “an emergent property that people construe” (M&J) is as indefensible as claims that motivations initiate behaviors. Even the most sophisticated of mental computational models cannot establish such directionality when it comes to the complex and dynamic of human motivations or human behaviors, however defined.