Murayama and Jach (M&J) critically evaluate psychology's explanatory use of high-level motivations as causes of complex behavior (i.e., the “black-box” problem). Their critique presents a valuable case for the need to focus on the concrete dynamics and causal relations of cognitive processes. The critical side of their argument helps clarify how descriptions of motivation interpreted as causal explanations are only apparent; however, their positive proposal simultaneously risks a continuation of the illusion through a new iteration of the problem. That is, their proposed solution seems to be built on the same theoretical foundations as the problem, and this might just exchange one large black box for several smaller ones.

M&J point to an explanatory illusion that there are properties being attributed to motivation that it does not possess. Instead, they propose to eliminate those properties from motivation altogether (Witherington, Reference Witherington2014). In turn, motivation is interpreted as a label for the composition of the causal relations amongst lower-level constructs that do the actual work of energizing (and explaining) behavior. Thus, motivation is merely a container with no causal (or explanatory) power over its contents and associated behavior – the motivation itself cannot explain behavior beyond its contents (Witherington, Reference Witherington2011). Consequently, M&J render motivation as an epiphenomenal outcome of the causal structures amongst lower-level constructs. Although they use the term “emergent” to describe motivation, it does not seem to be ontological emergence – because their definition of motivation lacks novel qualities that can causally affect the relations amongst the lower-level constructs (i.e., no downward causation; Witherington, Reference Witherington2011). There is degree-wise merit in M&J's solution since their proposed constructs – compared to motivations – have a more direct causal relation to the unfolding changes observed throughout a behavior. However, their solution assumes a foundational version of the same black-box problem – because the constructs and motivations are “just” foundational atoms at different scales, and the problems at the motivation level are inherited by the lower levels. In other words, M&J's attempt to resolve the explanatory illusion of motivation results in a “solution illusion.”

The key to their commitment to foundationalism and epiphenomenal emergence is an underlying substance-oriented framework (Bickhard, Reference Bickhard, Smith and Voneche2006). This framework is evident when they describe the “energization” aspect of motivation at the center of the explanatory illusion. This involves dependence on an external (or internal) impetus to initiate behavior (Bickhard, Reference Bickhard, Smith, Rogers and Tomlinson2003). This assumption aligns with the inertness of atomism and sets the stage for M&J to assert two corollaries of a substance-oriented framework: Compositional emergence and instrumental relations. Atomism establishes the foundationalism part of their solution, where constructs are considered to possess greater explanatory power than any emergent qualities that motivation might offer (Allen & Bickhard, Reference Allen and Bickhard2022). However, it is the two corollaries that ultimately make the solution to the black-box problem more apparent than real.

First, the compositional ontology of atoms underlies the lack of ontological emergence (Bickhard, Reference Bickhard, Smith and Voneche2006; Witherington, Reference Witherington2011). For M&J, due to the foundational atoms' surface togetherness, novelty is structural. This compositional quality is evident in the assertion that the causal relations of constructs can be a substitute for motivation (i.e., the [re]arrangement of foundational parts is the reason for the manifested difference among high-level concepts; Seibt, Reference Seibt2009). Based on this assumption, motivation does not possess any emergent qualities that could explain behavior beyond the foundational constructs; the entirety of the explanation takes place at the foundational level. Second, the assumption of instrumental relations is about the missing ontological ties amongst foundational parts. The foundation is the only existential reality, and no real phenomena could emerge through the relations of the parts (an implication of compositional ontology, Allen & Bickhard, Reference Allen and Bickhard2022; Seibt, Reference Seibt2009). Thus, foundational parts can continue their existence in isolation and any relations they possess are strictly instrumental. This corollary is evident in the re-interpretation of the high-level motivation “need for competence” as a reward-learning model. Reward-learning models are developed within a computationalist approach – which explicitly assumes instrumental relations to govern the communication amongst parts to explain how behavior unfolds (Bickhard & Terveen, Reference Bickhard and Terveen1995).

Based on these substance-oriented corollaries, M&J adopt an epiphenomenal re-interpretation of motivation that precludes their solution from enabling qualitative emergence. That is, any computational substitute for motivation does not have the flexibility to explain novelty in behavior – that is, the presuppositions underlying the proposed causal relations cannot undergo development through constructive emergence (Allen & Bickhard, Reference Allen and Bickhard2022). The explanatory power of any proposed model is constrained by the qualities of the foundational constructs – both ontological and relational. However, ontological emergence and constitutive relations (i.e., where the relation is intrinsic to the organization's existence and necessary for the continuity of the “parts”) are necessary at the higher-level phenomena to explain any behavior that develops through learning (e.g., developmental changes in social understanding). Therefore, the limitation of the proposed solution to explain novel behavior leads to a solution illusion, a foundation-level black box that can never be unpacked (Allen & Bickhard, Reference Allen and Bickhard2013).

The alternative solution to the black-box problem is a paradigm shift away from a substance-oriented framework. This would eliminate the black-box problem at all levels of behavioral complexity by replacing the atom-ontology of physical phenomena with process (van Geert & de Ruiter, Reference van Geert and de Ruiter2022). Since processes are inherently active, they must interact with each other (Bickhard, Reference Bickhard, Smith, Rogers and Tomlinson2003). Thus, the “need” to energize behavior is an illusion since living organisms constantly behave due to their existence as processes. Consequently, motivation is not a trigger for behavior but a selection amongst potential ways of reorganizing the lower-level processes that constitute the organism. This definition of motivation is similar to the “direction” aspect of motivation mentioned by M&J. Motivation is part of the flow of control in terms of how the organism changes its processes through which the behavior itself emerges. In this sense, a process-oriented framework offers a form of explanation that renders both the black-box issue and its purported solution superfluous.