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Imagining our moral values in the present and future

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 November 2022

Jordan Wylie
Affiliation:
Basic and Applied Psychology, The Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, NY 10016, USAjwylie@gradcenter.cuny.edu; jordancwylie.com agetreu@gradcenter.cuny.edu; alixalto.com
Alix Alto
Affiliation:
Basic and Applied Psychology, The Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, NY 10016, USAjwylie@gradcenter.cuny.edu; jordancwylie.com agetreu@gradcenter.cuny.edu; alixalto.com
Ana Gantman
Affiliation:
Basic and Applied Psychology, The Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, NY 10016, USAjwylie@gradcenter.cuny.edu; jordancwylie.com agetreu@gradcenter.cuny.edu; alixalto.com Department of Psychology, Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, NY 11215, USA ana.gantman@brooklyn.cuny.edu

Abstract

Imaginary worlds allow us to safely develop, crystallize, and criticize our moral values – at times even serving as catalysts for change in the real world. Fans of imaginary worlds sometimes form groups to advocate for social change in the real world, and it is part of Leftist ideology to imagine radically different, possible futures aligned around shared moral values.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

Dubourg and Baumard argue that imaginary worlds are so successful – drawing the interest and acclaim of many – because they exploit a basic human desire to explore, rather than because of the content they communicate. However, imaginary worlds enable communication and exploration of content that is central to being human: our moral values.

Spending time within imaginary worlds offers two unstated opportunities: First, imaginary worlds help us develop and crystallize our moral worldviews. They offer a stage to share moral lessons and values across time and space, and to form meaningful identity groups around those values. Second, imaginary worlds also allow us to envision new possibilities for our current reality. We can use imaginary worlds to conceptualize a future drastically different from the present – its own kind of imaginary but possible world. That is, we argue that imaginary worlds communicate and solidify our moral values, and offer rich landscapes from which we can imagine not just impossible worlds, but ones we can make strive to make possible too.

Engagement with and transfer of moral values is critical to successful complex human societies (e.g., Curry, Mullins, & Whitehouse, Reference Curry, Mullins and Whitehouse2019; Searle & Willis, Reference Searle and Willis1995; Tomasello, Reference Tomasello2009). Imaginary worlds allow for the communication and interrogation across time and space of moral values, which are notably sensitive to psychological distance (see Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, Reference Eyal, Liberman and Trope2008; Mentovich, Yudkin, Tyler, & Trope, Reference Mentovich, Yudkin, Tyler and Trope2016). Indeed, even everyday language points to this key function of imaginary worlds: “The moral of the story” is its key takeaway. Aesop's fables convey moral virtues through an imaginary world of talking animals. Fictional stories both convey norms and rules across time and cultures, and create memorable worlds where the reader can safely learn (e.g., through simulation; Mar & Oatley, Reference Mar and Oatley2008; Meyer, Zhao, & Tamir, Reference Meyer, Zhao and Tamir2019). And this learning is directly applicable to the real world: Imaginary worlds help us define right and wrong in our present reality – even after the story ends.

Writers of imaginary worlds also reveal our moral values by creating fictional universes with alternative manifestations of those same values. The most straightforward examples of these are the dystopian worlds named in Table 1, like 1984, the Handmaid's Tale and Brave New World. For example, 1984 presents an element of the present (e.g., war's ability to make violations of civil liberties permissible) in a way we can readily see as morally wrong (e.g., Big Brother). The same can be said of superhero stories with exaggerated exemplars of good and evil (Pizarro & Baumeister, Reference Pizarro, Baumeister and Rosenberg2013), and science fiction, which often asks us to grapple with moral quandaries that take new forms as technology advances (e.g., Asimov's Three Laws of Robotics). The authors do not include satire as a relevant genre, but one of the most famous satirists, Jonathan Swift, appears in Table 1. In Gulliver's Travels, Swift provides a veneer of fiction from which it is safe to confront moral breakdown in the real world. While we agree that imaginary worlds satisfy a need to explore (as the target authors describe), they also help us, separate good from bad (McHugh, McGann, Igou, & Kinsella, Reference McHugh, McGann, Igou and Kinsella2022; see also Pizarro & Baumeister, Reference Pizarro, Baumeister and Rosenberg2013), crystallize our own values, and explore concepts like justice, power, and punishment.

When we see imaginary worlds as a conduit for understanding the moral world around us, we also find another explanation for the recent proliferation of imaginary worlds that the authors describe. With increased globalization (i.e., interdependence across countries and cultures) people may have an increased need to understand not just their own moral world, but also how it compares to others.

Indeed, a core function of moral values is to regulate behavior and draw lines around meaningful social groups (Yudkin, Gantman, Hofmann, & Quoidbach, Reference Yudkin, Gantman, Hofmann and Quoidbach2021) – as do fandoms of imaginary worlds. Fans readily sort themselves into subcultural social groups within their imaginary worlds aligned with specific values. For example, Harry Potter fans strongly align with their chosen Hogwarts House, each identified by a moral value like bravery. What's more, participation in fan culture can motivate people to bring values from the world of the fandom into the real world. This is the case with fan activism, a participatory practice through which members of a fan community organize around real-world issues (Jenkins & Shresthova, Reference Jenkins and Shresthova2012). Fan activists use imagery from their imaginary world as protest symbols. For example, indigenous and Palestinian protestors have used imagery from the movie Avatar to convey their message of colonization and land rights (Brough & Shresthova, Reference Brough and Shresthova2012). The relationship between fandom and activism is also mutually reinforcing: Participating in collective action further solidifies group identity within a particular fandom (Carriere, Reference Carriere2018). This kind of fan-based collective action is an example of how engaging with imaginary worlds can help us picture and work toward a possible, different future, where we better live out our values or even prioritize entirely new ones.

This is especially notable because imagining a world with different moral values is uniquely difficult (Black & Barnes, Reference Black and Barnes2017; Gendler, Reference Gendler2000). One way that Leftist activists have met this challenge is through the practice of radical imagination. Drawing on radicalism as an ideology, which seeks to completely transform existing institutions to achieve an anti-oppression future (Bötticher, Reference Bötticher2017), the practice of imagining a radically different future – cohered around shared moral values (e.g., egalitarianism, solidarity) – fosters collective future cognition and community organizing (Haiven & Khasnabish, Reference Haiven and Khasnabish2010; Paulson, Reference Paulson2010; Reinsborough, Reference Reinsborough2010). Historic and contemporary radical movements have been theorized as organized around the radical imaginations of their participants – co-constructed imaginary worlds that activists first create in their minds (Petersen & Aarøe, Reference Petersen and Aarøe2013), and then work to make real (e.g., Kelley, Reference Kelley2002; Khasnabish, Reference Khasnabish2008). Here, we also find another explanation for the popularity of imaginary worlds among teens and young adults: They have the most to gain by remedying moral failures in the present.

In sum, imaginary worlds allow us to better understand and develop our moral worldviews. Engaging with imaginary worlds helps us negotiate and solidify our moral values, construct our social identities, and imagine and work toward radically different, but possible futures aligned around shared moral values.

Funding

None.

Conflict of interest

None.

References

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