The target article by Dubourg and Baumard takes a different approach to the study of imaginary worlds than what is usually found in Media Studies, and one which I think will yield some interesting fruit, particularly in the area of exploratory preferences and the idea of economic and ecological conditions which may encourage the production of imaginary worlds. At the same time, there are some assertations in the article to which I would have to take exception, where either the history of imaginary worlds does not correspond to their theory, or where other important influences have been omitted.
First, there is the authors’ suggestion that “For a long time, people's exploratory preferences were too weak to give rise to the production of imaginary worlds in fictions.” Hundreds of imaginary worlds were produced prior to 1900, including some rather detailed and elaborate ones (like More's Utopia [1516], Defoe's Crusoe's Island [1719], Paltock's Sass Doorpt Swangeanti [1750], Defontenay's Starian system [1854], and Abbott's Flatland [1884]), so it is incorrect to suggest that human beings lacked the cognitive abilities to create elaborate and inventive imaginary worlds of substantial size and with considerable amounts of world data; not only were the above book-length and quite detailed, but some included ancillary materials as well (e.g., More's had a map and a quatrain in the Utopian language, and Paltock's book includes its own glossary with over 100 entries). Some of these worlds were also culturally successful as well, as the influence of works like More's Utopia, Defoe's Robinson Crusoe, and Dante's Inferno demonstrate, since each of them inspired a deluge of imitators.
While I do not disagree with the authors’ suggestion that imaginary worlds co-opt our evolved preferences for exploration, it is too much to claim that “This hypothesis can therefore explain the way imaginary worlds evolved culturally, their shape and content” (abstract), since such a claim leaves out other important circumstances and influences that shaped them. One such influence that is not discussed here is the appearance of mass media venues around the turn of the twentieth century. It was the rise of mass media, particularly audiovisual media, that opened up possibilities for imaginary worlds beyond verbal descriptions, maps, and other drawings, encouraging more production of worlds and encouraging some of them to become transmedial worlds. While economic development certainly had some influence on the growth of worlds, it is too broad of a factor, and one which needs to be more materially connected to the production of worlds; for example, one could explore the connection between economic development and the growth of mass media, coupled with an increasing amount of leisure time (due to industrialization and mechanization), that also allowed for more consumption of imaginary worlds. Also, interest in imagined places grew as more of the physical world was explored, losing some of its status as the unknown, and the growing numbers of mediated accounts of real-world places produced an experience closer to that of imaginary worlds, which of course can only be experienced through media.
There is also the suggestion that “too much world data could be bewildering, frustrating or too complex, exactly like the attraction to novelty” (target article, sect. 6.3, para. 1); while this may be true for some people who are not interested in imaginary worlds, there are also very many who enjoy the high levels of detail and large amounts of world data; I have written elsewhere (Wolf, Reference Wolf2013, Reference Wolf and Boni2017a, Reference Wolf2017b) about the importance of saturation and overflow, that is, having more world data than the audience member can hold in his or her mind at one time; worlds which are too easily mastered may seem simple, unchallenging, and less interesting by comparison, and soon cease to ignite speculation in the mind of the audience. Also, while I can understand why the authors would refer to imaginary world information as “useless,” I would argue that this is not true, since imaginary world knowledge of popular worlds becomes a kind of cultural capital within the fandoms surrounding those worlds, even to level of scholarship about those worlds (with all the scholarship about Tolkien's work providing the best example). Thus, more work in the connection between an imaginary world and the real-world context in which it occurs should be done to explore such connections and effects.
The authors’ work on exploratory preferences, and differences in the interest in imaginary worlds due to age, affluence, social stability, and economic background is good, and I suspect a book-length project would be needed to fully explore these areas in a satisfactory way. My comments here may indicate some adjustments and omissions, but their overall work is sound and interesting to consider.
Finally, I can heartily agree with the authors’ closing assertion that “we need to be able to quantify the size of imaginary worlds, that is, the amount of background information associated with a particular world.” This is something that I have discussed elsewhere (Wolf, Reference Wolf2020), where I examine different criteria for measurement and the problems with them, concluding that a world quantification scheme remains one of the great unsolved problems in Subcreation Studies.
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The target article by Dubourg and Baumard takes a different approach to the study of imaginary worlds than what is usually found in Media Studies, and one which I think will yield some interesting fruit, particularly in the area of exploratory preferences and the idea of economic and ecological conditions which may encourage the production of imaginary worlds. At the same time, there are some assertations in the article to which I would have to take exception, where either the history of imaginary worlds does not correspond to their theory, or where other important influences have been omitted.
First, there is the authors’ suggestion that “For a long time, people's exploratory preferences were too weak to give rise to the production of imaginary worlds in fictions.” Hundreds of imaginary worlds were produced prior to 1900, including some rather detailed and elaborate ones (like More's Utopia [1516], Defoe's Crusoe's Island [1719], Paltock's Sass Doorpt Swangeanti [1750], Defontenay's Starian system [1854], and Abbott's Flatland [1884]), so it is incorrect to suggest that human beings lacked the cognitive abilities to create elaborate and inventive imaginary worlds of substantial size and with considerable amounts of world data; not only were the above book-length and quite detailed, but some included ancillary materials as well (e.g., More's had a map and a quatrain in the Utopian language, and Paltock's book includes its own glossary with over 100 entries). Some of these worlds were also culturally successful as well, as the influence of works like More's Utopia, Defoe's Robinson Crusoe, and Dante's Inferno demonstrate, since each of them inspired a deluge of imitators.
While I do not disagree with the authors’ suggestion that imaginary worlds co-opt our evolved preferences for exploration, it is too much to claim that “This hypothesis can therefore explain the way imaginary worlds evolved culturally, their shape and content” (abstract), since such a claim leaves out other important circumstances and influences that shaped them. One such influence that is not discussed here is the appearance of mass media venues around the turn of the twentieth century. It was the rise of mass media, particularly audiovisual media, that opened up possibilities for imaginary worlds beyond verbal descriptions, maps, and other drawings, encouraging more production of worlds and encouraging some of them to become transmedial worlds. While economic development certainly had some influence on the growth of worlds, it is too broad of a factor, and one which needs to be more materially connected to the production of worlds; for example, one could explore the connection between economic development and the growth of mass media, coupled with an increasing amount of leisure time (due to industrialization and mechanization), that also allowed for more consumption of imaginary worlds. Also, interest in imagined places grew as more of the physical world was explored, losing some of its status as the unknown, and the growing numbers of mediated accounts of real-world places produced an experience closer to that of imaginary worlds, which of course can only be experienced through media.
There is also the suggestion that “too much world data could be bewildering, frustrating or too complex, exactly like the attraction to novelty” (target article, sect. 6.3, para. 1); while this may be true for some people who are not interested in imaginary worlds, there are also very many who enjoy the high levels of detail and large amounts of world data; I have written elsewhere (Wolf, Reference Wolf2013, Reference Wolf and Boni2017a, Reference Wolf2017b) about the importance of saturation and overflow, that is, having more world data than the audience member can hold in his or her mind at one time; worlds which are too easily mastered may seem simple, unchallenging, and less interesting by comparison, and soon cease to ignite speculation in the mind of the audience. Also, while I can understand why the authors would refer to imaginary world information as “useless,” I would argue that this is not true, since imaginary world knowledge of popular worlds becomes a kind of cultural capital within the fandoms surrounding those worlds, even to level of scholarship about those worlds (with all the scholarship about Tolkien's work providing the best example). Thus, more work in the connection between an imaginary world and the real-world context in which it occurs should be done to explore such connections and effects.
The authors’ work on exploratory preferences, and differences in the interest in imaginary worlds due to age, affluence, social stability, and economic background is good, and I suspect a book-length project would be needed to fully explore these areas in a satisfactory way. My comments here may indicate some adjustments and omissions, but their overall work is sound and interesting to consider.
Finally, I can heartily agree with the authors’ closing assertion that “we need to be able to quantify the size of imaginary worlds, that is, the amount of background information associated with a particular world.” This is something that I have discussed elsewhere (Wolf, Reference Wolf2020), where I examine different criteria for measurement and the problems with them, concluding that a world quantification scheme remains one of the great unsolved problems in Subcreation Studies.
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