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What do infants need an ownership concept for? Frugal possession concepts can adequately support early reasoning about distributive dilemmas
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 October 2023
Abstract
Boyer's model posits that ownership intuitions are delivered by combining input representations of resource conflict and cooperative value, necessary to solve coordination dilemmas over resource access. Here I evaluate the implications of this claim for early social cognition and argue that cognitively frugal possession concepts can be leveraged to the same inferential end, making the ascription of ownership proper unnecessary.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
Ownership psychology as a cognitive adaptation: A minimalist model
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Author response
Ownership psychology, its antecedents and consequences