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Ownership language informs ownership psychology
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 October 2023
Abstract
Many languages grammatically distinguish between alienable and inalienable possessions. The latter are sometimes restricted to body parts, but they often include other kinds of personally significant entities too. These cross-linguistic patterns suggest that one's most precious owned objects tend to fall within a complex self system that includes not only the core (corporeal) self, but also the extended (noncorporeal) self.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
Ownership psychology as a cognitive adaptation: A minimalist model
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Author response
Ownership psychology, its antecedents and consequences