In the following pages I intend to survey the judgments of the International Court of Justice pronounced in the course of 1959.

Owing to the differing degrees of importance from the legal point of view of the individual cases dealt with, their discussion will necessarily vary in length and thoroughness.

Since 1 March 2002 the EC Regulation No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation) operates in legal practice. On 1 May 2004 the new EU Member States had to accept the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation as acquis communautaire. The Regulation is now in force in all EU Member States, with the exception of Denmark. As mentioned in the previous survey, it is the intention to conclude eventually a convention with Denmark in which the solutions reached under the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation will be laid down. Then the necessary unity in the application of the rules of jurisdiction and of recognition and enforcement will be restored again. According to Article 68 EC the EC Court of Justice can give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation. Although the first questions are put before the ECJ, there is no decision as yet in which the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation has been interpreted. In one decision regarding the interpretation of Article 5(3) Brussels Convention concerning the forum delicti, the ECJ referred to the solutions reached under the same provision in the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation. The Court decided that Article 5(3) Brussels Convention could also be used in case the harmful event might occur.

The development of nation States has led to a growing importance of nationality, to the expansion of the services provided by the State and to an improvement in the status of persons working in the public service. Each of these developments in the past provided grounds for the idea that only individuals possessing the nationality of the State could perform tasks in the public service.

The purpose of this lecture is to identify and investigate two things: (1) the centre of the intellectual activity described in its title as the defining and development of international law, and (2) the fundamental concept around which both defining and development revolve. The centre as indicated will be found to consist of (representatives of) what is to be called the three “legal archetypes”. The fundamental concept alluded to is the “normative concept of law”. The two notions are, of course, highly abstract as compared to the realities they are designed to help understand. They will be set forth as clearly as possible within the strict limits of this lecture, although it is realized that a truly satisfactory treatment cannot be imagined outside a full-size methodology. An apology beforehand is, therefore, in place. One particular question relating to the normative concept of law in international relations will be dealt with in some detail: it has to do with “tragedy in law” as resulting from the clash between competing normative concepts. As a final observation, the need for a maximum degree of flexibility in the international lawyer's way of thought will be stressed.

In this article the concept of dwaling will be examined in comparison with the English doctrine of misrepresentation. Dwaling — like misrepresentation — plays a role in the formation of the contract and concerns the intention of the parties to create legal relations. The concept of dwaling under Dutch law has been developed from a traditional ‘defect of the will’, a ‘vice of consent’ where the main emphasis is on the error of the mistaken party, to a legal concept with the emphasis on the false precontractual statement of fact made by the other party or his failure to disclose information. This evolution of dwaling through the years may be traced in s. 6:228 of the new Civil Code (CC) which came into force on 1 January 1992.

The purpose of this paper is the comparative study of the jurisdictional functions performed by attachment and garnishment under Belgian and American law. In other words, an attempt will be made to ascertain how and to what extent Belgian and American courts may adjudicate upon claims involving foreigners whose assets are found within their respective jurisdictions.

In many countries, including our own, the question whether there should be a right to strike, and, if so, to what extent, and with what restrictions, has been and still is hotly debated. There remain few countries where strikes are absolutely prohibited. On the other hand there are also few countries where the right to strike is an inalienable right vested in the constitution. The legislator can adopt various attitudes towards the strike by making a strike a criminal offence, by granting the liberty to strike or the right to strike. In most countries the second attitude prevails; strikes are considered a fairly normal phenomenon though not guaranteed as a right. The method of assesment of the possible illegality of strikes, and the sanctions imposed on workers or trade unions, vary greatly.

On April 1999, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (hereinafter: the Vienna Convention, CISG or the Convention)2 celebrated its 19th anniversary. The Convention has been praised throughout the world as a skillful and effective tool for governing international sales transactions. Hence, after more than fifty years of arduous work, the efforts undertaken to unify the law for international sales at a global scale seem, at last, to have reached success. As frequet referrals to former efforts undertaken will be made, it seems appropriate to set forth, at least summarily, the history of the Vienna Convention.

This article focuses on a number of recent decisions of English courts addressing issues of international law. The starting point is the House of Lords decision in Kuwait Airways v. Iraqi Airways (2002) that effect would not be given in English law to a decree of the Iraqi state which breached international law. Subsequent decisions exploring the role of international law in the context of the justiciability of UK state action have failed to follow Kuwait Airways' lead unless required to apply international law by statute, usually the Human Rights Act 1998. Cases involving terrorism and human rights and attacks on the UK's stance and involvement in Iraq have revealed further questions about the role of international law in English courts and elsewhere. The article examines how subtle movement is taking place in the approach taken by English judges to matters of international law particularly in the context of human rights but that executive action in foreign affairs remains largely immune from judicial scrutiny.