The territorial scope of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court was an issue which was hotly debated prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute. Yet, in the first 10 years of the Court's operation the negotiators' concerns with regard to a jurisdictional overreach seem to have been misplaced. To date, the interpretation and application of Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute – the key provision in this context – have remained uncontroversial. This practice, however, has left certain important questions untouched, and particularly the issue of jurisdiction in cases of the partial commission of a crime on State Party territory. In this context, the question is how little of an international crime should take place on State Party territory for the ICC to have jurisdiction. It is hereby suggested that in order to answer this question, the Court may have recourse to the jurisdictional rule of reason developed by Francis Mann in the context of his work on state jurisdiction and antitrust law. In this context, it is suggested that the Court would have jurisdiction over any case or situation that would have a sufficiently strong connection with the territory of a State Party. The meaning of a ‘sufficiently strong connection’ – an essential ‘reasonableness’ approach, showing the absence of an abuse of rights or arbitrariness – would then need to be specified on a case-by-case basis.

Natural resources trust funds have been employed in the developed world since the 1970s in order to achieve a fair allocation of revenues and promote social growth. This model has been applied recently in developing economies, however lacking transparency and democratic oversight. As a result of increased public spending and depletion of the funds' assets, instead of economic growth, Dutch disease set in when oil prices fell. The World Bank-inspired Chad trust fund is the only of its kind with some external oversight and a contractual obligation by the recipient state to use the fund's earnings for social development. The idea is commendable, but implementation has been slack and if this model is to work in the future the Bank must condition similar loans to full external oversight, otherwise the whole operation will remain a farce.

Despite great efforts made to conform maritime practice at The Hague in 1907, and later in London in 1909, the sheer pace of industrial competition in evidence by 1914 meant not only that disarmament remained out of the question, but further, that new theories of wartime necessity might over-ride the many developed, ‘civilised’ wartime restraints, if to do so favoured victory. One body of rules quickly disregarded was that for armed neutrality at sea, by which is meant a state stance of abstention and impartiality declared on the outbreak of war, in exchange for continued neutral rights of peaceful maritime commerce. Illustrative of the impact industrial warfare had on rules of maritime neutrality was the infamous Baralong incident of 9 August 1915, in which a German submarine was sunk by the British Q-ship. It is argued, however, that the unrestricted manner in which World War 1 was fought was not caused by any deficiency of the known rules of maritime neutrality, per se. Instead, the essence of that war may be sought in political, chauvinistic demands for ultimate success, and an associated greed that would ultimately force neutral states to share the costs of a conflict not of their making.

The codification of international law concerning the non-self-governing territories has proceeded through three distinct phases in this century. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations contained the notion that the well-being and the development of dependent peoples was the sacred trust of civilization. This concept legally applied only to the mandated territories, but in fact embodied the then current philosophy of the colonial powers. It implied that the territories should not be exploited for the benefit of the administering authorities; it was, however, a fairly static view, which did not even indicate to what end the “development” was to lead.

Themis is blind. The law is the same for wealthy and poor alike. Access to the court is open to all equally. The standard used applies to all equally. Fine ethical postulates, but not free of magniloquence. The law is for sale at a price, and a high price. In the field of law the asking of a price also produces inequality. For some time now the Dutch legislator has attempted to eliminate this discrimination by the use of aids. The person of nil assets who wishes to assert his rights or to defend them deserves support, at least financial support. However, this activity of the legislator has not remained free from scepticism and criticism. Dutch nationals have the right to support, thus, not litigants in general. In various legal provisions aliens, in principle, are excluded from that right. In various places in civil procedural law aliens are discriminated against -albeit financial discrimination. The core of the argument expounded below lies in two of those places: where in principle persons are excluded from free legal assistance (whether in or out of court); and where in principle they are excluded from cost free access to the courts.

The People's Republic of China (hereinafter: China) does not have a special statute on private international law. The relevant rules can be found mainly in China's Civil Procedural Law and the General Principles of the Civil Law. The rules of international jurisdiction are included in the former. In Part IV of the Civil Procedural Law entitled ‘Special Provisions for Civil Procedures Involving Foreign Parties’, there is a special chapter that is dedicated to the rules of international jurisdiction. This chapter has altogether four articles, all of which concern international jurisdiction over contract disputes.

The importance of a scholar like Hugo de Groot can be viewed in different ways. A systematic analysis of his works would clarify the coherence and depth, an historical approach would do the same for his sources and the extent of his originality. Other possibilities would be to trace the further development of his (legal and political) thinking or to ask what inspiration his works can still give towards the solution of problems today. Another approach has been adopted in the present contribution, viz., a discussion of Grotius' influence on a particular thinker of a later period, the Neapolitan lawyer and philosopher Giambattista Vico(1668–1744). Two aspects of his influence will be considered. In the first place, the question why Vico himself attributed such particular importance to Grotius. Vico even named Grotius as one of his “authors”. Vico employs the term “author” as a title of honour for his mentors in literature whom he considers especially important and in whose work he recognizes aspects of his pwn thinking which are of exceptional importance. However, Vico's attitude to Grotius does not consist solely of grateful admiration. In his principal work, the New Science, of which the first edition was published in 1725, and the last, totally rewritten, posthumous edition appeared in 1744, Vico's recognition of Grotius' merits is certainly still apparent, although his criticism has, by this stage, taken a dominant role. Vico's opposition to the predominant Cartesian rationalism, which he had already expressed in his De nostri temporis studiorum ratione of 1709 and in his De antiquissima italorum sapientia ex linguae latinae originibus eruenda, liber primus sive metaphysicus of 1710, also extends to the rationalist school of natural law of which he considers Grotius, Selden and Pufendorf to be the main representatives.

Federalism is a form of governmental organisation whose origins may be traced to antiquity. However, the establishment of the United States as a federation during the late 18th century led to renewed interest in federal government, which has continued undiminished to the present day. As a measure of the significance of federalism, in 1987 it was estimated that some 40 per cent of the world's population lived in States that are formally federal, and that another one-third lived in polities that apply federal arrangements in some way. Amongst these States are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, India,Mexico, the Russian Federation, Switzerland and the United States of America.

The ILA approach to the progressive structuring of international society, so typical of later 19th Century social optimism, has from the very first found a warm advocate in its oldest national branch, the NVIR. The idea to assemble legal luminaries and captains of industry into a single body might not be quite representative of the Dutch, rather compartmentalized, tradition of legal thinking, but even so, the NVIR, after a first abortive attempt in 1875, from its ‘re-launch’ in 1910 invariably met with a thoroughly welcoming intellectual climate in the Netherlands.

Over the past century, the Society's (board) members have not consistently proved themselves visionaries in their anticipation of, or reaction to, social change, be this in the domestic sphere or the international domain. Symptomatic of this were the fairly conservative views they held on such issues as Neutrality or the League of Nations in the 1920s; on the conflict with Indonesia, also regarding New Guinea, in the post-WWII years; on the Benelux experiment and the Schuman Plan in the 1950s; or on the decolonization process in the 1960s.

Even so, in the final analysis, the views represented by the NVIR have invariably been a welcome, indeed fairly refreshing contribution to the Dutch social debate. Also, and in spite of the progressive institutionalization and codification in the international arena auspicated by a wealth of intergovernmental bodies, ILA and the NVIR never did, nor will they presumably, fail in carving a very respectable niche of their own in aspiring to help the implementation of the Rule of Law in this world drawing nearer.

García Amador, the first Special Rapporteur on the topic of state responsibility, was of the view that in international law, special circumstances denote situations of exemption from the secondary rule which attaches disadvantageous consequences to breach of obligation under any primary rule. By contrast, his successor, Roberto Ago, advanced the notion that the exceptional circumstances characterise situations of exemption from the obligations arising out of primary rules. In departure from both conceptions, James Crawford, the last Special Rapporteur on the law of state responsibility, submitted that it is only after having established that a certain course of behaviour is contrary to the terms of a prohibition that it becomes possible to enquire whether the actor had a justification for acting as he did. If affirmative, the conduct in question is to be regarded as conduct which neither conforms with the obligation nor constitutes a violation thereof. If negative, then the act amounts to an unjustified wrongdoing and accordingly forms the basis for the operation of the various disadvantageous consequences envisaged by the law of international responsibility. This contribution first examines the process of the development of the notion of exceptional circumstances in the edifice of the law of international responsibility ex delicto. It then shows that from the three competing conceptions, only that advanced by Ago proves capable of accurately accounting for the circumstances of consent, self-defence, and the legitimate application of a countermeasure.

The Netherlands has traditionally supported a three-mile limit for the breadth of the territorial sea. Even when, especially after the Second World War, a large number of states laid claim to territorial sea limits exceeding three miles, the Netherlands continued to adhere to the position that any unilateral extension of the territorial sea to twelve miles or more was inconsistent with international law. This position, which was defended both before and during the First and Second United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea (1958 and 1960), was consistent with the dominant Dutch interest at that time, viz., keeping the breadth of the territorial sea to a minimum, with as few exclusive fishing rights as possible beyond this limit.

The international economic order of the late fifties and early sixties was still fascinated by the so-called salt-water colonialism. This appears from international legal attempts at that time to offer more protection to foreign investors than was available to their host countries. The mid-sixties inaugurated a new era by reversing this trend. Legal aspects of the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States, such as stabilization clauses and the choice of both forum and applicable law, thus in the seventies became subordinate to the discretionary powers of host States, whether or not a party to a contract. A possible consensus regarding the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) was even abandoned because of this prevailing view. The real challenge in this period formed the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) moulded in a predominantly political blue-print for the development of States as the sole or main actors in international economic relations.

One of the most difficult topics in both American and European procedural law is the jurisdictional reach of courts over defendants in tort and contract actions. This has become particularly evident with the exponential increase in the use of the Internet as a communication and marketing device. Questions regarding the proper forum in, for example, defamation actions or consumer disputes present difficult questions for both American and European courts. The European Union's adoption of a new Regulation for cases filed on or after 1 March 2002 (the ‘Brussels Regulation’) presents an opportunity for fresh examination of this important topic.