The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive provides tools to deal effectively with unsound or failing banks. Some provisions of this directive are designated as overriding mandatory provisions as referred to in Article 9 Rome I Regulation. The author analyses the effectiveness of the designation of a rule as an overriding mandatory provision, given the principle of private international law that parties can choose the applicable law and the competent forum. His conclusion is that in an international context overriding mandatory provisions are not always as overriding or as mandatory as they may seem at first sight. This may be acceptable with regard to 'normal' overriding mandatory provisions. However, the author argues that financial stability is so important that overriding mandatory provisions that protect financial stability need special treatment.

The humble contribution of this writer to the Festschrift in honour of Professor A.J.P. Tammes relates to a study of the status and norms of the principle of self-determination in contemporary international law. There has been a prolonged controversy on the issue: some consider that the principle now enjoys the status of a legal right with corresponding obligations while others attribute only a moral status to the principle without any binding legal effect. By way of illustration of the nature of the controversy one can refer to the views of Rosalyn Higgins on the one hand and of Leo Gross, L.C. Green and Rupert Emerson on the other. According to Rosalyn Higgins, the main question is not whether the General Assembly resolutions have any binding effect but whether the practice of States (which she finds unanimous and consistent) revealed by the cumulative effect of such resolutions indicates the emergence of new norms or rules of customary international law. Dr. Higgins considers that the conclusion is inescapable that self-determination has developed into an international legal right. To Professor Leo Gross, the practice of decolonization (which he finds neither constant nor uniform) is a matter of political expediency, not based on a sense of legal obligation. Hence, subsequent practice as an element of interpretation does not support the theory that the principle of self-determination has acquired the status of a legal right or that human rights provisions could be interpreted as rights with corresponding obligations either generally or specifically with respect to the right to self-determination. Rupert Emerson considers it a relevant factor that the colonial Powers and a number of States supporting them have not accepted the basic principle that colonization is illegitimate nor the corollary proposition that the colonial peoples are entitled to as speedy as possible an exercise of their right to self-determination. After pointing out that there is still no right of self-determination in positive international law, Professor Green has conceded that since 1966 (when by Resolution 2200 (xxi) of 16 December 1966 both the Covenants on Human Rights were adopted by the General Assembly), such a right may be one in nascendi and may mature into a legal right in future as and when such non-binding instruments come into force; such a right can never operate retroactively, particularly because no attempt has been made to clarify what is meant by the “peoples” who are supposed to enjoy the right.

This article is premised on my belief that the use of force and violence should not be unlimited, even in times of war. Despite countless examples of apparently lawless wartime behavior, the fact that international wars are subject to limits is fairly well-accepted. The Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials evidence the consequences of having exceeded acceptable limits of violence and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 represent an extensive codification of those limits for international war. Most States are parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and many of the provisions of those treaties are recognized as customary international law.

The Conference which met at Lancaster House, London, from March 31 to April 6, 1966, from October 17 to 28, 1966, and from March 6 to 17, 1967, and which resulted in the establishment of a new “Convention on Conduct of Fishing Operations in the North Atlantic” was made necessary by the denunciation by the British Government in 1963 of the Hague “International Convention for regulating the Police of the North Sea Fisheries” which, since 1882, had governed the conduct of fishing operations and their policing between the coastal states of the North Sea. Formally the convening of this Conference was based on a resolution, adopted by the 1963/64 European Fisheries Conference on January 17, 1964, asking the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

“To invite the Governments of all countries participating in the North-East Atlantic fisheries to send representatives to a technical conference to be held as soon as possible to prepare for the consideration of the governments concerned a draft Convention, on the general lines of the 1882 Convention for regulating the police of the North Sea Fisheries, embodying a modern code for the conduct of fishing operations and of related activities in the North-East Atlantic;

And to invite the Governments of the United States of America and Canada to send representatives to the Conference so that the extension of the provisions of any such Convention to the North-West Atlantic Fisheries may be considered.”

In 1967, on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the Confederation, the author of this paper suggested that it was about time for Canada to join the Hague Conference on Private International Law. Such a move would show to everyone that Canada's legal horizons and objectives had become world wide. The government of the day followed this suggestion and, in 1968, Canada joined the Conference. Since that time, Canada has participated actively in its work as well as that of other international organizations devoted to the unification of law especially in the area of commercial law. It is, therefore, appropriate to examine recent trends in the field of private international law in Canada on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the Hague Conference and to ascertain the extent to which Canadian rules have been influenced by its conventions.

The recent Tenerife aircrash of March 1977 involves a variety of multistate issues. The Dutch lawyer, if unable to obtain a satisfactory settlement for his client, may contemplate undertaking action in the U.S.A. He will then be confronted with such questions as against whom he can bring proceedings, under the jurisdiction of which court, what the procedure will be, and which state or national law will apply. He will also be required to know who may bring an action, who may ultimately benefit from it and what items may be included to determine the amount of damages.

On 21 May, Professor Dr. Jan Hendrik Willem Verzijl died peacefully at his home in the ninety-ninth year of his life. In his person, one of the last witnesses of a tremendously important period in international law has passed away — a period commencing, as far as he was concerned, with the Second Hague Conference of 1907.