Harry Dexter White is remembered today as the “other” founding father of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, almost always as an afterthought as homage is paid to his far more renowned British counterpart, John Maynard Keynes. In the months leading up to and beyond the U.S. entry into World War II, White and Keynes independently drafted plans for a postwar stabilization fund aimed at restoring multilateral trade with convertible currencies. They traded plans in 1942 and then worked jointly on increasingly detailed proposals that led eventually to the creation of the IMF and World Bank. White is also remembered as a man who was accused of being a Soviet spy during the war, who died of a heart attack in 1948 just three days after giving a spirited and emotional public defense of his character before the House Un-American Activities Committee, and whose name was dragged out prominently five years later in an ugly battle between the Eisenhower Administration and former President Truman. Squeezed into the shadows between the luminosity of Keynes and the glaring excesses of McCarthyism, White's reputation has long been in need of a more sober inspection in the light of history.

The aim of this paper is to explain the process of diversification of normative economics by presenting the work of two authors—Tibor Scitovsky (1910–2002) and Amartya Sen (1933–). While these two authors first contributed to traditional welfare analysis from within, they were subsequently involved in the development of two different, and even opposed, programs: the economics of happiness; and the capability approach. They focused on different concepts of well-being: the “joy” of satisfied consumers for Scitovsky; and the “capabilities” of deprived individuals for Sen. In imposing new theoretical frameworks and applications, as well as new concepts of well-being, which are measureable, the capability approach and the economics of happiness represent two major attempts to renew normative economic analysis.

Frequent reference is made to the Alonso-Muth model of the urban land and housing markets, and the creation of this model often is considered to be the founding act in the field of urban economics. One purpose of this paper is to examine closely the original writings of these two distinguished authors, William Alonso and Richard Muth, and to show that their contributions to the development of the model were not identical. Both authors focused on the idea that there is a trade-off between access to a central point (for employment) and the price of residential land or housing, but their models were designed to serve somewhat different purposes. A second objective of this paper is to evaluate the proposition that theirs was indeed the founding act in the field by concentrating on the earliest versions of their work on the model, rather than on the enormous literature that followed. See Masahisa Fujita (1989) for a comprehensive treatment of the subsequent theoretical literature that was stimulated by Alonso and Muth.

Scholarly discussions of the eighteenth-century luxury controversy invariably acknowledge the important role of David Hume, usually identifying him as one of the first to have made a strong case against the traditional view that luxury is morally corrupt and inimical to the survival of the state. But, having said this, they tend to treat Hume rather summarily, often focusing exclusively on the 1752 essay “Of Refinement in the Arts” and generally agreeing with one leading commentator that “Hume's arguments are straightforward, and can be dealt with briefly.” On closer examination, however, it appears that Hume's treatment of luxury was more complex in its historical development, and more subtle in its final form, than some have supposed. The first part of the following discussion considers the historical progression of Hume's thinking while the second consists in an analysis of “Refinement,” with particular attention to an important but overlooked distinction between the appropriate moral and political responses to luxury.

The “technical” interpretation of Karl Marx's theory of value, which asserted that the concept of use-value played no role in his economics, has in recent years been shown to be ill-founded. In particular, R. Rosdolsky (1977) and S. Groll (1980) have established the importance that Marx attached to the concept of use-value in his theory of value, while I have shown that the use-value is an essential component of his analysis of the commodity, and that when properly applied, that analysis invalidates the labor theory of value (Keen 1993). This modern re-evaluation of Marx raises the question of how the traditional view developed in the first place. R. Hilferding aside, the answer does not paint a complimentary picture of the scholarship of either friend or foe of Marx in the debate over his theory of value.

In a recent article in this journal, Laurent Derobert (2001) examined the origins of the canonical model of labor supply. According to this model, workers will exchange “leisure” for work at a rate determined by the hourly wage. In this case, labor supply will be a simple function of the utility of leisure and the utility of income. Paradoxically, this permits the understanding of labor supply to proceed without consideration of labor itself. Derobert identifies Philip H. Wicksteed (1910) as the originator of this approach. Apparently he was the first economist to model labor supply in terms of a leisure-income trade-off. Thus it is claimed that Wicksteed bequeathed to the economics profession the paradox of the “labor-less labor supply model.”

The rise of European fascism in the 1920s and '30s triggered the greatest migration of intellectual capital the world has ever known. This paper is concerned with the German-speaking economists who formed the core of the original Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research. Among émigré economists of the interwar period, those who found refuge at the New School exerted a distinctive influence on American economics, partly owing to their concentration at a single institution, and partly by virtue of the character and quality of their work. The paper has three aims: to provide an overview of the contributions of these economists, to assess their impact on American economics, and to account for the apparent evaporation of their legacy after the onset of the Cold War.

In the article I examine how model builders from the academia and from the Federal Reserve Board confronted the Phillips curve in the construction and subsequent modifications of the Federal Reserve, MIT, and University of Pennsylvania macroeconometric model. It is argued that academic debates on Milton Friedman’s and Edmund Phelps’s accelerationist hypothesis, and the evolution of the macroeconomics discipline, did not affect the model-building agenda at the Division of Research and Statistics at the Board over the 1970s and 1980s.

Some well-known economists suggest that a good economist should act like an engineer, a surgeon, a dentist, or even a plumber. These metaphors are useful in helping economists reflect the nature of economics and their role in society. But which is the most sensible one? This paper argues that economists should be playing all these roles and more, because economics is not a single entity, and each entity has separate goals, methods, and boundaries. To take this multiplicity of roles into account, this paper argues that in addition to the traditional boundary that delineates the disciplinary domain of economics against other sciences, an overarching boundary between economic science and applied policy needs to be recognized. It then examines Esther Duflo’s “economist as plumber” metaphor and suggests that a better metaphor for Duflo’s purpose would be “general contractor,” a metaphor that, if accepted, would suggest radical change in training applied policy economists.

Economic justice in the labor market is an abiding issue of economic policy. Concerns regarding fair pay or just compensation were addressed in classical political economy and continue to be the objects of policy discussion. What constitutes a fair wage? How is a fair wage to be determined? Will competition in the labor market ensure that a fair wage is established? Should employers be required by the State, or persuaded on a voluntary basis, to pay wages that maintain a family's dignity and honor?

In the aftermath of the so-called Marginal Revolution of the last end of the nineteenth century, economic analysis split into two branches. The first one was made up of economists who took as the methodological starting-point of their analyses the static or stationary state of a barter economy and considered that this basic framework was likely to be extended in order to account for monetary and financial considerations, as well as dynamics. However, in such a setting, the introduction of money, bank-credit, or any factor of growth did not substantially alter the features that are associated with the rudimentary economy of static real exchange.

The main opponent to the Bank Charter Act of 1844 in the Currency-Banking School debates of the 1840s and 1850s was undoubtedly Thomas Tooke (1774–1858). As is well known, the 1844 Bank Act embodied the Currency School's plan for the institutional separation of the Bank's “public” function of issuing banknotes in exchange for coin (bullion) from its “private” business of banking, consisting of receiving deposits, buying and selling securities in the open market, and discounting bills brought to its door. The objective of this plan was to compel the Bank of England to issue its banknotes pari pasu with changes in its bullion reserves. The Bank Charter Act of 1844 was perhaps the first attempt to introduce central banking “rules.” Tooke's grounds for criticizing the Act are, therefore, of interest to contemporary monetary economists. From 1840 until his last publication in 1857, Tooke engaged in a relentless campaign against the institutional separation of Bank of England functions under the 1844 Act. Before the Act's inception Tooke criticized the Currency School's plan on theoretical, as well as policy grounds. After its inception Tooke mainly criticized the 1844 Bank Act for actually contributing to monetary instability. These criticisms stemmed from Tooke's long-established position on banking policy together with the Banking School theory he largely developed in the early 1840s.

Accounts of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen’s career usually focus on his pioneer contributions to mathematical economics during the 1930s and his later conversion to a critical approach to economic theory anchored on the entropy law. These disparate moments, however, were connected by Georgescu-Roegen’s strong attraction to the study of problems afflicting less developed societies. This began with his work on the agrarian economy of his native Romania, in the late 1940s, under the auspices of Harvard’s Russian Research Center. Thenceforth, he embarked on a journey that spawned his early interest in Leontief-type linear models, an extended tour of Southeast Asia commissioned by Vanderbilt University’s Graduate Program in Economic Development, and several visits to Brazil during the 1960s. The paper highlights these lesser-known aspects of Georgescu-Roegen’s trajectory, examining how he built on neo-populist writings from the early twentieth century to construct an alternative to the mainstream emphasis on industrialization policies.

When the article “Experimental Confirmation of the Existence of a Giffen Good,” authored by Raymond C. Battalio, John H. Kagel, and Carl A. Kogut, appeared in 1991 in the American Economic Review it represented the culmination of two separate and seemingly unrelated traditions in the economics literature. The first is a now-venerable tradition of attempting to locate Giffen behavior in the real world. The second is a more truncated modern tradition of animal experimentation in economics. In their article, Battalio et al. combine these traditions through setting out to discover Giffen behavior in a laboratory setting using white rats as experimental subjects. The authors (p. 962) describe their experimental procedure:

Subjects were placed in an experimental chamber for approximately three hours each day, during which time they received their entire daily liquid food ration … A rat obtained quinine and root beer by pressing either of two levers mounted on a wall in the experimental chamber … Income was controlled by restricting the number of lever presses that would result in obtaining liquid. Prices were changed by varying the amount of liquid obtained at each lever press.

Roy Harrod (1951, p. 453) explicitly states that he “supplied a diagram purporting to reconcile the classical theory [of interest] with [Keynes's] theory, and he incorporated it in the [General Theory]-the only diagram in it!” (italics added). John M. Keynes (1936, p. 180n) himself writes: “This diagram was suggested to me by Mr. R.F. Harrod.” Furthermore, Harrod, in a letter to Ralph Hawtrey (19 June 1951) also says: “I was myself responsible for the diagram on page 180 which was an attempt to demonstrate to Maynard that his theories were not quite so out of line with the classical position as he supposed” (quoted in Warren Young 1987, p. 136). Now Rod O'Donnell (1999) claims that Harrod never supplied a diagram but only suggested how one could be drawn. Thus both Harrod and Keynes have misled us about the genesis of the only diagram in the General Theory. O'Donnell advances arguments in support of his claim which do not appear convincing.

Jeremiah Whittle Jenks currently ranks as one of the more obscure academic economists of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. While other prominent economists of the era such as Richard T. Ely and John Bates Clark have been the subject of many books and articles (Everett 1946, Rader 1966, and Henry 1996, for example) Jenks remains almost unknown and unheralded. For instance, he is scarcely mentioned in the relevant volume of Joseph Dorfman's The Economic Mind in American Civilization (Dorfman 1948, III), despite his very substantial scholarly and public roles in the economics of the day. He was likewise below the radar of Joseph A. Schumpeter's (1954) magisterial, History of Economic Analysis, and Mark Blaug's (1985) Economic Theory in Retrospect. Where Jenks's career has attracted scholarly notice, the aspects examined have focused less on his economic scholarship and more on his public policy roles. (Green 1956, Weinstein 1968, Furner 1975, Parrini and Sklar 1983) The reasons for Jenks's relative neglect are unclear, although several hypotheses will be entertained below.

The expulsion of the academicians from Germany, Austria, and other central European countries is for the history of social science as traumatic and significant an event as the bombing of Pearl Harbor was for the United States' naval fleet in the South Pacific. The Restoration of the Civil Service Act occurred on April 7, 1933, shortly after the National Socialists came to power. It ordered “disagreeable” persons to leave the Universities and was the harbinger of other “cleansing” that followed the German war machine into Austria, the Czech Republic, and so on. The start of this intellectual exodus occurred a whole eight years before the United States entered the war on December 7, 1941. The destruction of the American naval fleet by the Japanese air force in 1941 required a massive State-sponsored mobilization as the United States prepared for and entered the war in the Pacific. The destruction of social science in the German-speaking Universities started on April 7, 1933, and continued as the German armies moved eastward, resulting in no less than 328 dislocated economists who emigrated out of central and eastern Europe to rebuild their lives and academic reputations in other places, especially in the United States. As Hagemann has demonstrated, the United States “was the direct or indirect destination for some two-thirds of the German-speaking emigré economists” (Hagemann 2005). This “rebuilding” of lives, families, and scientific reputations is amazing in its magnitude and complexity and is also itself a topic for serious study and understanding within the sociology of the social sciences. Hagemann has made major contributions to the telling of this story (Hagemann 1997).

Francis Wayland (1796–1865) became the president of Brown University at age 31, remaining so for twenty-eight years. According to the custom of that era, the president taught moral philosophy and political economy to the Brown undergraduates. Wayland published his lectures on moral philosophy as a textbook in 1835 (this essay cites the 1837 edition); his notes on political economy followed in 1837 (this essay cites the 1841 edition). The Elements of Moral Science ultimately reached 100,000 copies in print, while The Elements of Political Economy reached approximately 50,000 copies and its abridgment another 12,000 (Wayland and Wayland 1868, p. 389). Paul T. Heyne (1982, p. 126) states that Wayland's Political Economy “was by far the most popular political economy texbook prior to the Civil War,” with ongoing influence “through adaptations and imitations.” A comparison of book sales to college enrollments suggests that Wayland's Political Economy served a greater proportion of the market of its day than Paul Samuelson's Economics did between 1948–1980.