Ricardo “and his chief followers … did not express their meaning with sufficient clearness, and they have been misunderstood by all but the most careful readers” (Marshall, 1920, p. 84).

“Ricardo … has not been fortunate in finding careful students” (Cairnes, 1874, p. 237).

The language of graphical analysis has an immediacy which has proven potent in the dissemination of economic ideas (Solow, 1987, p. 186). J. M. Keynes' General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money contained only one diagram (Keynes, 1936, p. 180), but J. R. Hicks' graphical IS/LM analysis contributed to the popularization of one interpretation of Keynes' message. Paul Samuelson's textbook used many graphs, which may account, in part, for its pedagogical irresistibility (Elzinga, 1992, p. 863). Two graphs, named after A. W. H. Phillips and Arthur Laffer respectively, became particularly influential in post-1960 policy debates. The “theoretical Phillips curve” (Phillips, 1953, p. 31; 1954, p. 308) was of interest mainly to specialists in optimal control theory; and Phillips' second empirical curve (Phillips, 1959) remained unpublished for almost four decades. Yet his first empirical curve (1958) led to policy implications which were accepted by virtually an entire scientific profession almost instantaneously, “with alacrity” (Friedman, 1977, p. 469). It appeared to fill a gap in the Keynesian neoclassical synthesis, and was rapidly adopted by the textbook writers (Samuelson, 1961, p. 383; Lipsey, 1963, p. 438). During the 1960s, it became widely accepted that ongoing inflation would be accompanied by a sustained reduction in unemployment. When inflation came to be associated with increasing rates of unemployment, this reflected adversely on the economics profession in general, and Keynesian economics in particular.

“PAUVRES PAYSANS, PAUVRE ROYAUME” (Quesnay's emphasis), this is the synthesis of the evil and damages of France in Extrait des économies royales de M. De Sully (Kuzcynski and Meek 1972, p. 10). This text is made up of twenty-four short maxims that accompany the third edition of the Tableau économique, in the first months of the 1759; the words quoted refer to a note and to maxim fourteen. A similar text, with the emphasis, is in the Maximes générales du gouvernemente économique d'un royaume agricole published in the 1767 in the Physiocratie by Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours, a disciple of Francois Quesnay (INED 1958, vol. II, p. 973). This is no secondary item in the work of the master of Physiocracy; in this brief sentence and in that emphasis there is the synthesis and analysis of the main problem of France in the eighteenth century.

Many commentators have pointed out the presence of a tension, even a contradiction or inconsistency, between two theses advanced by Friedrich Hayek: that the growth of institutions ought to be spontaneous rather than consciously designed, and that the conscious design of a constitution is necessary, so as to secure a desirable social order. Our paper shows via textual analysis that, far from being irreconcilable, these two theses, on the contrary, complement each other.

In this paper, we build on data on officials of the Federal Reserve System, oral history repositories, and hitherto underresearched archival sources to unpack the tortuous path toward crafting an institutional and intellectual space for postwar economic analysis within the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. We show that growing attention to new macroeconomic research was a reaction to both mounting external criticisms against the Fed’s decision-making process and the spread of new macroeconomic theories and econometric techniques. We argue that the rise of the number of PhD economists working at the Fed is a symptom rather than a cause of this transformation. Key to our story are a handful of economists from the Board of Governors’ Division of Research and Statistics (DRS) who did not hold a PhD but envisioned their role as going beyond mere data accumulation and got involved in large-scale macroeconometric model building. We conclude that the divide between PhD and non-PhD economists may not be fully relevant to understand both the shift in the type of economics practiced at the Fed and the uses of this knowledge in the decision-making process. Equally important was the rift between different styles of economic analysis.

Since the 1980s, institutional change has become a matter of great interest as economists faced the necessity and the challenge to provide a theory of economic or cultural evolution. Their first reaction was to refer to biology, a field in which theories of evolution have reached a high degree of sophistication. This was all the more legitimate and relevant given that biology has been largely influenced by economics (Schweber 1977, 1980; Gordon 1991; Kresge and Wenar 1994; Depew and Weber 1995). Indeed, the influence of classical political economy on the views of one of the fathers of the modern theory of evolution, Charles Darwin, is widely admitted. Darwin borrowed from economists fundamental ideas such as spontaneous order and methodological individualism (from Adam Smith), the positive role of diversity and variety (from Charles Babbage) and the concept of the struggle for life (from Thomas Malthus). Therefore, the ideas promoted by the founding fathers of political economy, sometimes called “Darwinians before Darwin” (Hayek 1973, p. 23), have shaped Darwin's theory of biological evolution.

More than 100 years have passed since Alfred Marshall introduced the representative firm to economic theory in 1891. During this long period of time, many arguments have been raised giving either support or opposition to the concept. In recent years, macroeconomists have taken an increasing interest in the representative firm. Since the beginning of the modern microfoundations literature in the early 1970s, the representative firm and its big brother, the representative agent, have been made essential analytical tools for linking macroeconomics and microeconomics. Within this debate, the microfoundation of business cycle theory has played a prominent role.

This article examines the early regulation of futures markets in the 1920s and 1930s. We contrast the analysis of speculation developed by the Grain Futures Administration (GFA) with Holbrook Working’s. Within the GFA we focus on Paul Mehl, who directed the statistical analysis of order flows, trade volumes, and positions that supported the GFA’s policy recommendations. In retrospect Working was the most prominent academic analyst of futures markets. The relationship between the GFA and Working was complex and at times intimately collaborative, but the New Deal provoked sharp disagreement. Working rejected the tighter trading rules advocated by the GFA as counterproductive and tried to persuade the Secretary of Agriculture to embrace a discretionary approach to regulation based upon his analysis of neighboring futures prices (the Working curve) and his distinctive conception of “perfect markets”—a nuanced version of the subsequent efficient market hypothesis.

In 1798, Sophie de Grouchy, the marquise de Condorcet, published a translation of the seventh edition of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (1792), along with a series of eight “letters” on the subject of sympathy. These letters are, in fact, substantial essays that allow us to discern how she read Smith. Intellectual historians have a tendency to privilege an author's intent, and to read the Theory of Moral Sentiments in order to determine what Smith actually meant, and how meaning was constructed in the context of a particular intellectual environment. As long ago as 1978, literary theorists such as Wolfgang Iser suggested that a reader's response is at least as interesting a question as an author's intent (Iser 1978). And Sophie de Grouchy is no ordinary reader. Her translation of, and commentary on, Smith's work allow us to see how a theory constructed in the intellectual context of the Scottish Enlightenment would be received by a different intellectual community. While de Grouchy shared much of the background that informed Smith's work, she could not write a commentary on sympathy during the Terror without taking into account recent French political experience and debate. And, I argue, her reading was not merely idiosyncratic, but rather representative of a particular group of intellectuals seized with the problem of adapting Enlightenment theory to the political reality of the Republic.

Recent scholarship has noted differences and even discrepancies among the members of the so-called Austrian school. It has been possible to identify discontinuities between generations (Hayek 1968), along methodological lines (Caldwell 1988, Hutchison 1981), among the various threads of the “Austrian revival” (Vaughn 1990), and between heterogeneous intellectual systems (Dufourt and Garrouste 1993). Brian Loasby (1989) has remarked that Friedrich Hayek was one of the few scholars to develop one of Carl Menger's outstanding contributions to economics, his theory of social institutions (Langlois 1989). The purpose of this paper is to appraise the continuities and discontinuities between the two authors' conceptions of institutions. In what follows, I shall present successively Menger's and Hayek's conceptions of institutions, and then I shall compare them.

Robert Heilbroner (1990) challenges us to re-examine our preconceptions about the development of economic analysis in the twentieth century. John Maynard Keynes (1951, p. 141) once said, in a discussion concerning Alfred Marshall, that the “master economist…must study the present in light of the past for the purposes of the future,” and in this regard Heilbroner's essay is the work of a historian of economics who commands our attention and respect. The purpose of his essay “is to inquire into the successes and failures of economic thought in anticipating the march of actual events” (Heilbroner 1990, p. 1097). The failures, Heilbroner points out, considerably outweigh the successes. But, he conjectures, even in those cases of success, the success is not due to superior analysis. Rather, “the success of the farsighted seem accounted for more by their prescient ‘visions’ than by their superior analyses” (ibid., p. 1098).

The economics of education gradually became institutionalized in the period following the Second World War. Human capital theory was the central pillar in this process. Nevertheless, it did not go unchallenged. The first challenges came from within the mainstream itself, but economists affiliated to other paradigms also called human capital theory into question. This applied in particular to the work of the radical economists. The aim of this article is to document this critical episode in the history of ideas in the economics of education. To that end, the nature of the radical economists’ critique is examined and it is shown how it connects to human capital theory.

The USDA Graduate School was founded in 1921 to provide statistical and economic training to the employees of the Department of Agriculture. The school did not grant degrees, but its graduate courses were accepted for credit by a significant number of universities.

In subsequent years, the activities of the school grew rapidly to provide training in many different subject areas for employees from almost all federal departments. The training in statistics provided by the school was often highly advanced (instructors included Howard Tolley and, later, Edwards Deming), while the economics taught displayed an eclectic mix of standard and institutional economics. Mordecai Ezekiel taught both economics and statistics at the school, and had himself received his statistical training there. Statistics instruction in 1936 and 1937 included seminar series from R.A. Fisher and J. Neyman, and courses on the probability approach to sampling involving Lester Frankel and William Hurwitz became important after 1939. The instruction in economics was noticeably institutionalist in the period of the New Deal. Towards the end of the period considered here, the instruction in economics became narrower and more focused on agricultural economics.

The activities of the school provide a basis for understanding some of the sources of the relative statistical sophistication of agricultural economists and of the statistical work done in government in the interwar period. It is noteworthy than within the USDA Graduate School, and in contrast to the Cowles Commission, statistical sophistication coexisted with an approach to economics that was not predominantly neoclassical. It also provides a light on the place of institutional economics in the training of government economists through the same time span.

Having in the General Theory quoted a passage from John Stuart Mill’s Principles as representative of ancient confusion, John Maynard Keynes has been accused of misinterpreting that passage and thus mistakenly identifying Mill as an upholder of the “classical” proposition that “supply creates its own demand.” Certain critics, seizing on Keynes’s misunderstanding, draw the conclusion that little was actually wrong with Mill’s analysis and that Keynes’s attack on Mill was therefore without justification.

Our contention, however, is that, despite his error with respect, so to say, to the “letter” of Mill’s exposition, Keynes was right about the essential “substance” of Mill’s thesis. Mill’s thinking, we suggest, was deeply in thrall to the ideas of his father and Jean-Baptiste Say. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Mill did indeed stand for a “classical” position, albeit qualified, but nevertheless vulnerable to Keynes’s critique as developed in the General Theory.

The Physiocrats “New Science” of Political Economy is often represented as unrelated to the pursuit of national power. A recent study (Fourquet 1989), which rests on the approaches of Fernand Braudel (1979) and Immanuel Wallerstein (1980), has radicalized the thesis already propounded by Edmond Silberner (1939) who claimed that Quesnay was profoundly ignorant of military matters and failed to understand the power struggles being played out on the seas and in the colonies. Did not Quesnay propose turning back to an agricultural economy, banishing industry, trade, and the navy—in short, all the active forces thanks to which Great Britain had snatched domination of the world economy from Holland and thanks to which she would prevent France from obtaining it?

Yet this thesis is weak. It must be remembered that Quesnay's first economic writings date from 1756–57, that is to say a period when confrontation between France and England was at a peak, with the start of the Seven Years' War. How could an author who claims to de ne the economic government ofan agricultural nation ignore the military problems which were so crucial in this period? Even if he wanted to, how could he succeed in doing so once he came to deal with taxes and the highly sensitive question of finance? How could he make himself understood by his contemporaries with a political theory that set aside all the burning issues of the day? How could he find an audience among those developing the science of commerce who always accorded great importance to the pursuit of power?

Under scrutiny the traditional thesis appears inaccurate. After recalling the writings of some of his contemporaries, whom Quesnay knew and read (section 1), I shall show that articles drafted between 1756 and 1757, like published or unpublished works which Mirabeau and Quesnay elaborated between 1757 and 1760, give significant room to the nation's military power, particularly when the economic government is in question (section 2). From the years 1763–64 the idea of a natural order does not lead Quesnay to neglect the pursuit of power (section 3). These links between power and wealth in the work of the founder of Physiocracy will lead finally to some remarks on political economy as a form of rationalization of politics.

In his Journal of the History of Economic Thought article, “A Suggestion for Clarifying the Study of Dissent in Economics,” Roger Backhouse usefully proposed some terminological clarifications with respect to studying the ideas of disagreement, controversy, and dissent in (Western) economic discourse, heterodoxy being defined as a more narrow category than dissent. Backhouse also wrote that “the ideas on which Marxist, Radical, and Post Keynesian economics are based were arguably never widely held” (Backhouse 2004, p. 265).