The presence of large, often dissident, minority populations has been one of the most serious problems facing many of the nations which have attained independence since the close of World War II. This paper will examine the minority situation in Burma, where the problem has been of serious proportions, posing a threat to national unity and in some cases resulting in armed insurrection. There are at present an estimated 11,000 insurgents in Burma, most of whom represent ethnic minorities.

In the on-going debate over the consequences of national policies of political and economic integration in pluralistic nations such as the Philippines, two facts have become increasingly obvious. We need to know more about the effects of the patterns of political incorporation and more about the type of economic strategies pursued by individuals to judge the effects of integration on peripheral populations. Our former views of the monolithic nature of external influences have been modified; new research has made it apparent that local populations have certain resources at their disposal which can influence the direction of political and economic change. One such resource is the manipulation of the discrepancy between state law and customary law, a strategy which often includes the use and/or invention of custom. This paper uses diachronic data from one upland community in the northern Philippines to illustrate how individuals have manoeuvred within and utilized the conflicts between the provisions of customary law and national legal codes in order to pursue certain economic strategies. The creative process of inventing custom is demonstrated, since the patterns of communal ownership which have been set against Philippine state property law in this region, and which have been used to support claims for regional autonomy, are shown to be a relatively new jural construct. The paper suggests that there are no clear winners in these strategies, elite prerogatives have been eroded in favour of poorer families and the community as a whole has suffered from increased factionalism. This in turn suggests that should regional autonomy be granted in this region, conflict will not necessarily be reduced by a return to customary practice.

The 19th century is chosen as a period for a static section study of the population of Kedah for a number of reasons. The most important is perhaps the feasibility of the study at all, for as with the other states of Malaysia, no statistically based discussion on population or landuse can be undertaken for periods earlier than the 19th century. Secondly, the population of the State during that century provides us with a picture of what the situation was like, and what it might have continued to be, with regards to numbers, composition and distributions, prior to the drastic demographic and economic upheavals of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The existence within the State's population of certain elements and situations peculiar to the century alone provide other points of interest. Examples were the presence of a large Thai element and of the Jawi Pekan community, both of which became conspicuously absent after the census of 1911.

From at least the early sixteenth century, when Tomé Pires acclaimed the marvels of Malacca, Westerners have evinced an interest in the cities of Southeast Asia, though for different reasons and from varying perspectives. Travellers like Cesare Fredrici, Ralph Fitch, and Gasparo Balbi were generally impressed with what they saw and compared it favourably in many respects with Europe of the 1580s. In the course of the two hundred years, however, this appreciation altered markedly. Western authors after the late eighteenth century took a less sanguine view and tended to describe towns and cities rather disparagingly as little more than collections of villages. During the late 1920s, the panorama made possible by the advent of air travel in Southeast Asia distinguished clearly between rural and urban areas, but showed the latter as thoroughly Europeanized enclaves. In the popular aerial photographs of the day, these cities appeared slick in their new tropical-colonial architectural style and uncomplicated by large or even particularly visible non-European populations.

Our chief sources of information about Vietnam until the middle of the tenth century are the dynastic histories and related writings of China. This is because, from the beginning of recorded history in Vietnam until then, Vietnam was, for the most part, under the authority of Chinese governors or people who posed as Chinese-style governors. By the end of the tenth century, an independent Vietnamese monarchy was established, and historical information was being independently preserved by the Vietnamese; this information was eventually incorporated into the Vietnamese historiographical tradition as it developed in later centuries. Consequently, the historian of tenth-century Vietnam finds two streams of information, one coming from a wellestablished viewpoint from which Vietnam was a remote frontier district at the edge of the horizon, the other coming from the Vietnamese themselves as they worked toward a standpoint from which to remember their past.

The United States did not give Marshall aid to Western Europe for purely humanitarian reasons. Aid was also, perhaps even mainly, provided to serve the economic and political purposes of the United States. In studies dealing with the Marshall aid programme, the suspension of aid to the Dutch colony of Indonesia, and the seeming threat to halt the stream of dollars to the Netherlands, has been used as an example to prove that the programme was an American instrument of political power. In studies dealing with the decolonization of Indonesia, it is also alleged that the menace of adjournment of Marshall aid forced the Dutch to retreat from their colony in December 1949. However, primary sources show that neither the offer of Marshall aid in June 1947, nor the seeming threat to halt aid to the Netherlands in December 1948, prevented the Dutch government from pursuing its own way in the process leading to the independence of Indonesia. The Dutch cabinet was not sufficiently impressed by both the offer and the threat to keep it from engaging in military “police actions” in July 1947 and December 1948 against the nationalist Republic of Indonesia.

This essay considers the importance of looking at writings for children for historical analysis, particularly in times of war, focusing on magazines published for youth in South Vietnam in the early 1970s. Two magazines, Thiếu Nhi and Thằng Bờm, in particular, are studied in terms of their editorial aims and contents, as well as their young readers' submissions in response to contemporary sociocultural issues raised in these magazines. The lively discussions in these magazines were made possible by the relative freedom of expression in South Vietnam, compared to North Vietnam, which was an important reason for the civil war being fought. Yet this freedom also challenged the fabric of Vietnamese society. The strongest concern of these magazines' initiators, editors and writers was that its readers not lose their sense of being Vietnamese in the face of the great wartime flood of American popular culture that captivated many youth. Anxiety that the younger generation would be Americanised and lose their identity struck at the core of what the war was being fought about: i.e. different versions of being Vietnamese in the modern world. This threat of Americanisation to fundamental Vietnamese values was perceived by some intellectuals in the South as more serious than the threat of communism, because at least the communists were Vietnamese.

Sociocultural boundaries come in many forms, and crucially, are responsive to power and constantly in flux. This article focuses on the production of space and unmarked sociocultural boundaries linked to spirit mediums in a historically contested area of northeastern Thailand who are possessed by the spirits of Phaya Narin Songkhram — a key ‘Lao’ military leader of Chao Anou's famous Vientiane revolt against Siam between 1826–28 — and those of his subordinates. Spirit mediums linked to ethnic ‘Thai’ leaders are also found to the south of this area. Through channeling and performing these historical persons, spirit mediums keep alive and reproduce group memories with space-making implications. This article also shows how the mediums' positioning has shifted over time and varies in relation to contemporary power relations, altering the sociocultural boundaries between ethnic Lao and Thai.

When asking the Editor's approval for responding to the replies to my article it was only with the intention to rectify possible misunderstandings; little did I imagine what unpleasant an exercise this would have to be. For, the first impression I derived from reading these replies was that their impetuosity appears to be out of proportion with the relative mildness of my remarks, which are seen as “a most curious attack” by Bayard & Pisit and as “criticisms” by Solheim. In actual fact they were meant to be neither; but merely an exhortation to ask some questions, albeit maybe slightly embarrassing ones. Contrary to what my three colleagues seem to think, I have no axe to grind and no alternative model to propose, be it my own or that evolved by somebody else; this, I thought, was clearly apparent from my text.

“[Your committee] are not aware that anything material has been omitted that could have conduced to the welfare of the Association, or the trade of India and China generally…They have not failed to maintain their communications with the different Presidencies in India and the Chambers of Commerce at Canton and Singapore.”

In September 1944 the Japanese government promised to give “independence in the near future” to Indonesia. However, when Japan surrendered in 1945, the Allies ordered the Japanese authorities to suppress any move by the Indonesians toward independence. Caught between their old promise and their new role, the Japanese exhibited contrasting patterns of behaviour. This paper analyzes their reactions by using two categories, the “allegiance type” of person who adhered to Allied instructions, and the "renunciation type" who attempted to honour the promise given to the Indonesians.

This article examines one Cambodian village's efforts to resettle a war-altered landscape and reconstruct a sense of belonging in the aftermath of war. The resettlement of Reaksmei Songha village entailed physically settling over the sediments and traces of a fractured and violent past, as settlers cleared a landscape of foliage and the explosive remnants of war. Settlers living side by side had often fought on different sides of the war, yet divisive former allegiances were rarely discussed. Instead, a post-war sense of communal belonging was constructed through references to accounts of the resettlement period, focusing upon common elements of struggle and hardship.

This is the first part of a study made in my seminar on the relations between the German ports Hamburg and Bremen and the trading centres in the area of the Indian Ocean. The study covers the whole period from the end of the eighteenth century until the beginning of the First World War. For reasons of time and space this paper is limited to the first part of the study which deals with the period up to 1870.

The framing of British policy towards India in the twentieth century sought to reconcile its prime importance in the dependent empire with its political aspirations through some kind of evolution towards the status afforded the settler dominions. Though British policy towards other dependencies was rarely co-ordinated — even so far as concerned a region like “Further India” — it was influenced by their relationship with India. India in a sense defined the limits of those policies: they must not go so far as to undermine the British position in India by untoward example; nor, on the other hand, must they make so little advance as to alienate the Indians and inhibit the availability of Indian forces. For Burma the inter-relationship was particularly close. Burma had been acquired from India, partly in order to protect British commerce based in India, but mainly to provide for the security of British India. It had been administered from India. Indian commerce, Indian labour, Indian moneylending had as a result established new ties. But India also influenced the reshaping of the constitutional as well as the administrative structure. Working both within and outside those structures, Burman nationalism was itself influenced by developments in India, though directing its criticism at Indian, even more, perhaps, than at British economic exploitation. The Burman nationalists insisted that the constitutional advance of Burma must at least keep pace with that of India.

Thailand is primarily a peasant society. In 1974, about 65 per cent of the labour force earned their livelihood from agriculture, although 87 per cent of the population lived in rural areas. Because land has been relatively abundant until recent years, most farmers are landowners, with noted exceptions of tenant farming in areas contiguous to Bangkok. Their simple occupational skills have been transmitted from one generation to another within the village and family, supplemented only by up to four years of compulsory elementary education, acquired intermittently and sporadically between the ages of seven and fourteen. The basic necessities of life historically have been easily satisfied in a hospitable, tropical climate.

Southeast Asian Studies (SEAS) in China has experienced significant changes in the past twenty years. China's rising political and economic power has stimulated growing demands for better understanding of the wider world, resulting in the rapid development of area studies in recent years. Although SEAS in China predated the relatively recent notion of ‘area studies’ by at least half a century, the boom in area studies has profoundly transformed the field, most notably by attracting a large number of scholars to conduct policy-relevant research. Not only does the ‘policy turn’ reflect shifts of research paradigms in the field of SEAS, but it is also consistent with some larger trends prevailing in China's higher education sector and rapidly changing society in general. This article shows that SEAS in China has grown even more imbalanced, as indicated by the rapid growth of language programmes, absolute domination of short-term policy research, and further marginalisation of humanistic subjects. To respond, Chinese universities have adopted new approaches to SEAS depending on their distinct disciplinary foundations, language coverage, faculty interests, and local governments’ policy preferences.

Sayyidi ‘strangers’ and ‘stranger-kings’, borne on the eighteenth-century wave of Hadhrami migration to the Malay-Indonesian region, boosted indigenous traditions of charismatic leadership at a time of intense political challenge posed by Western expansion. The extemporary credentials and personal talents which made for sāda exceptionalism and lent continuity to Southeast Asian state-making traditions are discussed with particular reference to Perak, Siak and Pontianak. These case studies, representative of discrete sāda responses to specific circumstances, mark them out as lead actors in guiding the transition from ‘the last stand of autonomies’ to a new era of pragmatic collaboration with the West.