Among the more noteworthy features of the Indonesian government's current efforts to recover and accentuate what is believed to be the nation's “cultural identity” is the encouragement being given to the shift in emphasis in the writing of Indonesian history so as to bring out more fully the uniqueness and greatness of the Indonesian cultural achievement. This new “Indonesia-centric” approach is said to provide a much needed correction of the earlier, colonially oriented and “Western centric” type of historical writing about Indonesia, in which the Indonesian “identity” allegedly was obscured because of Western and Dutch ethnocentric prejudices, arid in which historical events in Indonesia were treated as mere appendages to Dutch or European history generally. As early as December, 1957, a seminar of historians in Djokjakarta, Central Java, was convened “in order to eliminate the colonial historian's presentation and restore the proper emphasis on the indigenous culture, tradition and history” in “the history books of the country”. More than five years later the problem still appeared not to have been resolved as yet, for at another historical seminar held in Medan, North Sumatra, in March, 1963, Indonesia's Deputy First Minister for Information, Ruslan Abdulgani, was reportedly still calling “on Indonesian writers to begin to ‘rewrite’ Indonesian history to cleanse it of what he called ‘West-centrism’”. Indonesian historians, Abdulgani urged, “must dare to rewrite our history so that it will no longer be West-centric but Indonesiacentric”.

Japanese forces attacked Malaya late in 1941 and, by 15 February 1942, had occupied the entire peninsula as well as Singapore. Among other changes, the Japanese regime introduced a new currency. Pre-war British currency remained legal tender but rapidly vanished from the open market, and by 1943 the economy operated on Japanese currency, commonly referred to as “banana” money because the ten-dollar note featured a banana plant. By the end of the occupation, the buying power of this currency had deteriorated dramatically, and the country experienced massive inflation as large quantities of money were printed and put into circulation.

The Orang Sakai of Mainland Riau, on the east coast of Sumatra, have an elaborate performing art genre through which they physicalise the unseen spirit-dimension in a shamanic ritual called dikei. Their shamanic ritual utilises songs, dance as well as comedy. This article elaborates on how songs and dance visualise the unseen beings and provides detailed examples of Sakai performances during which shamans ‘dance with’ or ‘move with’ the spirits. A second theme of the article is the question of the relationship between the meaning of ‘performance’ and fakery, and suggests that there are three types of performed fakery, two of which are accepted as valid and necessary performances which technically contribute to the performance of medicine and the physicalisation of spirit presence.

Historians have examined the Japanese peace settlement of 1951 in a variety of ways. A few have treated it as an episode in the ongoing evolution of the structure of international relations in the Pacific and East Asia. Most have focused on the interaction between the principal victor, the United States, and vanquished Japan, weighing the negotiating successes and failures of each and assessing the impact of the settlement on subsequent Japanese-American relations. Recently still other historians have exploited newly available archival materials to analyze the role middle-range powers such as Australia and Britain played in shaping the 1951 peace treaty. While this research has revealed a great deal about the San Francisco peace settlement, it has left unexplored the part small powers played in a major restructuring of the Pacific/East Asian international order.

Most of the stories we know about the Vietnamese goddess Liêu Hanh derive from Doàn thi Diêm's story Vân Cát Thân Nũ Truyên. This article analyses the story, arguing that in fact it is a piece of fiction which reflects the author's views, experiences and aspirations for greater freedom for women.

Based on surviving local records, this essay argues that after 1943 Japanese policy towards Islam underwent far-reaching changes when the faith, religious elites and religious edifices were incorporated into the Japanese propaganda machinery for the purpose of winning a war in which neither Islam nor Malay-Muslims had any vested interest.

Abdul Rahim Kajai (1894–1943), his life and his work, are discussed against the background of socio-cultural developments on the Malay Peninsula in the 1930s. A journalist, writer and author, Kajai played an important role in the emergence of notions of ‘Malayness’ which made Malays feel different from and hostile to the growing numbers of ‘others’ in the colony. In particular, his stories, splendid exercises in fragmentariness, suggest a strong nostalgia for the pastoral way of life, at variance with Kajai's own life in urban areas.

In recent years a considerable amount of theoretical and empirical activity in social and historical demography has been directed towards assessment of the relationship between modernization and household size and structure. Largely stimulated by Levy's postulation of discrepancies between idea and actual household configurations, Burch's pioneering cross-national evaluation of the Levy thesis, and the monumental historical demographic research of the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure, studies have been conducted both historically in currently developed societies, as well as in contemporary developing societies. Focused on the co-residential domestic group, these social demographic investigations have questioned long-standing assumptions and conventional wisdom in family sociology with respect to such issues as the universality of extended family co-residential arrangements in pre-industrial societies, the implicit smooth evolutionary trend from extended to nuclear household structures, and the relative contribution of variations in the size of nuclear and extended (as well as non-relative) membership components to variations in overall household size.

The demise of elective local government in the State of Penang, Malaysia, is worth examining for several reasons. George Town, the state capital, was the first British settlement in the Far East; traces of elective local government appeared in the city early in the nineteenth century and the subsequent development of local government in the city followed British theory and practice to such a degree that at the time of Malayan Independence in 1957 the George Town City Council was a remarkable replica of a British town council. To study the George Town Council after Independence is thus to study a transplanted western institution which failed to survive within an Asian political system. Of more significance, however, is the light which a study of elective local government in Penang casts upon the fundamental transformations now underway in local government throughout Malaysia. Penang was the only state in the Federation to attain fully developed elective local government. Penang was one of the two states (the other was Malacca) in which all state territory and all state citizens were within the jurisdiction of local authorities. Penang however, was the only state in which every local authority consisted entirely of elected members and the only state in which every local authority was financially autonomous of the state government. Yet in 1966 the George Town Council was suspended and in 1971 the remaining local authorities were suspended as well. Penang became the first state in the federation to have no elective local government at all. It now seems likely that the other Malaysian states will follow Penang's lead (indeed, Malacca did so in early 1972), since it is now clear that the sanguine view of elective local government originally held by state and central officials has given way to one of pessimism and distrust. In July 1971 the Minister of Local Government indicated in Parliament that the central government believed that elective local government should be abolished. For these reasons, and for others which will become apparent in this paper, a study of the decline of elective local government in Penang provides an opportunity not only to test the hypotheses which have already been advanced to explain the demise of elective local government in the State itself, but also to test wider hypotheses advanced to explain the actions of national and state government towards elective local government throughout Malaysia.

Over the past several decades a considerable body of scholarly literature has accumulated concerning the evolution of Thai social and political patterns, behaviour, and values, and our study of Thai society now is much more solidly-based than it was only a generation ago. One might legitimately begin to wonder, however, whether we might not “have it all wrong”. The question is not entirely flippant. Much of what has been written on such subjects has little solid historical depth. Historians' study of Thailand prior to the nineteenth century remains relatively superficial, based on very scanty sources; and to the extent that social scientists and others have depended on the historians, none would argue that they have been completely well-served. Even more seriously, however, one can argue that there has been a good deal of reading contemporary and recent situations back into the past; and even historians' analyses of pre-Chakri social and political history have been all too readily the prisoner of a narrow, linear view of Thai history as the political succession of kingdoms from Sukhothai to Ayudhya to Bangkok.

Until the fifteenth century, Vietnam was essentially a Buddhist country. The piety of the dynasties constituted their source of legitimacy, and Buddhism provided a means for royal authority to penetrate and incorporate the local political structure. In the face of the development of social unrest, however, Confucian literati started to voice their concern for the maintenance of order and eventually emerged in the fifteenth century as spokesmen for royal authority, definers of public morality and guardians of the court. As a result, institutional Buddhism lost the court patronage it had previously enjoyed, and henceforth its political influence declined steadily.

This paper is ethnographically concerned with two different orang asli communities: the Meniq living in Southern Thailand and the Orang Sakai in Riau, Indonesia. The focus is on the different discursive rhetorics of development in the two nation-states. These rhetorics have been absorbed by the two indigenous groups to form part of their own modern cultural discourses within their respective countries. These rhetorics of development define the indigenous groups as somewhat lacking in culture and provide them with new understandings of themselves that devalue their customary way of life. The post-development indigenous identity work (such as the development of an ethno-cultural identity) will therefore usually be constructed through these negated developmental foundations.

It has become a commonplace of Malayan historiography that the period following the end of the Pacific War witnessed the establishment of a pattern of political life which has persisted in its main features into the present decade. Existing accounts have focused around the restructuring of the British presence in Malaya under a military administration and the introduction of, and opposition to, the Malayan Union scheme in 1946 and the Federal structure which succeeded it in April 1948. These years saw the emergence of an ethnically based nationalist movement and the defeat of a radical challenge to its predominance. The communal and insurrectionary violence which was a feature of the period has been represented as a constraint to subsequent political action — as a limit to what the structure of Malaya's pluralism could tolerate — and the constitutional struggles as a lost opportunity to effect its transformation. Whilst it is hard to exaggerate the importance of these events in shaping the landscape of Malaysian politics, there is a sense in which the sophistication of these political and constitutional preoccupations suggests uneven development within the historical writing as a whole. The social context which stimulated change, and the breadth of the local response which dignified it, has been marginalized in many accounts. There has been a tendency to conceive the state system and the colonial presence in Malaya within the bounds of a paradigm governed by the constitutional settlement, and the various phases of insurrection and political change as primarily the products of the subversive or nationalist imagination.

This article details the development of Indonesian national art theatre in Makassar, South Sulawesi from the 1950s to the present. It argues that through a commitment to modernity and modern aesthetics strong bonds to the idea of the nation were formed by Makassar theatre workers. Furthermore, in charting the relationship between local Makassar theatre and national trends often pioneered in Jakarta, I argue that beginning in the New Order and continuing to the present, through several formal and stylistic changes, the deployment of local cultural elements in modern Indonesian national theatre has deepened. Yet this development represents both a renewed pride in local identity and a continuing commitment to the national community.

This paper comprises an enquiry into the unrest in the Belait and Tutong districts of Brunei at the turn of the twentieth century. After outlining the course of the disturbances, I shall examine their causes, explain why the recrudescence of violence (after a period of calm) early in 1901 led to a departure in British policy towards the Sultanate, and finally, show how the factors which had given rise to the original disaffection were removed, and lasting peace restored, under a reformed administration introduced at the beginning of 1906. First, however, some background information is necessary.

Phạm Sū Mạnh's name first appears in the annals during the 1340s, and by 1358 he is described as a hanh-khǐên. Several of his surviving poems were written when he was travelling on duty in northwestern Vietnam, perhaps in the 1360s. In 1364 and 1365, military precautions were taken on the northern border to safeguard Vietnam from consequences of the civil warin southern China on the eve of the Ming dynasty's accession in 1368.

British Malaya before the Japanese occupation was heavily dependent on imported rice, producing on average only 35 per cent of its requirements between 1920 and 1940. During the 1930s, efforts were made to expand rice cultivation, but progress was slow and did not even keep pace with population growth: imports increased at the same rate as domestic production.

As war approached, the government of Malaya built up a stockpile of rice and had about one year's supply in reserve when the occupation began. However, a considerable proportion of this grain was appropriated for military use and the civilian population soon faced food shortages.

Studies on leadership in Southeast Asia's early modern era have tended to centre necessarily on men, and in particular, on O.W. Wolters' concept of ‘men of prowess’. The concept of female leadership is still little researched. This case study of Sultanah Safiatuddin Syah of Aceh (1641–75) provides some insights into female leadership in the Malay-Muslim island world of Southeast Asia. Contrary to the received view that successful leadership tended to be male (men of prowess), this article demonstrates that female leadership and the justification for the position of the ruler relied less on notions of sacral and charismatic power based on male prowess, but instead shifted to Muslim notions of piety and the just ruler.