This article modestly seeks to address some of the various matters related to transitional justice and focuses on whether penal repression for violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law must be insisted upon in all situations, or if there are cases where other action, in particular amnesties, would be more appropriate to ensure national reconciliation or the peaceful development of a country. Dilemmas clearly exist in responding to such choices, calling for the ability to maintain a judicious balancing act between competing important interests, including the most basic decision of whether or not to provoke the dragon on the patio.

The article discusses the “ethnic paradigm” that currently prevails in analyses of Iraqi history and politics. While acknowledging the strong forces associated with ethnic and sectarian loyalties in the country, the article points to three important indicators of the surviving Iraqi nationalist sentiment that cut across these ethno-sectarian categories. It highlights the misfit between Western approaches to Iraqi politics and indigenous Iraqi political thinking on ethnicity and sectarianism, and pays special attention to the implications for the debates about federalism and the partitioning – “soft” or “hard” – of Iraq.

Before a framework can be set for efforts centred on human security to combat chaos, instability and insecurity in conflict areas, the human tragedy in those areas must be understood and discussed. This article analyses the human tragedy in Iraq and shows that it extends beyond our current perception of the situation. The war has led to the loss of lives and social capital, and has destroyed the Iraqi infrastructure. This substantially lowers the quality of life, leads to the inability to provide essential services and renders state-building activities even more difficult. In line with the policy of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the article also emphasizes the need for reconciliation between the various groups in Iraq, an end to sectarian tensions and the preservation of the country's territorial unity as the ultimate resolution of the Iraqi question.

This article examines the status of military and civilian personnel of sending states and international organisations involved in UN peace operations. It undertakes an assessment of relevant customary law, examines various forms of treaty regulation and considers topics and procedures for effective settlement of open issues prior to the mission. The author stresses the need for cooperation between the host state, the sending states and the international organisation in this context. He draws some conclusions with a view to enhancing the legal protection of personnel involved in current and future UN peace operations.

Protectionist frames of children as passive, uncomprehending victims characterize the international architecture of responding to children in war. However, stories such as those in children's war memoirs draw attention to the agency and capacity of children to negotiate and navigate distinct traumas and experiences in war. Children experience particular vulnerabilities and risks in conflict zones and their potential as contributors to the solutions to war must also be taken seriously. Children's authoritative voices in memoir writing reveal the limitations of protectionist-dominated approaches and offer a rationale for taking the participatory elements of international humanitarian mechanisms and responses to conflict more seriously. Such a move may help address the comprehensive silencing of children's voices in the institutional architecture concerned with children in war.

For some years it has been customary to call “humanitarian law” that considerable portion of international law which owes its inspiration to a feeling for humanity and which is centred on the protection of the individual. This expression of humanitarian law appears to combine two ideas of a different character, the one legal and the other moral. Now, the provisions which are the subject under study are, as will be seen later, precisely a transposition in international law of considerations of a moral order, and more especially humanitarian. This then would seem to be a satisfactory designation.

On 1 January 1994, Mexico's awakening after New Year's Eve was rude to say the least, for that was the date chosen by a hitherto unknown guerrilla movement, the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista National Liberation Army), to launch a simultaneous attack on several municipalities in the south-eastern Mexican State of Chiapas, and particularly on its jewel, well known to tourists — San Cristobal de Las Casas.

The introduction of nanotechnology into our civil life and warfare is expected to influence the application and interpretation of the existing rules of international humanitarian law. This article examines the challenges posed to international humanitarian law by the widespread use of nanotechnology in light of four basic rules of international humanitarian law: (1) the obligation to ensure the legality of weapons; (2) distinction; (3) proportionality; and (4) precaution. It concludes by identifying three areas of concern, which arise from widespread use of nanotechnology, for the application of international humanitarian law.

This issue of the International Review of the Red Cross addresses the importance of understanding armed groups and the norms by which they are bound. One way of gaining insight into armed groups and engaging with them on improving respect for the law is to examine the rules and decisions that they choose to adopt.

In 2008, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) published a study on increasing the respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) in non-international armed conflicts.1 The study identified codes of conduct as one of the legal tools to improve compliance of armed groups with IHL.2 While they do not guarantee respect for the law, codes of conduct provide an important glimpse into the ideological and organizational structure of an armed group, its chain of command, and the rights and obligations that the hierarchy of the armed group chooses to bestow on its members. Furthermore, codes of conduct can provide a basis upon which legal representations can be made and accountability required regarding norms of IHL.3

Several authors in this edition of the Review discuss the importance of codes of conducts for understanding and engaging with armed groups.4 The Review has thus decided to include a collection5 of codes of conduct, or relevant extracts thereof.6 All materials in this collection are publicly available.7 They originate from various geographic areas and time periods – from China in 1947 to Libya in 2011 – and provide an insight into different armed groups' views of and appreciation of humanitarian norms.8 The publication of these codes of conduct does not in any way imply endorsement by the Review of the content of these documents.

Before the International Criminal Court (ICC) came into being, world public attention was focused on issues such as the significance of the Court's establishment, the importance of implementing international criminal justice and the time when the Rome Statute could enter into force. Once the Court was established, attention naturally turned to practical issues, such as whether it would be able to operate normally and perform its historic mission. The question of whether the ICC can operate effectively and perform its mission largely depends on the scope and degree of co-operation provided to it by states. This co-operation concerns not only states party to the ICC but also non-party states. This article offers to explore the obligation of non-party states to co-operate under international law, the prospects of their co-operation and the legal consequences of non-co-operation. The author suggests that beyond the general principle of the law of treaties according to which treaties are binding only on states parties, when viewed in the light of other general principles of international law, co-operation with the ICC is no longer voluntary in nature, but is instead obligatory in the sense of customary international law. Therefore, while a state may not have acceded to the ICC, it may still be subject to an obligation to co-operate with it in certain cases.

Modern armed forces are employed in a wide array of operations that range from peacetime riot control to outright international armed conflict. Classifying these various scenarios to determine the applicable international law is rendered difficult by both the lack of clarity inherent in the law and the political factors that tend to enter the decision-making process. The author describes the major challenges of legal classification facing the military leadership, and proposes a solution to ensure that the intended beneficiaries of the law – from soldiers to civilians – do indeed receive its protection.

At first glance, merely the ‘ordering’ of displacement seems to be prohibited in non-international armed conflict. However, after interpreting Article 17(1) AP II and Rule 129(B) of the ICRC Customary Law Study with particular regard to State practice and opinio juris, the author concludes that these norms prohibit forced displacement regardless of whether it is ordered or not. On the other hand, the ICC Elements of Crimes for the crime of forced displacement under Article 8(2)(e)(viii) ICC Statute require an order. It remains to be seen whether the ICC adopts that interpretation in its jurisprudence.

Having established that massive human rights violations in armed conflict constitute a threat to peace and that women are the most severely affected by the scourge of war, the Security Council has since 1999 adopted a number of resolutions intended specifically for this group. These instruments contribute to the development of humanitarian law applicable to women and acknowledge the value of active participation by women in peace efforts. The following article first analyses the foundations on which the Council has been able to assume responsibility for protecting women in situations of armed conflict, and then considers the actual protection it provides. It concludes that the Council has had varying success in this role, pointing out that the thematic and declaratory resolutions on which it is largely based are not binding and therefore, they are relatively effective only as regards their provisions committing United Nations bodies. The author proposes that the Council's role could be better accomplished through situational resolutions than through resolutions declaratory of international law.

Private security and military companies have become a ubiquitous part of modern armed conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. Their diverse clients include governments in the developed and developing world alike, non-state belligerents, international corporations, non-governmental organizations, the United Nations, and private individuals. The implications of this proliferation of private security and military companies for international humanitarian law and human rights are only beginning to be appreciated, as potential violations and misconduct by their employees have come to light in Iraq and Afghanistan. The author critically examines the theoretical risks posed by private military and security company activity with respect to violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, together with the incentives that these companies have to comply with those norms. Empirical evidence is also presented to expand on this theoretical framework. Taking a multidisciplinary approach, the author draws on law, international relations theory, criminology, economics, corporate strategy and political economy, as well as psychology and sociology, to analyse the competing “risk-factors” and “compliance levers” that interact at each level of private military and security company activity to enhance or reduce the likelihood of a violation occurring. These findings are then applied by the author to assess emergent measures to deal with private security and military companies outside the legal sphere, including a programme of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the advent of the International Peace Operations Association.

What is the position of non-state armed groups in public international law, a system conceived for and by states? This article considers the question, mainly in the light of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. It shows that, while armed groups essentially trigger the application of jus ad bellum, they are not themselves endowed with a right to peace. Jus in bello confers rights and obligations on armed groups, but in the context of an unequal relationship with the state. This inequality before the law is strikingly illustrated by the regulation of detention practised by armed groups in non-international armed conflicts. Despite the significant role that they play in modern-day conflicts, armed groups constitute an ‘anomaly’ in a legal system that continues to be state-centric.

This article explores the law governing the maintenance of public order and safety during belligerent occupation. Given the potential for widespread violence associated with international armed conflict, such as occurred in 2003–2004 in Iraq, it is inevitable that military and police forces will be engaged in activities that interface and overlap. Human-rights-based norms governing law enforcement, such as the right to life, are found in humanitarian law, permitting an application of both law enforcement and conduct of hostilities norms under that body of law. This results in the simultaneous application of these norms through both humanitarian and human rights law, which ultimately enhances the protection of inhabitants of the occupied territory.

Neutrality and independence continue to be part of the four core humanitarian principles, in addition to humanity and impartiality. Promoting these principles needs to go hand in hand with efforts to apply and implement them. Applying neutrality and independence is a considerable undertaking. This article explains the various aspects of these two principles that are crucial for understanding and applying them. The author suggests that these aspects should be taken into account in assessing whether humanitarian organizations are managing to uphold the principles. In turn, these assessments will enable humanitarian organizations and other stakeholders in humanitarian action to understand what the opportunities and obstacles are in applying independence and neutrality.