If recent estimates are to be believed, more than two million people may have died in the famine that engulfed North Korea in 1997 and 1998. In 1997, the United Nations estimated that 4.7 million North Koreans were in danger of starvation. In response, the international community pledged food aid. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies presented an expanded appeal for aid in June 1997. In January 1998, the World Food Programme (WFP) launched its biggest appeal, setting a target of 380 million US dollars in food aid, nearly double the amount requested for 1997. Yet, the international community has met resistance in attempting to assist North Koreans suffering from malnutrition and facing starvation.

This article looks at business activities in violent and fragile environments through an armed violence lens and explores the role of business in armed violence reduction and prevention (AVRP) strategies. The article argues that the transformation of armed violence patterns over the last decade requires a new optic on a subject that has traditionally been discussed in the context of ‘business and peace’ or ‘business and conflict’, and of armed violence related to inter- or intra-state armed conflict. The article sets out to better understand how different constituencies have dealt with the role of the private sector in reducing armed violence, and to connect the dots between various scholarly and practice communities to identify entry points for AVRP strategies across sectors and institutions. The article suggests that such entry points exist in relation to the costing of armed violence and civic observatories.

The conduct of hostilities in urban areas is inherently difficult, particularly with respect to the protection of civilians. International humanitarian law places restraints on both attackers and defenders. While much is written about the obligations of attackers with respect to protecting civilians, much less attention has been paid to the defender's obligations. These obligations are routinely referred to as “passive precautions” or “precautions against the effects of attacks” and are codified in Article 58 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Article 58 requires parties, “to the maximum extent feasible”, to remove civilians and civilian objects from the vicinity of military objectives, to avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas, and to take other necessary precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects from the dangers resulting from military operations.

Even though they are limited by only requiring those actions which are feasible, the obligations placed on the defender are far from trivial and, if applied in good faith, would certainly provide much needed protections to civilians in armed conflict, particularly in times of urban conflict. However, this ever-increasing urbanization is creating significant pressure on the doctrine of precautions in defence, stretching the “feasibility” standard beyond its capacity to adequately protect civilians. On the other hand, the emergence of advanced technology provides a mechanism for defenders to more easily and more fully comply with their obligations to segregate or protect the civilian population.

For the customary obligation of “precautions against the effects of attacks” to maintain its effectiveness, particularly in urban areas of conflict, the understanding of feasibility and what is “practicable” in current urbanized armed conflicts will have to expand, increasing the practical responsibilities on the defender, including through the use of modern technology. Moreover, imposing criminal responsibility when appropriate and feasible precautions are not taken will rectify the perceived imbalance between the responsibilities of the attacker and those of the defender.

Gerald Draper (1914–1989) was the foremost specialist in humanitarian law of his generation in the United Kingdom, and was well-respected in the law of war community worldwide. He was a Military Prosecutor in the war crimes trials in Germany after the Second World War, and following his retirement from the Army Legal Staff became a distinguished academic, finishing as Professor of Law at the University of Sussex. Draper was a delegate to many International Conferences of the Red Cross as well as to the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the Additional Protocols of 1977.

This article discusses the role of archives of transitional justice and “dealing with the past” (DWP) mechanisms when determining the fate of missing persons. The concept of dealing with the past, the terms “enforced disappearance” and “missing person”, and the specific role of archives in periods of transition are examined. Subsequently, specific questions and challenges related to access and use of archives by DWP mechanisms, including those mechanisms with a mandate to determine the fate of missing persons, are described. Many questions related to access to archives, information management and preservation of records are similarly applicable to DWP mechanisms in general and to specific mechanisms mandated to search for missing persons. The article provides some examples of States’ obligations related to maintaining and providing access to archives that could assist in the search for missing persons under international law and policy. The article concludes by emphasizing the importance of the preservation and protection of archives relevant for dealing with the past. It further highlights the need to grant DWP mechanisms, especially those aimed at determining the fate of missing persons, access to those archives.

In recent years there have been repeated calls for the establishment of so-called “safe areas” to protect civilians from the effects of hostilities in a number of contexts. The present article presents the international law framework relevant to the establishment and operation of such areas: the provisions of international humanitarian law on protected zones; the rules regulating resort to armed force, Security Council authorization and mandates for the establishment of such areas by multinational forces in the absence of agreement between belligerents; and the refugee and international human rights issues raised by such zones. Using the example of the “protection of civilians sites” in South Sudan, the article then highlights some of the operational challenges raised by safe areas. It concludes with some reflections on how to enhance the likelihood that belligerents will establish such protected zones in the future.

Nowadays, there exists an international movement towards the extensive recognition as cultural heritage, or “heritagization”, of areas where wars, genocides and massacres have taken place. The phenomenon of “seeing” mass death, called “dark tourism” or the “tourism of desolation”, has become both an aim and a destination for visitors. The article examines this heritagization, with an emphasis on the memorials of the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi of Rwanda.

The theme of this paper is not an easy one. The difficulty of our subject is twofold: on the one hand, two of its three facets (peace and human rights) raise conceptual and interpretative problems; on the other hand, to deal with them together would involve finding a common factor, something which is not obvious even—perhaps especially—within the limited framework of the Red Cross movement.

During its war against the armed nationalist movement fighting for Algerian independence (1954–62), France made extensive use of torture, for which the main justification given was the terrorism employed by the National Liberation Front, even though such terrorist violence was neither the nationalists' main form of action nor the French army's true target. Research into the methods used and the aims pursued challenges that justification, shedding light on the way in which torture really operates in a war of this kind, even though the Algerian War has been presented as a model for many subsequent conflict situations.

Historical events since 1939 and the only partially completed codification of the law of air warfare have made it one of the most controversial areas of the law of war. Though Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions does contain provisions governing air warfare, it has not yet assumed its due significance owing to the hesitancy shown in ratifying it. All the more importance must therefore be attributed to the historical development of such rules.

There are several aspects to reviewing the role of punishment in ensuring greater respect for international humanitarian law. First, there is the question of improving compliance with the law, second, the focus on the punishment itself and, third, the characteristics of the perpetrators. The situation of armed groups is dealt with separately. The article also examines transitional justice as an accompanying measure and the problem of how to take care of the victims. Finally, suggestions are presented which could help the parties concerned in the establishment of a system of sanctions capable of having a lasting influence on the conduct of weapon bearers so as to obtain greater respect for international humanitarian law.

This article provides an overview of the impact of United Nations (UN) sanctions and counterterrorism (CT) measures on humanitarian action. The mandatory requirements of UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373 on member States to prohibit the provision of “funds, financial assets or economic resources” to terrorists complicates the work of humanitarian actors delivering assistance in areas where groups designated under the 1267 regime control territory. After explaining the impact of sanctions and CT measures on humanitarian actors, the article explores three primary sets of challenges encountered by such actors: (1) lack of clarity and adequate legal protection for carrying out humanitarian activities in countries subject to sanctions or areas in which designated entities operate; (2) financial access difficulties or de-risking by financial institutions limiting the ability of non-profit organizations (NPOs) to transfer funds to higher-risk jurisdictions due to banks’ risk aversion or fear of regulatory scrutiny of such transactions; and (3) conditions placed in funding contracts by donors effectively offloading CT and sanctions risks onto beneficiaries. The article analyzes experience with UN humanitarian carve-outs (exceptions as employed in the Somalia sanctions regime and case-by-case exemptions utilized in the North Korea regime), explaining why exceptions are the optimal solution for humanitarian actors. New data are presented indicating that the scope and scale of financial access difficulties experienced by NPOs have grown. Financial institutions, concerned about regulatory requirements to counter terrorism financing, are increasingly reluctant to provide banking services to NPOs working in highly sanctioned jurisdictions, and the resulting de-risking by banks results in significant problems for humanitarian organizations needing to move funds abroad. Additionally, contractual conditions related to CT and sanctions compliance are routinely employed by donors, resulting in an offloading of risk onto recipients without appropriate clarity and guidance from donors. Numerous initiatives in recent years have called attention to the challenges that humanitarians face: stakeholder dialogues, high-level meetings and other discussion fora promote broader understanding among participants and acknowledgement of the impacts that these polices have on humanitarian action. UN action to renew the 1267 regime's mandate and the consideration of a humanitarian carve-out in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Taliban's takeover represent opportunities to reform sanctions in order to better protect humanitarian action. Recommendations are presented for each of the three sets of challenges, with an urgent call for the Security Council to embrace the opportunity for reform and more effectively balance the equally critical objectives of countering terrorism and safeguarding humanitarian action.

Prévenir et limiter la souffrance, tel est le rôle principal de la profession médicale. Dans cet article, l'auteur décrit les tâches spécifiques qui incombent au personnel médical, en particulier aux médecins, en situation de conflit ou de guerre. Après avoir examiné, notamment, la position du médecin face à la politique, la neutralité du personnel médical et les possibilités quʼil a d'influencer le choix des méthodes et moyens de guerre que feront les belligérants, l'auteur définit les trois rôles que le médecin peut et doit assumer :

• mettre à disposition ses connaissances professionnelles et son expérience afin de limiter la souffrance des victimes de conflits armés ;

• sur la base de l'expérience acquise lors de conflits, tenter de réduire tout ce qui peut provoquer la souffrance ;

• tenter d'influencer l'opinion publique en luttant contre le risque de tomber dans le piège de la guerre « propre », par des témoignages sur le vrai visage de la souffrance quʼelle engendre.

Avec son expérience professionnelle unique et l'autorité que lui conjere sa tâche, le médecin peut, mieux que quiconque, tenter de rendre la guerre moins cruelle.

It is generally acknowledged by the international community that the taking of hostages is one of the most vile and reprehensible of acts. This crime violates fundamental individual rights—the right to life, to liberty and to security—that are protected by binding legal instruments such as the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the worldwide level, and the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights and the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the regional level. The United Nations General Assembly has stated that the taking of hostages is an act which places innocent human lives in danger and violates human dignity.

The questions facing the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement today are no different from those with which the Movement began: What is the best way to help? How can we give immediate aid and also provide long-term protection? To answer these questions we have to go back to the early years of the Movement.

Cette première phrase du préambule de la Constitution de l'organisation Mondiale de la Santé nous donne la définition du terme santé tel qu'on l'entend aujourd'hui dans son acception la plus étendue. Nous sommes très loin, on le voit, du concept individuel de santé : absence de maladie chez un être donné. Il s'agit là de la conception sociale intégrate de la santé.

This article discusses some of the challenges related to the beginning of application of international humanitarian law (IHL). It concludes that IHL pertaining to international armed conflicts begins to apply as soon as one State employs force in the territory of another State without the latter's consent, provided that the violence is of a collective nature. In the case of non-international armed conflicts, this article acknowledges that it is now well settled that the two key criteria are the organization of the parties to the conflict and the level of intensity of the violence. This article shows however that some of the challenges inherent to the beginning of application of IHL make it almost impossible to identify a very single point in time at which it begins to become applicable, be it for international armed conflicts, including occupation, or non-international armed conflicts.

This article will briefly present a number of international human rights law considerations related to the topic of citizenship stripping of foreign fighters, that is: “individuals, driven mainly by ideology, religion and/or kinship, who leave their country of origin or their country of habitual residence to join a party engaged in an armed conflict”, most notably the conflict in Syria and Iraq. After that, the article will focus on considerations in the context of international humanitarian law, which have been less frequently the subject of academic debate. This contribution concludes that citizenship stripping is not only highly problematic under international human rights law, but also from the perspective of international humanitarian law. The measure – which is likely to constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment – violates Article 3 Common to the four Geneva Conventions, but it also undermines accountability for international humanitarian law violations already committed and can engender new violations through the non-removal of the suspect from the conflict zone. One of the few positive sides of the connection between the measure and international humanitarian law is that even if nationality is deprived, this will not have an effect on the international humanitarian law obligation to treat that deprived person humanely. In that sense, international humanitarian law provides a welcome – albeit temporary – safety net of decent treatment for people who have become victims of countries’ refusal to take responsibility for their own citizens.