In this contribution, respect for international humanitarian law among combatants is considered from a social psychological perspective. According to this perspective, the social identities derived by individuals from their membership of social groups provide norms and values used by the individual to interpret events, form opinions and decide upon a course of action. We argue that group identities are particularly salient in combat situations, and that they have a profound influence on combatants' decisions to respect or violate international humanitarian law.

On 3 October 2015, the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Trauma Centre in Kunduz, Afghanistan was bombed during a US–Afghan joint military operation to retake the city. Even before that night, attacks on health-care facilities in war zones were already a worrying trend and a major concern for humanitarian organizations. Such attacks have led both MSF and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to launch campaigns1 addressing the need for greater protection of the medical mission in situations of armed conflict. Nonetheless, the scale and specific context of the attack on the Kunduz Trauma Centre have given rise to various specific investigations2 and provoked many more questions that this article will explore. The article will delve into the “many mistakes” scenario that has been presented by the US investigation in order to critically analyze whether these mistakes may originate from either incorrect or biased interpretations or implementation of international humanitarian law.

The current legal regime relative to occupation is no longer based solely on the contributions made by customary law and treaty-based law as set forth in the law of The Hague and the law of Geneva. It has undergone a thorough change with the progressive recognition of the applicability of human rights law to the situations which it governs, and their complementarity has been highlighted on several occasions. The question of the interrelation of international humanitarian law and human rights is not resolved merely by analysing their respective areas of application. The author examines the issue at the level of their individual rules. He considers whether the rules of international humanitarian law are confirmed, complemented, relativized or even contradicted by those deriving from human rights. The analysis focuses more particularly on the interrelation of the law of occupation and economic, social and cultural rights by concentrating on the promotion of adequate standards of living (right to food, right to health) and respect for property.

The ultimate purpose of dissemination of and compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) is to mitigate the effects of armed conflict and provide the best possible protection for its victims. At the same time, IHL fosters wider acceptance of the ideals of humanity and peace between peoples. The relationship between IHL, the struggle for peace and the prohibition of the use of force is becoming ever clearer as the realization grows that lasting peace, development and peaceful international co-operation can be achieved only on the basis of compliance with international law and respect for human life and dignity.

On 28 November 2003, the States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) adopted a new protocol on explosive remnants of war. This new instrument of international humanitarian law, the fifth protocol to the CCW, is an important addition to the efforts to reduce the death, injury and suffering caused by the explosive munitions that remain after the end of an armed conflict. Protocol V establishes new rules that require the parties to a conflict to clear explosive remnants of war, to take measures to protect civilians from the effects of these weapons and to assist the efforts of international and non-governmental organizations working in these areas. If widely adhered to and fully implemented, it has the potential to significantly reduce the civilian casualties that regularly occur after the end of hostilities and to minimize the long-term socio-economic consequences that explosive remnants of war inflict on war-affected countries. It complements the work of the international community to reduce the suffering caused by anti-personnel landmines.

Armed drones pose a major threat to the general prohibition on the inter-state use of force and to respect for human rights. On the battlefield, in a situation of armed conflict, the use of armed drones may be able to satisfy the fundamental international humanitarian law rules of distinction and proportionality (although attributing international criminal responsibility for their unlawful use may prove a significant challenge). Away from the battlefield, the use of drone strikes will often amount to a violation of fundamental human rights. Greater clarity on the applicable legal regime along with restraints to prevent the further proliferation of drone technology are urgently needed.

The war in Syria has lasted for six years and has led to massive destruction and loss of life. Stymieing international peace efforts from the outset, there is increasing doubt that the conflict will reach a resolution or political settlement in the near future. This frustration has triggered an appetite among States, civil society and the international community for finite and concrete measures that can contribute to greater protection and compliance with international law. A recent constellation of events around the protection of cultural property appears to herald a shift in the response of the international community toward prescribing practical and actionable measures for third-party States. Drawing on the responsibility of third States “to respect and ensure respect for” international humanitarian law, this article examines the legal framework protecting cultural property and recent innovative protection responses that contribute to ensuring compliance with international law in Syria, short of military assistance and intervention.

International human rights law abhors a legal black hole. It applies wherever a State exercises its jurisdiction, not only in peacetime but also during armed conflict, as a compliment to humanitarian law. The deprivation of liberty is subject to certain conditions, and even initially lawful detention becomes arbitrary and contrary to law if it is not subject to periodic review. Indefinite detention is incompatible with Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. While temporary derogation from this provision is allowed in Article 4 of the ICCPR, such derogation is only possible “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation” and “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” Persons deprived of their liberty are entitled to a prompt trial or release, and in cases of arbitrary detention, they are entitled to compensation. Neither the war on terror nor restrictive immigration policies justify indefinite detention.

Although there are areas of uncertainty and overlap, authorizations for maritime law enforcement operations are beholden to a different regime from that which governs the conduct of armed conflict at sea. This article seeks to briefly describe five regularly employed authorizations for maritime law enforcement operations at sea: flag State consent, agreed pre-authorization, coastal State jurisdiction, UN Security Council resolutions, and the right of visit.

Sexual violence and rape in armed conflicts are widespread phenomena, with devastating consequences. Over the last thirty years, our understanding of these phenomena has significantly improved. Today humanitarian and health professionals understand better the reality, scale and impact of sexual violence on the personal, physical, social and mental health of individuals and communities. Rape is recognized to have a dehumanizing effect, as much as torture or mass violence. Major efforts are put into providing an effective and ethical response, with respect and sympathy to the survivors. Health and humanitarian assistance contribute to the healing and resilience of survivors and communities. Looking forward, programmes must be centred on the person, promoting their autonomy and dignity, and integrating medical, psychosocial and socio-economical responses.

Since the 1990s, the concept of ‘state-building’ has become the means by which intervenors have attempted to tackle ‘state failure/fragility’. The ‘ideal’ referred to when attempting to do this – both theoretically and in practice – has been that of the classic ‘nation-state’ as developed by Max Weber. To answer the question posed by the title above, the article first looks generally at the evolution of the current state-building paradigm and global governance discourse. Second, a background of historical attempts at state-building in Afghanistan is given. Third, an assessment is made of the international community's approach to Afghanistan since 2001. Finally, the appropriateness of replicating a Weberian state-building model onto more traditional societies such as Afghanistan – where modes of governance and authority are often informal, complex, and characterized by historical and charismatic sources of legitimacy – is addressed. Until now, such contexts have barely been acknowledged, still less understood, by intervenors. Today, however, some academics are beginning to outline an alternative response to state fragility, recognizing more traditional sources of legitimacy and a hybridity of political order.

Since the constituent Conference in October 1863, which gave birth to the Red Cross,1 the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent has met on thirty occasions. The first meeting took place in Paris in 1867 and the thirtieth in Geneva in November 2007. What contribution has the Conference made to the development of international humanitarian law and humanitarian action? What are the main challenges that the Conference has had to face? Where has it succeeded and where has it failed? These are the questions that this article seeks to answer.

Au cours des années 90, l'intérêt de la recherche et de la pratique sʼest tourné vers la prévention de conflits, cʼest-à-dire toute activité tendant à gérer ou à résoudre des situations conflictuelles avant quʼelles ne dégénèrent en affrontement ouvert et violent. Cet article examine les possibilités et les chances de succès d'actions de prévention entreprises, soit par un État, soit dans un contexte multilatéral. L'expérience des dernières années démontre clairement que les États ne souhaitent pas sʼexposer dans un conflit qui ne les concerne pas directement. Les conflits d'aujour d'hui en appellent done à des stratégies plus complexes, et seule une approche multilatérale a une chance d'aboutir à des résultats satisfaisants. Il existe aujourd'hui un grand nombre d'organisations gouvernementales et non gouvernementales — universelles et régionales, grandes et petites —, chacune avec un mode d'action bien distinct, ce qui permet l'engagement de l'une ou de l'autre, selon les données de la situation.

In recent years, there has been more and more interaction and engagement between “faith-based” organizations (FBOs) and secular humanitarian organizations. While humanitarian organizations operate under the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, it is often believed that faith-based organizations cannot be neutral or impartial due to their religious identity and agenda. Drawing on the research of Islamic Relief Worldwide, this article looks critically at connections that can be drawn between Islamic religious principles and those upheld as key to secular humanitarian action. The article outlines the Islamic maqasid al-Shari'ah framework as an example of how religious-based approaches can provide a basis for humanitarian action that is both relevant to Islamic communities and complementary to humanitarian principles.

The rehabilitation of essential services infrastructure following hostilities, whether during a conflict or post-conflict, is a complex undertaking. This is made more complicated in protracted conflicts due to the continuing cycle of damage and expedient repair amid changing demands. The rehabilitation paradigm that was developed for the successful post-World War II rehabilitation of Germany and Japan has been less successful since. There are a myriad of conflicting interests that impede its application, yet the issue consistently comes down to a lack of systems-level understanding of the current situation on the ground and a lack of alignment between what is delivered and the actual local need. This article proposes a novel conceptual framework to address this, affording a greater “system of systems” understanding of the local essential services and how they can be restored to reflect the changed needs of the local population that has itself been changed by the conflict. The recommendations draw on heuristic practice and commercially available tools to provide a practicable approach to restoring infrastructure function in order to enable essential services that are resilient to temporary returns to violence and support the overall rehabilitation of the affected community.

This article modestly seeks to address some of the various matters related to transitional justice and focuses on whether penal repression for violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law must be insisted upon in all situations, or if there are cases where other action, in particular amnesties, would be more appropriate to ensure national reconciliation or the peaceful development of a country. Dilemmas clearly exist in responding to such choices, calling for the ability to maintain a judicious balancing act between competing important interests, including the most basic decision of whether or not to provoke the dragon on the patio.

Protectionist frames of children as passive, uncomprehending victims characterize the international architecture of responding to children in war. However, stories such as those in children's war memoirs draw attention to the agency and capacity of children to negotiate and navigate distinct traumas and experiences in war. Children experience particular vulnerabilities and risks in conflict zones and their potential as contributors to the solutions to war must also be taken seriously. Children's authoritative voices in memoir writing reveal the limitations of protectionist-dominated approaches and offer a rationale for taking the participatory elements of international humanitarian mechanisms and responses to conflict more seriously. Such a move may help address the comprehensive silencing of children's voices in the institutional architecture concerned with children in war.