In recent years, experimental economics has seen a rise in the collection and analysis of choice-process data, such as team communication transcripts. The main purpose of this paper is to understand whether the collection of team communication data influences how individuals reason and behave as they enter the team deliberation process, i.e. before any communication exchange. Such an influence would imply that team setups have limited validity to speak to individual reasoning processes. Our treatment manipulations allow us to isolate the effects of (1) belonging to a team, (2) actively suggesting an action to the team partner, and (3) justifying the suggestion in a written text to the team partner. Across three different tasks, we find no systematic evidence of changed suggestions and altered individual sophistication due to changes in aspects (1)–(3) of our experimental design. We thus find no threat to said validity of team setups. In addition to investigating how the team setup affects individual behavior before communication, we also investigate the sophistication of decisions after the communication. We find that sophisticated strategies are more persuasive than unsophisticated strategies, especially when communication includes written justifications, thereby explaining why teams are more sophisticated and proving rich communication to be fruitful.

The highly popular belief that rent-control leads to an increase in the amount of affordable housing is in contradiction with ample empirical evidence and congruent theoretical explanations. It can therefore be qualified as a misconception. We present the results of a preregistered on-line experiment in which we study how to dispel this misconception using a refutational approach in two different formats, a video and a text. We find that the refutational video has a significantly higher positive impact on revising the misconception than a refutational text. This effect is driven by individuals who initially agreed with it and depart from it after the treatment. The refutational text, in turn, does not have a significant impact relative to a non-refutational text. Higher cognitive reflective ability is positively associated with revising beliefs in all interventions. Our research shows that visual communication effectively reduces the gap between scientific economic knowledge and the views of citizens.

Gallice and Monzón (Econ J 129(621):2137–2154, 2019) present present a natural environment that sustains full co-operation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. They demonstrate that in a sequential public goods game, where agents lack knowledge of their position in the sequence but can observe some predecessors’ actions, full contribution emerges in equilibrium due to agents’ incentive to induce potential successors to follow suit. In this study, we aim to test the theoretical predictions of this model through an economic experiment. We conducted three treatments, varying the amount of information about past actions that a subject can observe, as well as their positional awareness. Through rigorous structural econometric analysis, we found that approximately 25% of the subjects behaved in line with the theoretical predictions. However, we also observed the presence of alternative behavioural types among the remaining subjects. The majority were classified as conditional co-operators, showing a willingness to cooperate based on others’ actions. Some subjects exhibited altruistic tendencies, while only a small minority engaged in free-riding behaviour.

We report laboratory evidence on the voluntary provision of threshold public goods when the exact location of the threshold is not known. Our experimental treatments explicitly compare two prominent technologies, summation, and weakest link. Uncertainty in threshold location is particularly detrimental to threshold attainment under weakest link, where low contributions by one subject cannot be compensated by others. In contrast, threshold uncertainty does not affect contributions under summation. We demonstrate that non-binding pledges improve the chances of threshold attainment under both technologies, particularly under weakest link.

Most multilateral bargaining models predict bargaining power to emanate from pivotality—a party’s ability to form different majority coalitions. However, this prediction contrasts with the empirical observation that negotiations in parliamentary democracies typically result in payoffs proportional to parties’ vote shares. Proportionate profits suggest equality rather than pivotality drives results. We design an experiment to study when bargaining outcomes reflect pivotality versus proportionality. We find that commitment timing is a crucial institutional factor moderating bargaining power. Payoffs are close to proportional if bargainers can commit to majority coalitions before committing to how to share the pie, but pivotality dictates outcomes otherwise. Our results help explain Gamson’s Law, a long-standing puzzle in the legislative bargaining literature.

We conduct a field experiment with Amazon Mechanical Turk (“AMT”) workers to causally assess the effect of introducing a control mechanism in an existing work relationship on workers’ performance on tasks of varying difficulty. We find that introducing control significantly reduces performance. This reduction occurs primarily on challenging tasks, while performance on simple tasks is unaffected. The negative effects are primarily driven by workers who exhibit non-pecuniary motivation in the absence of control. Our results show that there are adverse effects of control, and they suggest that these adverse effects are of particular concern to firms that rely on high performance on challenging tasks.

Teamwork has become increasingly important in modern organizations and the labor market. Yet, little is known about the role of self-confidence in teamwork. In this paper, we present evidence from a laboratory experiment using a team effort task. Effort and ability are complements and there are synergies between teammates’ efforts. We exogenously manipulate subjects’ self-confidence about their ability using easy and hard general knowledge quizzes. We find that overconfidence leads to more effort, less free riding, and higher team revenue. This finding is primarily due to a direct effect of overconfidence on own effort provision, while there is no evidence that subjects strategically respond to the teammate’s overconfidence.

We study how people solve the optimal stopping problem of buying an airline ticket. Over a set of problems, people were given 12 opportunities to buy a ticket ranging from 12 months before travel to 1 day before. The distributions from which prices were sampled changed over time, following patterns observed in industry analysis of flight ticket pricing. We characterize the optimal decision process in terms of a set of thresholds that set the maximum purchase price for each time point. In a behavioral analysis, we find that the average price people pay is above the optimal, that there is little evidence people learn over the sequence of problems, but that there are likely significant individual differences in the way people make decisions. In a model-based analysis, we propose a set of nine possible decision strategies, based on how purchasing probabilities change according to time and the price of the ticket. Using Bayesian latent-mixture methods, we infer the strategies used by the participants, finding that some use purely time-based strategies, while others also attend to the price of the tickets. We conclude by noting the limitations in the strategies as accounts of people's decision making, highlighting the need to consider sequential effects and other context effects on purchasing behavior.

This study investigates the mechanisms driving the effectiveness of free-form communication in promoting cooperation within a sequential social dilemma game. We hypothesize that the self-constructing nature of free-form communication enhances the sincerity of messages and increases the disutility of dishonoring promises. Our experimental results demonstrate that free-form messages outperform both restricted promises and treatments where subjects select and use previously constructed free-form messages. Interestingly, we find that selected free-form messages and restricted promises achieve similar levels of cooperation. We observe that free-form messages with higher sincerity increase the likelihood of high-price and high-quality choices, thereby promoting cooperation. These messages frequently include promises and honesty, while threats do not promote cooperation. Our findings emphasize the crucial role of the self-constructed nature of free-form messages in promoting cooperation, exceeding the impact of message content compared to restricted communication protocols.

Research from the last four decades suggests that fairness plays an important role in economic transactions. However, the vast majority of this research investigates behavior in an environment where agents are fully informed. We develop a new experimental paradigm—nesting the widely used ultimatum game—and find that fairness has less impact on outcomes when agents are less informed. As we remove information, offers become less generous and unfair offers are more likely to be accepted.

We experimentally test a model of public good bargaining due to Bowen et al. (Am Econ Rev 104:2941–2974, 2014) and compare two institutions governing bargaining over public good allocations. The setup involves two parties negotiating the distribution of a fixed endowment between a public good and each party’s individual account. Parties attach either high or low weight to the public good and the difference in these weights reflects the degree of polarization. Under discretionary bargaining rules, the status quo default allocation to the group account (in the event of disagreement) is zero while under the mandatory bargaining rule it is equal to the level last agreed upon. The mandatory rule thus creates a dynamic relationship between current decisions and future payoffs, and our experiment tests the theoretical prediction that the efficient level of public good is provided under the mandatory rule while the level of public good funding is at a sub-optimal level under the discretionary rule. Consistent with the theory, we find that proposers (particularly those attaching high weight to the public good) propose significantly greater allocations to the public good under mandatory rules than under discretionary rules and this result is strengthened with an increase in polarization. Still, public good allocations under mandatory rules fall short of steady state predictions, primarily due to fairness concerns that prevent proposers from exercising full proposer power.

The present study transforms subjective conflict perceptions into formally defined games, tests the reliability of the transformation, and explores the properties of several conflict scenarios. To this end we: (i) develop an illustration-based method that transforms implicit perceptions of expected outcomes and experiences into sets of structured numerical values, termed subjective game structures; (ii) develop a reliability index that compares the properties of two subjective games, allowing to test the consistency of repeatedly elicited games; (iii) empirically test game perceptions across eight conflict scenarios; and (iv) interpret the results in terms of two game taxonomies. The results reveal the capacity of the applied methods to transform vague social scenarios into reliable formal games, point to natural solutions, and show the distribution of games that characterizes each conflict scenario. The newly developed model and tools provide a potent instrument for studying a diverse array of social interactions, ranging from interpersonal relations to trade, political conflicts, and war. They represent invaluable resources for conducting polls, examining implicit attitudes, and assisting in the formulation of political, commercial, and social policies.

We introduce and test a stylized model of dynamic pricing under duopolistic competition. In our model, a consumer receives alternating price offers between two retailers over an indefinite number of periods so that the game or “season” terminates with a fixed probability after each period. The two retailers do not know the valuation of the consumer for the good they are competing to sell to the consumer, but they have common knowledge about the probability distribution of the valuation. Our equilibrium analysis suggests that price offers decrease exponentially across periods over the season. Moreover, when there are multiple consumers in the game, as long as their valuations are ex ante independently and identically distributed, the equilibrium predictions are the same regardless of the number of consumers. An experiment on the model showed that subjects acting as retailers often overpriced relative to equilibrium predictions. In addition, the theoretical invariance with respect to the number of consumers did not hold: consumers seemed to be more prone to strategic waiting in the first period of the season when there were multiple consumers (compared with when there was only a single consumer), leading to a decrease in the per-consumer payoff of the retailer who made the price offer in the first period and a corresponding increase in per-consumer payoff of the other retailer. There is also evidence of within-session evolution that led to lower retailer prices that were closer to equilibrium predictions, and higher tendency for consumer strategic waiting, as the session progressed.

We present experimental evidence for decision settings where public good providers compete for endogenous rewards which are donations (transfers) offered by outside donors. Donors receive benefits from public good provision but cannot provide the good themselves. The performance of three competition mechanisms is examined in relation to the level of public good provision and transfers offered by donors. In addition to a contest where transfers received by public good providers are proportional to effort, we study two contests with exclusion from transfers, namely a winner-takes-all and a loser-gets-nothing. We compare behavior in these three decision settings to the default setting of no-contest (no-transfers). Results for this novel decision environment with endogenous transfers show that donors offer transfers (contest prizes) at similar levels across contests and contributions to the public good are not significantly different in the three contests settings, but are consistently and significantly higher in all contests compared to the setting with no-transfers. Initially, the winner-takes-all setting leads to a significantly higher increase in public good contributions compared to the other two contests; but this difference diminishes across decision rounds.

We study the provision problem of an asymmetrically valued public project using a novel mechanism proposed by Van Essen and Walker (2017). Under this mechanism, each player simultaneously submits a price (either a contribution or a requested compensation) and a desired project quantity. In our context, two non-hosts interact with the project’s host, who gets harmed by provision. The minimum submitted quantity is provided if the contributions are sufficient to cover the building costs and the host’s requested compensation. We test the efficiency-enhancing effects of communication and find that, although it led to larger provided quantities, the probability of provision is unaffected, and the non-hosts kept most of the efficiency surplus. Moreover, the effect of communication disappears in settings where the host demands a larger compensation in equilibrium. The coding of chat logs reveals that veto threats are rare (1%), although the mechanism allows to do so. Reaching non-binding agreements and the host’s engagement with communication are positively correlated with the probability of provision.