Nowadays as political decision making involves such a huge range of complex matters, scientific experts have become more and more involved in European risk regulation. The support by so-called independent experts may, on the one hand, be seen as a guarantee of rational decision making, increasing the quality of decisions as well as the general acceptance of all people affected. On the other hand, the number of expert groups, scientific committees and agencies helping the Commission in fulfilling its duties is vast and confusing.

In addition, scientific advisory bodies often face the burden of unrealizable independence, as well as a lack of transparency and democratic control. This article sums up the central position of science-based risk regulation within the European Union (EU), referring to the necessity for expert opinion as well as to consequent problems concerning the involvement of these experts in risk regulatory actions.

A visual display ban on tobacco products, imposed by national legislation of an EEA State, such as the one at issue in the case at hand, constitutes a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports within the meaning of Article 11 EEA if, in fact, the ban affects the marketing of products imported from other EEA States to a greater degree than that of imported products which were, until recently, produced in Norway. It is for the national court to identify the aims which the legislation at issue is actually intended to pursue and to decide whether the public health objective of reducing tobacco use by the public in general can be achieved by measures less restrictive than a visual display ban on tobacco products (author's headnote).

The centralised authorisation of GMOs in the European Union (EU) has received considerable academic attention in recent years, partly due to the fact thatMember States have not been able to agree on authorisation decisions in the comitology committee. As a consequence, these authorisations are given by the European Commission. These decisions are invariably in favour of authorisation despite the fact that Member States had been divided on this issue. Apart from the on-going discussions on a possible reform of the GMO authorisation (allowing for national restrictions or prohibitions), the new comitology rules brought about by the Lisbon Treaty are of equal importance as they might affect the authorisation of GMOs. In this article we discuss some of the changes to comitology and present empirical material on the first authorisation decisions after the entering into force of the new comitology rules. By drawing on delegation theory we will argue that, for the time being, the level of politicisation ofGMOauthorisation is unlikely to change.

Any business having experienced a product recall knows how costly this can be. Sometimes the main costs of the recall are concentrated around counteracting bad publicity, but if several or large numbers of batches are affected by the recall, the costs of the recall itself can mount up considerably.

In many large companies the overall responsibility for quality assurance and product safety is placed in a different part of the organization from the one responsible for product liability insurance and recall insurance.

As a consequence inside the organization there is not always a common understanding of what the insurance should cover and what the insurance actually does cover – or of whether and when the insurance company should become involved in the process.

In this contribution we focus on the role of experts in the assessment of tort damages from an economic point of view. We distinguish two different aspects.

First, we examine the role which economists might play in assessing damages in tort cases. This approach focuses on the insights that Law and Economics provides regarding the correct assessment of damages. We pay specific attention to two problematic forms of losses where economic insights may play an important role: pure economic loss and personal injury damage (both loss of income and compensation for immaterial losses due to fatal and non-fatal accidents).

Second, we investigate from a Law and Economics point of view the role of experts in general (not only economists) in the assessment of damages. We discuss i.a. the question why experts may be involved in the assessment of damages, the potential problems (and the possible solutions) when using experts, and differences between party appointed experts and court appointed experts.

It turns out that the economic analysis can provide a different, insightful viewpoint in some respects, such as the fact that market based mechanisms may help to provide incentives to party appointed experts to provide an accurate and objective damage assessment.

More often than not, controversy produces reform. Nowhere is this more true than in the regulations of the safe production of food. The publication of the White Paper on Food Safety in early 2000 marked the beginning of the modern era of food safety law. That paper promised enactment of a new fundamental law which ultimately became the General Food Law (178/2002). It also promised the establishment of The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). EFSA was required to be an independent point of scientific reference for the European Union. EFSA has provided that function to a very high standard for the consumers of the European Union and for all stakeholders in the food chain.

“After a reform is before another reform.” This paraphrasing of a famous saying from the world of football seems to be a very fitting way to describe the status quo of the European policy on genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

The long subtitle of this paper, appearing in the first issue of the EJRR – a publication which fills a serious gap in the scholarly literature of the old continent – identifies what I take to be the key terms of the current debate on risk regulation. It is impossible to understand the evolution of risk regulation over the last three decades in Europe and the United States without having a good grasp of how these concepts, and their corresponding practices, interact. How, for example, does a particular institutional design affect the way scientific uncertainties are resolved? What decision rules are appropriate in situations of high scientific uncertainty? Which constitutional principles facilitate policy learning and accountability in the regulation of risk?

Regulation n. 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market entered into force on 14 December 2009 and applies as of 14 June 2011, subject to some transitional measures set out in Article 80. It shall replace gradually the current legislation on plant protection products which is laid down in Council Directive 91/414/EEC and related implementing Regulations.

Broadly speaking, the harmonized authorization system for active substances used in plant protection products, as originally set out in Directive 91/414/ EEC, is maintained. Indeed, the placing on the market of plant protection products is still subject to a two-steps process whereby active substances are approved at the EU-level (with the inclusion into a “positive list” – Annex I to the new Regulation) while formulated products are authorised at the national level based on “Uniform Principles” laid down in a new implementing Regulation 546/2011. However, the criteria underlying each of these two steps have changed remarkably.