Standing determines a person's ability to obtain judicial review of a legal act by the government. Judicial review of EU measures, including risk regulatory measures, is an important device to ensure that the rule of law is respected. Even after the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, private parties still have limited standing rights under EU law to challenge EU risk regulations. While they are able to challenge “decisions” addressed to them (or, in some cases, addressed to others), they generally have been unable to claim standing at the European courts to seek review of generally binding rules. These restricted standing rights for private parties have been the subject of debate and criticism, both before and after the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty.

In Europe, debate as to whether one should regulate chemicals based on intrinsic hazard or assessment of risk, or possibly a combination of both, has been gaining momentum. This article first provides a brief history of this risk versus hazard debate. Secondly, it examines how European regulators are currently handling the regulation of two chemical compounds, namely Bisphenol A and Deca BDE (a brominated flame retardant), based on forty-five expert interviews with regulators, policy makers and industry representatives in eight Member States, as well as with European Commission officials. The paper shows that there is no clear consensus as to when risk or hazard considerations should be the basis for regulatory decision-making, with wide discrepancies between Member States (e.g. the UK is overall more risk based than Sweden) and between regulatory agencies within Member States. The penultimate section puts forward a series of recommendations to help regulators and policy makers develop more consistent and science based regulations for Europe.

Mass harm situations caused by corporate misbehaviour, defective products, harmful pharmaceuticals, accidents or environmental disasters nowadays multiply and create new challenges for legal actors and society at large. In its 2013 Recommendations, the EU Commission highlighted that ‘a key role should be given to courts in protecting the rights and interests of all the parties involved in collective redress actions as well as in managing the collective redress actions effectively’. The role of judges therefore turns out to be essential: they are expected to behave as watchdogs scrutinizing the overall admissibility of mass claims, as active case managers ensuring that cases make orderly progress, and as shepherds ensuring that all interests at stake are sufficiently protected. A key issue to be explored remains the influence of the mass context on decision-making which may potentially lead judges to depart from policy makers’ expectations. Interestingly, the mass context is nowadays an element often discarded by judges themselves. Yet, in the context of mass litigation, cases involve and consolidate in one lawsuit hundreds of represented claimants who have suffered a similar harm. The magnitude of the case - that is the number of people involved and/or the size of the loss at stake – is therefore likely to be considerable. Even though judges discuss and exchange with a limited number of protagonists during hearings – e.g. with representative bodies such as associations or leading counsels – judges must preserve the interests of absent parties. Behavioural studies have shed important light on ways groups are perceived by external observers, and on the impact of number and size on information processing. By investigating in greater details the effects associated with the case magnitude on decision-making, this paper aims at providing an alternative viewpoint on the issue of collective redress which will be of particular interest for courts and regulators at both national and European levels.

This brief opinion piece draws upon behavioural and cognitive research to argue that the Paris Agreement's goal of keeping global temperature change below 2 degrees Celsius sets a psychologically powerful baseline against which future policy failures can be measured. When international law successfully triggers perception of a baseline, it can lead decision makers to perceive deviations from that baseline as “losses.” This implicates loss aversion, which provides an additional motivation to achieve international norms. The psychological impacts of this new status quo may end up being more powerful and more durable than either the unusual structure of the document or the domestic implementation questions that have already attracted so much scholarly debate.

This piece critically analyses the development of a novel food technology: the Frankenburger, a type of cultured/in vitro meat (or ‘shmeat’, which stands for ‘sheet of meat’). It assesses the risks raised by cultured meat as well as the role it could play to alleviate environmental and food security concerns. The article argues that the current EU regulatory structures for cultured meat, and for novel foods more generally, ought to be strengthened. There is a necessity to transfer and develop food innovations in partnerships with all the relevant stakeholders (the public, scientists, the food industry, policy-makers and regulators). Including interested parties from the inception of a technology as well as within the decision-making process would provide a supporting framework for cultured meat.

Case C-19/15 Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV v Innova Vital GmbH (ECJ, 14 July 2016)

On 14 July 2016, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment on a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Article 1(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 on nutrition and health claims made on foods. The Court ruled for the first time that the Regulation applies to nutrition and health claims made in commercial communications exclusively addressed to health professionals. This represents a major breakthrough as – in a climate of uncertainty – the established industry practice was to interpret Article 1(2) in the sense that the Regulation only applied to commercial communications addressed to final consumers. From now on, food business operators will need to take further precautionary steps to ensure that any information they communicate to health professionals either qualifies as non-commercial or complies with the Regulation. The following case note analyses the content of the judgment and its main implications (authors' summary).

The novelty in Adam Burgess’ paper is that he assesses nudge policies in the context of the shift in the UK government's approach to risk from the nannying policies of Labour to the nudge policies of the Conservatives. There is a wealth of ideas in this paper. I find it useful to disentangle some of these ideas focusing on the following two questions:

1. 1. In what respects do Labour's nannying policies and the Conservatives’ nudge policies differ?

2. 2. What is problematic about Labour's nannying and the Conservatives’ nudge policies?

Subsequently I will reflect on how a particular strand of research in the social sciences can be made relevant to designing a more responsible way of dealing with societal risk and show how this approach can evade some of Burgess’ concerns.

This article aims to consider whether classic criminal offences (such as manslaughter) are adequate to reprove the scientists’ behaviour when major calamities are being judged to have caused the death of people and wide destructions. The fundamental problem hinges on the role of risk-assessment and consultancy carried out by the scientists, as well as on the unknown state of major risks. Then, to establish a link of causality between the defendants’ behaviour and the death-events affecting the victims, it must be proved that: a) the scientists “psychically” influenced the victims to leave any safety precaution in relation to the risk; b) the deaths of the inhabitants are not to be considered an “extraordinary” circumstance, even by experts. The difficulties faced by the Judge to fulfil these tasks prompt us to wonder whether other types of criminal charges would be more appropriate for sanctioning scientists who are found to be derelict in their duty of risk-assessment to authorities and citizens.

This paper argues that the EU Regulation of credit rating agencies is concurrently pursuing two objectives that conflict with and would undermine each other. One is the objective of enhancing rating accuracy, and the other is the objective of restoring market discipline in the wholesale investment markets for credit ratings as information goods. The Regulation places more emphasis on regulating for rating accuracy which has the effect of instituting a form of product regulation for credit ratings, raising the public interest profile of credit ratings. This paper argues that this is undesirable and is contrary to policy-makers’ endeavours to enhance market discipline for rating quality and the private accountability of credit rating agencies. EU policy-makers would eventually need to confront the underlying conflicting objectives in the Regulation so that a normatively coherent and consistent regulatory regime can be designed and implemented.

Cautious skepticism rather than euphoric joy surrounds the activities of the European Commission developing its new – flexible – approach towards cultivation of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). Following its announcement in the summer of 2010, new elements of the reform unravel at the beginning of 2011.

GMO regulation has experienced a rather uneasy track in the European Union. The specificity of the sector, with its economic importance, its social controversies as well as the high levels of uncertainty as to the long-term effects, have all contributed to various political and regulatory troubles in Europe and worldwide. After the revision of the first wave of regulation in 2001-2003, the de facto moratorium, and ensuing conflicts under the WTO adjudication, the situation seemed to be settling down.

How can we assess the quality of an analytical deliberative decision support procedure in environmental health practice? Objectifying quality criteria is difficult for several reasons. Opening up evaluation to a diversity of critics is one approach to take into account different actor perspectives and complexity. We describe how social scientists organized extended peer evaluation of a participatory multi-criteria procedure that was applied in Flemish environmental health practice. International peer review was combined with local extended peer evaluation. Social scientists collaborated closely with natural scientists and policy representatives in designing several evaluative activities and in interpreting the results.We discuss how these different perspectives came to reach conclusions, with a special focus on methodological decision-making. A process of learning by doing and negotiating, finding a methodological path amidst practicalities, complexity and ambition.

Although scholars have described and commented on the European New Approach to standardisation principles, they have paid much less attention to the ways in which this innovative process and its follow-on, i.e. the Global Approach, have been implemented. In many cases, this comes through the day-to-day activity of a very specific population of European experts, the notified bodies. Notified bodies, whose role it is to certify that products, for a given sector, comply with the essential safety requirements set out in the corresponding directive, originate from the Member States, but also compete against each other within a European certification market. This article examines the technical and political difficulties encountered by the Commission and the Member States in ensuring both the independence and the competences of these certifiers. It describes and questions the organisational architecture devised in response to these problems.

We deepen Adam Burgess’ insight that under current conditions nudging cannot solve complex policy problems reliably and without controversy. We do so by integrating his concerns about nudging into Braden Allenby and Daniel Sarewitz's three-leveled model of the basic problems technology can address and generate. We use this model to explain why the UK experiment with nudging has revolved around techno-fixes with limited policy potential, and conclude that nudging is best seen as an emerging form of soft law.

The General Court annuls Decision C(2004) 1614 final, in which the Commission declared that the modified exemption to the aggregates levy in Northern Ireland, as notified by the United Kingdom, fell within the scope of Article 87(1) EC [107(1) TFEU] but was compatible with the common market on the basis of Article 87(3)(c) EC [107(3)(C) TFEU] (author's headnote).

A Law on Administrative Procedure (LAP) is an essential institutional feature of democratic and effective governments. It is a general law on executive law-making, setting out how laws and regulations should be made. The need for a LAP at EU-level is growing – to counter the EU's legitimacy deficit and to make the regulatory process more predictable and robust. At the same time, the EU regulatory “machine” faces new challenges and pressures, as it seeks to implement highly complex (risk management) regulation. Greater regulatory effectiveness depends on more transparency, evidence quality standards and participation. As such, an EU LAP appears to be the natural culmination of the EU Smart Regulation agenda. Since the European Parliament in 2013 called for the Commission to adopt a LAP-related legislative proposal, the debate has gained in visibility and political salience. This article makes the case for an EU LAP for the EU institutions, citizens and businesses – provided the Law enshrines the four key principles of good administration (transparency and consistency; public participation; public record; and accountability); it establishes clear and legally binding procedural standards; and it covers as a principle also rule-making and adjudication decisions by all EU institutions and bodies involved in the preparation, adoption, implementation and repeal of secondary legislation.