Baumard et al. propose that our morality has evolved mainly through “partner choice” (and that individuals choose to avoid and not to cooperate with defectors), rather than “partner control” (with individuals retaliating and imposing costs on defectors). From this evolutionary hypothesis, a certain number of psychological predictions can be drawn, and these predictions can be compared to available psychological data. Here, we want to focus on implications of Baumard et al.'s hypothesis they do not discuss – implications regarding the role and the place of emotions in our moral lives. As emotions are closely linked with moral evaluations and play a determinant role in moral motivation, it is no surprise that a hypothesis about our moral psychology has implications for the psychology of emotions.
Given that Baumard et al. consider that morality evolved through “partner choice” rather than “partner control,” they should predict that the key role in morality (and cooperation) will be played by emotions whose action tendency is avoidance (avoid immoral cooperators), rather than by emotions whose action tendency is punishment (punish immoral cooperators). Contempt and disgust belong to the first category – they lead us to avoid certain people – whereas anger and anger-related emotions (indignation, irritation, outrage, and righteous anger) belong to the second category – they lead us to seek revenge or make the transgressor “pay” for what he did (Dubreuil Reference Dubreuil2010b). For example, studies show that, in economic games, anger and irritation are emotions that are strongly correlated with the infliction of punishment (Bosman et al. Reference Bosman, Sutter and van Winden2005; Reuben & van Winden Reference Reuben and van Winden2008; for third-party punishment, see: Fehr & Fischbacher Reference Fehr and Fischbacher2004). Questionnaire methods yield a similar result, with the emotional response of “outrage” being an excellent predictor of punishment (Darley & Pittman Reference Darley and Pittman2003). Consequently, the mutualistic hypothesis should predict that contempt and disgust play a greater role than anger-related emotions in our moral lives, particularly in the contexts of cooperation and right infringement. Is this plausible?
The first observation to make is that this prediction goes against a widespread conception of anger as the emotion that is the more directly triggered by moral and cooperation transgressions. This is how anger was understood by Aristotle (Reference Rackham1982), for example, and how it continues to be viewed in most contemporary philosophy (e.g., Roberts Reference Roberts2003, pp. 202–22). The recent protests in Spain against economic injustice and political corruption that have gathered in the “Indignant Movement” (Los indignados) – a name inspired by Stéphane Hessel's book entitled Time for Outrage! (Indignez-vous! [Reference Hessel2011]) – precisely hook on this relation between reaction to injustice and anger-related emotions.
This link between sensitivity to injustice and anger-related emotions can also be observed in laboratory settings. Rozin et al. (Reference Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt1999) have asked Japanese and American participants to associate moral violations with facial expressions typical of the emotion that would be triggered by the spectacle of such violations. For moral violations involving the infringement of other persons' rights (e.g., a person stealing a purse from a blind person or a drunk man beating his wife), anger was the most associated emotion. In line with these results, studies with economic games reveal anger and irritation to be the most reported emotions when a cooperation norm is broken (Reuben & van Winden Reference Reuben and van Winden2008).
These observations spell trouble for mutualistic anthropology, for it is hard to understand why breaches of morality and cooperation tend mainly to elicit a punitive emotion if morality evolved mainly through partner choice and not through partner control and the enforcement of social norms by punishment. Nevertheless, Baumard et al. succeeded in making room for punishment in their mutualistic anthropology: punishment, they say, is about restoring fairness. Thus, mutualistic anthropology can explain the role of anger in our moral life by making the hypothesis that anger, in its moral manifestations, has evolved to motivate us to restore fairness.
This hypothesis also leads to precise predictions: If anger is really about motivating us to restore fairness, then anger should be more concerned with the consequences of an action (i.e., whether someone's rights were infringed), than about the mental states of the agent (i.e., whether he wronged his victim accidentally or on purpose). But, once again, this prediction is at odds with empirical results. First, punishment does not vary uniquely according to the consequences of one's action and the magnitude of the wrong: though it is sensitive to consequences, it is also sensible to the agent's intentions (Cushman Reference Cushman2008; Cushman et al. Reference Cushman, Dreber, Wang and Costa2009; Falk et al. Reference Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher2003). This is consistent with most legal systems, in which punishment varies not only according to the actus reus (what the agent did), but also according to the mens rea (what the agent's intentions were). If punishment is driven by anger-related emotion, then it is plausible that anger is sensible not only to consequences, but also to the agent's intention.
Additional support for this inference can be found in Darley and Pittman (Reference Darley and Pittman2003): while keeping consequences constant, they varied the agent's intentions and found that the sentiment of “moral outrage” varied with the agent's intention. Finally, using a similar method (Cova Reference Cova2012), we gave participants scenarios that vary along two factors: intention (the agent had the intention to harm someone or not) and consequences (the action had bad consequences or not). We found that the agent's intention, but not consequences, had a significant impact on the anger people felt towards the agent. In fact, participants reported more anger (and desire to punish) about an ill-intentioned agent whose action had no consequences than about a well-intentioned agent whose action had terrible consequences. This strongly suggests that anger is more concerned with the agent's mental states than with the wrong he actually inflicted, whereas the mutualistic view of anger should predict the contrary.
To sum up, anger and anger-related emotions play a crucial role in our moral lives. The fact that these emotions are about retaliation and inflicting punishment suggests that punishment might have played a greater role in our evolutionary past than the one suggested by mutualistic anthropology.
Baumard et al. propose that our morality has evolved mainly through “partner choice” (and that individuals choose to avoid and not to cooperate with defectors), rather than “partner control” (with individuals retaliating and imposing costs on defectors). From this evolutionary hypothesis, a certain number of psychological predictions can be drawn, and these predictions can be compared to available psychological data. Here, we want to focus on implications of Baumard et al.'s hypothesis they do not discuss – implications regarding the role and the place of emotions in our moral lives. As emotions are closely linked with moral evaluations and play a determinant role in moral motivation, it is no surprise that a hypothesis about our moral psychology has implications for the psychology of emotions.
Given that Baumard et al. consider that morality evolved through “partner choice” rather than “partner control,” they should predict that the key role in morality (and cooperation) will be played by emotions whose action tendency is avoidance (avoid immoral cooperators), rather than by emotions whose action tendency is punishment (punish immoral cooperators). Contempt and disgust belong to the first category – they lead us to avoid certain people – whereas anger and anger-related emotions (indignation, irritation, outrage, and righteous anger) belong to the second category – they lead us to seek revenge or make the transgressor “pay” for what he did (Dubreuil Reference Dubreuil2010b). For example, studies show that, in economic games, anger and irritation are emotions that are strongly correlated with the infliction of punishment (Bosman et al. Reference Bosman, Sutter and van Winden2005; Reuben & van Winden Reference Reuben and van Winden2008; for third-party punishment, see: Fehr & Fischbacher Reference Fehr and Fischbacher2004). Questionnaire methods yield a similar result, with the emotional response of “outrage” being an excellent predictor of punishment (Darley & Pittman Reference Darley and Pittman2003). Consequently, the mutualistic hypothesis should predict that contempt and disgust play a greater role than anger-related emotions in our moral lives, particularly in the contexts of cooperation and right infringement. Is this plausible?
The first observation to make is that this prediction goes against a widespread conception of anger as the emotion that is the more directly triggered by moral and cooperation transgressions. This is how anger was understood by Aristotle (Reference Rackham1982), for example, and how it continues to be viewed in most contemporary philosophy (e.g., Roberts Reference Roberts2003, pp. 202–22). The recent protests in Spain against economic injustice and political corruption that have gathered in the “Indignant Movement” (Los indignados) – a name inspired by Stéphane Hessel's book entitled Time for Outrage! (Indignez-vous! [Reference Hessel2011]) – precisely hook on this relation between reaction to injustice and anger-related emotions.
This link between sensitivity to injustice and anger-related emotions can also be observed in laboratory settings. Rozin et al. (Reference Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt1999) have asked Japanese and American participants to associate moral violations with facial expressions typical of the emotion that would be triggered by the spectacle of such violations. For moral violations involving the infringement of other persons' rights (e.g., a person stealing a purse from a blind person or a drunk man beating his wife), anger was the most associated emotion. In line with these results, studies with economic games reveal anger and irritation to be the most reported emotions when a cooperation norm is broken (Reuben & van Winden Reference Reuben and van Winden2008).
These observations spell trouble for mutualistic anthropology, for it is hard to understand why breaches of morality and cooperation tend mainly to elicit a punitive emotion if morality evolved mainly through partner choice and not through partner control and the enforcement of social norms by punishment. Nevertheless, Baumard et al. succeeded in making room for punishment in their mutualistic anthropology: punishment, they say, is about restoring fairness. Thus, mutualistic anthropology can explain the role of anger in our moral life by making the hypothesis that anger, in its moral manifestations, has evolved to motivate us to restore fairness.
This hypothesis also leads to precise predictions: If anger is really about motivating us to restore fairness, then anger should be more concerned with the consequences of an action (i.e., whether someone's rights were infringed), than about the mental states of the agent (i.e., whether he wronged his victim accidentally or on purpose). But, once again, this prediction is at odds with empirical results. First, punishment does not vary uniquely according to the consequences of one's action and the magnitude of the wrong: though it is sensitive to consequences, it is also sensible to the agent's intentions (Cushman Reference Cushman2008; Cushman et al. Reference Cushman, Dreber, Wang and Costa2009; Falk et al. Reference Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher2003). This is consistent with most legal systems, in which punishment varies not only according to the actus reus (what the agent did), but also according to the mens rea (what the agent's intentions were). If punishment is driven by anger-related emotion, then it is plausible that anger is sensible not only to consequences, but also to the agent's intention.
Additional support for this inference can be found in Darley and Pittman (Reference Darley and Pittman2003): while keeping consequences constant, they varied the agent's intentions and found that the sentiment of “moral outrage” varied with the agent's intention. Finally, using a similar method (Cova Reference Cova2012), we gave participants scenarios that vary along two factors: intention (the agent had the intention to harm someone or not) and consequences (the action had bad consequences or not). We found that the agent's intention, but not consequences, had a significant impact on the anger people felt towards the agent. In fact, participants reported more anger (and desire to punish) about an ill-intentioned agent whose action had no consequences than about a well-intentioned agent whose action had terrible consequences. This strongly suggests that anger is more concerned with the agent's mental states than with the wrong he actually inflicted, whereas the mutualistic view of anger should predict the contrary.
To sum up, anger and anger-related emotions play a crucial role in our moral lives. The fact that these emotions are about retaliation and inflicting punishment suggests that punishment might have played a greater role in our evolutionary past than the one suggested by mutualistic anthropology.