Where does the “self” (φ) come from?

The begin-state φ may just as well be defined as “self.” Positive situation classification, reappraisal, and interference inhibition typically are regarded under a larger umbrella that researchers have dubbed self-regulation, a crucial factor in resilience (Hofmann et al. Reference Hofmann, Schmeichel and Baddeley2012; Lindenberg Reference Lindenberg, Wittek, Snijders and Nee2013). But the nature of this self is “obscure” and “mysterious even” (Swann & Buhrmester Reference Swann and Buhrmester2012, p. 424), and the reflection on our own experiences is even often wrong (Nisbett & Wilson Reference Nisbett and Wilson1977). What is it then that makes a begin-state φ that, in turn, influences the functionality of emotions for resilience? Humans cannot function without others, and evolution has likely “designed” humans with a biological bias to “assume that [they are] embedded within a relatively predictable social network characterized by familiarity, joint attention, and interdependence” (Beckes & Coan Reference Beckes and Coan2011, pp. 976–77).

From this standpoint, facing the world alone is more challenging than with others, and the development of self is virtually impossible without being with others. It is nearly impossible to find individuals who are simultaneously well adjusted, healthy, and socially isolated. In other words, the self, which “regulates various reactions and activities” and “experiences life and attempts to make sense of it” (Swann & Buhrmester Reference Swann and Buhrmester2012, p. 423, 424) should emerge from basic relational structures.

Extending the biosocial model: The emergence of begin-state φ

A more complex and coherent self is related to a more predictable social world, and we agree that biosocial models are vital to understand its development. Indeed, this aspect of a predictable world can be profitably unpacked in light of findings on rodents. One of the two evolutionary causes of group living in rodents is social thermoregulation, the idea that others are involved in regulating one's body temperature (Ebensberger 2001) and therefore metabolic resources (Beckes & Coan Reference Beckes and Coan2011). As others – also for humans – are crucial in regulating our energetic resources in early life (Beckes & Coan Reference Beckes and Coan2011), social thermoregulation can help us regulate energetic resources, incidentally and throughout development (Beckes et al. Reference Beckes, IJzerman and Tops2014; IJzerman et al. Reference IJzerman, Coan, Wagemans, Missler, Van Beest, Lindenberg and Tops2014a). And social thermoregulation may free energy to be dedicated to other parts of the brain. To take but one example, maternal thermoregulation in rats extends the stress hyporesponsive period, protecting the developing infant brain and allowing it to mature (Suchecki et al. Reference Suchecki, Mozaffarian, Gross, Rosenfeld and Levine1993). Social thermoregulation is a potential candidate for aiding the emergence of φ, through specific, dedicated social regulation structures.

Alienation – understanding the early social network

Some research on humans supports what we theorize above. For example, kangaroo care (keeping the infant skin-to-skin, allowing for comparable maternal thermoregulation) has been found to lead to increased executive functioning in the child (Feldman et al. Reference Feldman, Rosenthal and Eidelman2014). Further, certain types of self-control lead to alienation (i.e., a state in which the individual neglects its own needs and desires; Koole et al. Reference Koole, Tops, Strübin, Bouw, Schneider, Jostmann, Forgas and Harmon-Jones2014), which is supported by the finding that individuals from countries that are less (vs. more) socially integrated are more vulnerable to becoming alienated when they are under severe stress such as post-traumatic stress disorder (Jobson & O'Kearney Reference Jobson and O'Kearney2009). We also found that an ability that leads to better reappraisal – interoception (Carlson & Mujica-Parodi Reference Carlson and Mujica-Parodi2010; Füstös et al. Reference Füstös, Gramann, Herbert and Pollatos2013) – closely relates to social thermoregulatory processes: People's interoceptive abilities correlated significantly with the comfort they feel being touched by close others (IJzerman et al. Reference IJzerman, Häfner, Gallucci and Lindenberg2014b).

So what do we need so as to make Kalisch et al.'s model sufficiently precise for interventions? The work we cite suggests that the begin-state φ indeed emerges from its relational context and that, in turn, φ influences the role of emotions for resilience. A first – but certainly not only – take on operationalizing this begin-state φ in the model is to use attachment style as proxy for predictability in early social thermoregulation. It is well known that securely attached individuals typically cope more constructively (e.g., Mikulincer & Florian Reference Mikulincer and Florian1995; Mikulincer et al. Reference Mikulincer, Florian and Weller1993) but, crucially, also reveal greater self-complexity (Mikulincer Reference Mikulincer1995). Comparably, state predictability – like secure relationships – allows for spontaneous facial emotion regulation, such as a spontaneous smile to a partner's angry face (Häfner & IJzerman Reference Häfner and IJzerman2011). We take from this that the secure agent's emotions directly inform how the agent should act in specific social situations, allowing it to maintain its social bonds. In addition, the display of emotions of securely attached individuals may play an important role in validating others' goals, which, in turn, leads to mutual reinforcement of secure attachment (Arriaga et al. Reference Arriaga, Kumashiro, Finkel, Vander Drift and Luchies2014). We therefore propose that in such cases, not reappraising one's emotions leads to greater resilience.

The agent's begin-state φ, itself dependent on social thermoregulation, is in this way vital in determining whether the agent's emotional state is likely to inform or distract the agent. We think therefore that, paradoxically, intervening in the secure agent's emotional life leads to its alienation, potentially causing worse resilience, greater stress, and poorer health instead.