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The value of “negative” appraisals for resilience. Is positive (re)appraisal always good and negative always bad?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2015

Alexandra M. Freund
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and University Research Priority Program Dynamics of Healthy Aging, University of Zurich, 8050 Zurich, Switzerlandfreund@psychologie.uzh.chhttp://www.psychologie.uzh.ch/fachrichtungen/lifespan/team/freund_en.html
Ursula M. Staudinger
Affiliation:
Columbia Aging Center, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, New York, NY 10032. ums2103@cumc.columbia.eduhttp://www.mailman.columbia.edu/our-faculty/profile?uni=ums2103

Abstract

In contrast to the PASTOR model by Kalisch et al. we point to the potential negative long-term effects of positive (re)appraisals of events for resilience. This perspective posits that emotional reactions to events provide important guidelines as to which events, environments, or social relations should be sought out and which ones should be avoided in the future.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

There is no doubt that positive (re)appraisals of negative events can contribute to a person's affective and subjective well-being. The PASTOR model proposed by Kalisch et al. elaborates the central role of such positive (re)appraisals for understanding the processes contributing to resilience in the face of stressors and adversities. Although we agree with the main tenets of this model, we believe that this perspective overlooks the potentially negative effects of positive (re)appraisals as well as the potentially positive effects of negative appraisals of a given event or situation with regard to functional outcomes such as mental health. In contrast to Kalisch and colleagues, we maintain that emotional reactions to events provide important information as to which events, environments, or social relations should be sought out and, importantly, which ones should be avoided.

The question of the optimal margin of positive illusions – in the context of the present paper, you may say of positive (re)appraisals – is not new, with some of it dating back to a heated debate in the late 1980s and early 1990s conducted by Taylor and Block (Colvin & Block Reference Colvin and Block1994; Taylor & Brown Reference Taylor and Brown1988; see also Baumeister Reference Baumeister1989). Too much realism is related to depression (Alloy & Abramson Reference Alloy and Abramson1987), but too many illusions are linked with a loss of motivation (e.g., Colvin & Block Reference Colvin and Block1994). Not surprisingly, it has not been possible to define or quantify where exactly the optimal margin between realistic and overly positive appraisals of an event lie. Also, it is still unclear: Is the relationship linear between positive (re)appraisals of negative events and short-term as well as long-term well-being and mental health? Or – more likely – is the relationship more complex, such that the association is linear up to a certain level of positive reappraisal, beyond which people fall out of touch with a given negative reality, which is then indicative of a delusion rather than an illusion?

Furthermore, it also may be useful to consider that different types of outcomes can be at stake when it comes to reappraisal. One distinction proposed by Staudinger (Staudinger & Kessler Reference Staudinger, Kessler, Smith and DeFrates-Densch2009) is between adjustment (i.e., fending off negative effects of negative events in order to regain or maintain subjective well-being) and growth (i.e., facing the negative and thereby being able to learn from negative events and gaining life-insight). In their lifespan model of resilience, Staudinger and colleagues define resilience, in the sense of adjustment, as one kind of developmental plasticity and distinguish it from growth as another kind of plasticity (Greve & Staudinger Reference Greve, Staudinger, Cicchetti and Cohen2006; Staudinger et al. Reference Staudinger, Marsiske, Baltes, Cicchetti and Cohen1995). This definition of resilience is akin to the biological notions of homeostasis and allostasis. According to McEwen and Wingfield (Reference McEwen, Wingfield and Fink2007), allostasis refers to the active process of achieving stability through change when faced with events that challenge the basic maintenance of functioning (i.e., homeostasis). Both concepts, homeostasis and allostasis, include the possibility of changing the functional set-points in order to adapt optimally to a changing environment. In this way, resilience can be considered as the basis for growth, including the setting of future goals that motivate behavior to change oneself and/or the environment in a way that promotes optimal development or even progress toward wisdom (Freund Reference Freund2008; Staudinger & Kessler Reference Staudinger, Kessler, Smith and DeFrates-Densch2009).

Continuous positive reinterpretation of negative events might help a person to feel better, but also jeopardizes the veridicality of judgment. In other words, appraising challenging or threatening events as such (i.e., in a “negative” or realistic way) may be experienced as aversive but motivate a person to actively change the aspects of the situation/event or to acquire resources that will help him or her adapt successfully to the situation/event (Carver & Scheier Reference Carver and Scheier1998). Imagine a person who does not acknowledge the negative information of having been diagnosed with a malignant form of cancer. Exclusively appraising this situation as positive (e.g., as a message that highlights the value of life and to enjoy every moment of it), rather than also acknowledging that certain steps, even though aversive (e.g., undergoing chemotherapy), will have to be taken to cope with the life-threatening situation, might drastically shorten the person's chances of actually beating the cancer. Or imagine (re)appraising the negative critique of your behavior by your partner as an expression of his or her insecurity, rather than facing the negative critique. The latter will motivate you to work toward changing your behavior that causes the partnership problems. In contrast, the former might upregulate your positive emotions and downregulate your negative emotions in the short run, but jeopardize the goal of maintaining a good relationship with your partner in the long run. In other words, resilience defined as the ability to maintain well-being and mental health in the face of daily hassles as well as more dramatic negative events might require acknowledging the negative in order to stay tuned with reality and change one's behavior or the environment if necessary.

This view is consistent with the notion that emotional reactions, and in particular negative ones, serve as information that something in the person-situation-interaction requires to be changed (e.g., Clore & Storbeck Reference Clore, Storbeck and Forgas2006). Just appraising negative events differently (i.e., positive reframing) might in fact prevent such more active ways to change the situation or to acquire new resources or to extend one's behavioral repertoire in order to achieve a better person–environment fit.

Taken together, resilience defined as adjustment to negative events and resulting in stable mental health is likely to profit from positive reappraisals that help to maintain positive well-being, as assumed in the PASTOR model put forth by Kalisch and colleagues. We posit, however, that facing the negative – and, as a consequence, experiencing negative emotions – lies at the heart of the ability to adapt flexibly to one's environment, and thereby, to change oneself or one's environment in a way that promotes long-term resilience and serves as the basis for personal growth.

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