In questioning the widespread assumption that individuals with autism are not interested in others as social beings, Jaswal & Akhtar (J&A) open the door to inspecting similar assumptions that lurk in psychological characterizations of other groups, including the young, the shy, bystanders, and those with disorders such as Parkinson's disease. Indeed, J&A's thesis points to the hazards of complacently defaulting to assumptions about either motivation or capacity in the absence of apposite evidence. Rigorous scrutiny of unexamined assumptions, as demonstrated by these authors, has the potential to illuminate other psychological phenomena and, in doing so, uncover additional methodologies for examining the social uninterest hypothesis with respect to autism.
J&A focus on a perpetual challenge for psychologists, that of determining whether a difference or putative deficit in behavior stems from lack of capacity (knowledge, skill, motor ability, etc.) or motivation. Their argument that autism research slants toward an assumption of social uninterest intriguingly hints that assumptions regarding the relative primacy of motivation or capacity may color perceptions of a group, even in the absence of germane evidence. The tendency to assume (here, about autism) a motivation deficit consistent with behaviors that merely fail to reflect interest constitutes an unexamined inference, an infelicity that likely infects literatures beyond that on autism.
It is tempting to speculate, from J&A's comparisons of typical and atypical populations, that unexamined assumptions arise from essentialist tendencies (e.g., Gelman Reference Gelman2003; Medin & Ortony Reference Medin, Ortony, Vosniadou and Ortony1989). The assumption of a social interest deficit in individuals with autism is consistent with behavior such as reduced eye contact. Yet the assumption is not made about children in some cultures where eye contact is considered rude or in non-autistic adults engaged in difficult problem solving who exhibit the same behavior; instead, this behavior is viewed as adaptive to culture or to cognitive overload (J&A, sect. 2.1, paras. 2–4). Perhaps a motivation deficit is assumed when we believe the individual has a disorder (e.g., “that's not what people with autism care about”) but a capacity deficit is assumed when the individual is young and developing typically (“that's not something young children know about yet”). The former accords with our conception of disorder, the latter with a conception of typical development that assumes cognitive advances. In their analysis, J&A provide an instructive example of how research literatures may lean, without warrant but perhaps with some predictability, on unexamined placeholder assumptions.
J&A's articulation of motivational and capacity influences may be usefully extended to characterizing behavioral variations in typically developing children. Researchers who investigate developing theory of mind have long debated the significance of young children's failure to predict an actor's search for a desired object when the actor is shown to have a false belief about the object's location (e.g., Fabricius & Khalil Reference Fabricius and Khalil2003), suggesting that young children may be primarily motivated by irrelevant factors such as object salience. Yet such characterizations dismiss too hastily children's interest in others’ beliefs. We found that, when asked for explanations of actions, even 3-year-olds invoked beliefs in accounting for incorrect search (“he thinks it's there”), suggestive of some understanding of, as well as interest in, others’ beliefs (Bartsch & Wellman Reference Bartsch and Wellman1989). Young children who failed false belief prediction tasks also mentioned false beliefs – eventually – when asked repeatedly to explain actions based on false beliefs (e.g., running toward an attractive apple while unaware that the apple is made of wood), first invoking desires (e.g., “she likes apples”) and finally offering explanations such as “she thinks it's real” (Bartsch et al. Reference Bartsch, Campbell and Troseth2007). Like J&A, we found that verbal accounts (i.e., testimony) revealed important information bearing on both cognitive and motivational influences.
Understanding young children's behaviors as they relate to moral, as well as mental, aspects of other people similarly requires careful inspection of motivational and capacity factors. Researchers have long pondered whether young children's relatively selfish, sometimes callous, behavior results from lack of empathy or lack of understanding (e.g., Eisenberg Reference Eisenberg2000). An attractive placeholder assumption is that young children cannot take others’ perspectives, a view that figures substantially in theories of moral development (e.g., Hoffman Reference Hoffman2000). Literature on children's prosocial behavior abounds with efforts to untangle motivational and social competence factors (e.g., Eisenberg et al. Reference Eisenberg, Spinrad, Morris, Killen and Smetana2014). The value of investigating such factors independently is illustrated by research suggesting that even infants prefer helpers to hinderers, as indicated by their choosing to touch actors shown to assist, rather than impede, another's attempt to reach a destination (Hamlin & Wynn Reference Hamlin and Wynn2011). Such evidence of preferences relevant to moral sensitivities and motivations constitutes an unexpected complement to abundant evidence documenting cognitive deficits related to moral or prosocial behavior, cautioning against complacent assumptions about either motivation or capacity.
Application of J&A's deep analysis to a broader range of psychological phenomena may also uncover methodologies to further explore “social uninterest” with respect to autism. Elicited testimony is but one example of a method that reveals unexpected engagement in both autistic individuals and young typically developing children, providing data that counter a broad “social uninterest” assumption. This approach has also proved useful in sorting out the roles of emotion and reasoning in older individuals as well, as in Dahl et al.’s (Reference Dahl, Gingo, Uttich and Turiel2018) studies of adolescent and adult moral judgment. Perhaps elicited testimony could be used to understand young children's experience of empathy even when behavior appears callous. Conversely, approaches for parsing motivational and capacity influences in studies of typical development may prove useful in exploring social interest in individuals with autism. Even the infancy methods for detecting preferences for helpers or hinderers (e.g., Hamlin & Wynn Reference Hamlin and Wynn2011) may suggest some similar behavioral measure for assessing social interest in older individuals with (or without) autism. Though motivational and capacity influences will always be conjoined in behavior, each is worthy of thorough scrutiny, and employing methods used with different populations may advance this aim.
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In questioning the widespread assumption that individuals with autism are not interested in others as social beings, Jaswal & Akhtar (J&A) open the door to inspecting similar assumptions that lurk in psychological characterizations of other groups, including the young, the shy, bystanders, and those with disorders such as Parkinson's disease. Indeed, J&A's thesis points to the hazards of complacently defaulting to assumptions about either motivation or capacity in the absence of apposite evidence. Rigorous scrutiny of unexamined assumptions, as demonstrated by these authors, has the potential to illuminate other psychological phenomena and, in doing so, uncover additional methodologies for examining the social uninterest hypothesis with respect to autism.
J&A focus on a perpetual challenge for psychologists, that of determining whether a difference or putative deficit in behavior stems from lack of capacity (knowledge, skill, motor ability, etc.) or motivation. Their argument that autism research slants toward an assumption of social uninterest intriguingly hints that assumptions regarding the relative primacy of motivation or capacity may color perceptions of a group, even in the absence of germane evidence. The tendency to assume (here, about autism) a motivation deficit consistent with behaviors that merely fail to reflect interest constitutes an unexamined inference, an infelicity that likely infects literatures beyond that on autism.
It is tempting to speculate, from J&A's comparisons of typical and atypical populations, that unexamined assumptions arise from essentialist tendencies (e.g., Gelman Reference Gelman2003; Medin & Ortony Reference Medin, Ortony, Vosniadou and Ortony1989). The assumption of a social interest deficit in individuals with autism is consistent with behavior such as reduced eye contact. Yet the assumption is not made about children in some cultures where eye contact is considered rude or in non-autistic adults engaged in difficult problem solving who exhibit the same behavior; instead, this behavior is viewed as adaptive to culture or to cognitive overload (J&A, sect. 2.1, paras. 2–4). Perhaps a motivation deficit is assumed when we believe the individual has a disorder (e.g., “that's not what people with autism care about”) but a capacity deficit is assumed when the individual is young and developing typically (“that's not something young children know about yet”). The former accords with our conception of disorder, the latter with a conception of typical development that assumes cognitive advances. In their analysis, J&A provide an instructive example of how research literatures may lean, without warrant but perhaps with some predictability, on unexamined placeholder assumptions.
J&A's articulation of motivational and capacity influences may be usefully extended to characterizing behavioral variations in typically developing children. Researchers who investigate developing theory of mind have long debated the significance of young children's failure to predict an actor's search for a desired object when the actor is shown to have a false belief about the object's location (e.g., Fabricius & Khalil Reference Fabricius and Khalil2003), suggesting that young children may be primarily motivated by irrelevant factors such as object salience. Yet such characterizations dismiss too hastily children's interest in others’ beliefs. We found that, when asked for explanations of actions, even 3-year-olds invoked beliefs in accounting for incorrect search (“he thinks it's there”), suggestive of some understanding of, as well as interest in, others’ beliefs (Bartsch & Wellman Reference Bartsch and Wellman1989). Young children who failed false belief prediction tasks also mentioned false beliefs – eventually – when asked repeatedly to explain actions based on false beliefs (e.g., running toward an attractive apple while unaware that the apple is made of wood), first invoking desires (e.g., “she likes apples”) and finally offering explanations such as “she thinks it's real” (Bartsch et al. Reference Bartsch, Campbell and Troseth2007). Like J&A, we found that verbal accounts (i.e., testimony) revealed important information bearing on both cognitive and motivational influences.
Understanding young children's behaviors as they relate to moral, as well as mental, aspects of other people similarly requires careful inspection of motivational and capacity factors. Researchers have long pondered whether young children's relatively selfish, sometimes callous, behavior results from lack of empathy or lack of understanding (e.g., Eisenberg Reference Eisenberg2000). An attractive placeholder assumption is that young children cannot take others’ perspectives, a view that figures substantially in theories of moral development (e.g., Hoffman Reference Hoffman2000). Literature on children's prosocial behavior abounds with efforts to untangle motivational and social competence factors (e.g., Eisenberg et al. Reference Eisenberg, Spinrad, Morris, Killen and Smetana2014). The value of investigating such factors independently is illustrated by research suggesting that even infants prefer helpers to hinderers, as indicated by their choosing to touch actors shown to assist, rather than impede, another's attempt to reach a destination (Hamlin & Wynn Reference Hamlin and Wynn2011). Such evidence of preferences relevant to moral sensitivities and motivations constitutes an unexpected complement to abundant evidence documenting cognitive deficits related to moral or prosocial behavior, cautioning against complacent assumptions about either motivation or capacity.
Application of J&A's deep analysis to a broader range of psychological phenomena may also uncover methodologies to further explore “social uninterest” with respect to autism. Elicited testimony is but one example of a method that reveals unexpected engagement in both autistic individuals and young typically developing children, providing data that counter a broad “social uninterest” assumption. This approach has also proved useful in sorting out the roles of emotion and reasoning in older individuals as well, as in Dahl et al.’s (Reference Dahl, Gingo, Uttich and Turiel2018) studies of adolescent and adult moral judgment. Perhaps elicited testimony could be used to understand young children's experience of empathy even when behavior appears callous. Conversely, approaches for parsing motivational and capacity influences in studies of typical development may prove useful in exploring social interest in individuals with autism. Even the infancy methods for detecting preferences for helpers or hinderers (e.g., Hamlin & Wynn Reference Hamlin and Wynn2011) may suggest some similar behavioral measure for assessing social interest in older individuals with (or without) autism. Though motivational and capacity influences will always be conjoined in behavior, each is worthy of thorough scrutiny, and employing methods used with different populations may advance this aim.